Public Attitudes to Regional Integration in Atlantic Latin America

Mark Aspinwall

This chapter looks at the causes of individual attitudes to regional integration in Latin America. Many scholars have considered how individuals perceive European integration, and some others have examined the attitudes of Latin Americans and US citizens to free trade and regionalism. But few have applied the lessons from Europe to Latin American states to identify the structure of attitudes there. A better understanding of how citizens in Latin America perceive regional integration is important, and especially a clearer understanding of what structures their attitudes—whether it is material incentives, ideology and party identification, education levels, or something else.

The results of this study will help us better understand public attitudes in Latin America, and it will help close some of the gaps in understanding across the Atlantic region. While we know a great deal about the structure of public attitudes in Europe toward European integration, the same is not true of Latin America. In Europe, integration is perceived by citizens not simply as a means to create (or destroy) economic opportunities—a material rationale—but is also seen as a means by which the dominant cultural identity may be weakened by outsiders who gain access through free movement rules. It is also seen as a means to control domestic politicians, prevent backsliding on reforms and ideally to control corruption. Whether those same perceptions are present in Latin American attitudes to regional integration is the aim of this study. Do residents of Latin American countries see regional integration in the same way as their counterparts around the Atlantic Basin? Are there patterns in their support for regional agreements?

Attitudes to regional integration

EU studies mainly look at attitudes to European integration and the EU, whereas due to lack of data there is less work on Latin American attitudes to regional integration (but see Seligson 1999; Maldonado and Marin 2018;

Davis et al 1998; Merolla et al 2005; Deutschmann and Minkus 2018). These studies often do not seek to explain support for a particular regional agreement, but rather support for the more abstract notion of regional integration.

In Europe, anti-European Union attitudes are not necessarily explained by opposition to free trade, although some findings have highlighted the importance of material considerations (such as occupation). Other studies suggest that ideology or party support (political cues), and education are more important than material considerations.

In one of the earliest studies seeking to understand support for European integration, Matthew Gabel found strong support for utilitarian explanation of public attitudes to European integration (Gabel 1998). Public support in original member states was more likely to be influenced by political values and cognitive mobilization, while in newer member states attitudes were more shaped by elite actions and utilitarian concerns. There was also some evidence that support for the government predicts support for integration in a positive way.

In an important and widely cited study, Hooghe and Marks (2005) found that community identity was a stronger predictor of support for European integration than a utilitarian calculus. In other words, where citizens saw themselves as having an exclusively national identity, they tended to be more anti-EU. Also, where political elites were divided about European integration, citizens tended to be more negative toward it, especially among those individuals who see their identity as exclusively national.

Other work shows that educational levels have mixed effects on support for integration. Hakhverdian et al (2013) show that the impact of educational levels on support for European integration has become stronger, probably because of a deepening cleavage between the winners and losers of globalization. Human capital, convertible skills, networking, mobility, and related factors lead to utilitarian variation. These skills and attributes are affected by education. Educational attainment and Euroscepticism are negatively correlated, but educational attainment interacts with utilitarian considerations, political cues, and identity.

They delineate between an earlier research tradition that identified utilitarian explanations for anti-Europeanism, and later ones that see identity, cultural and national attachments, political parties, the media, and other domestic factors as important. Cuing by media and political parties plays a role in support for European integration, but cue influence declines as

education increases. Identity is affected by perceptions of cultural and sovereignty threats. Nationalism and cultural intolerance predict Euro-scepticism, but Euro-scepticism is predicted by education levels as well. These relationships are established in the literature, but they find that the gaps have become more pronounced over time, particularly since the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. This is because the salience and reach of the EU have increased.

Yet other work indicates that economic ideology interacts with local economic conditions. Garry and Tilley (2015) show that EU citizens are affected by both economic ideology and the context of their national political economy. Those who are leftist and live in member states with high income inequality and low state ownership are supportive of European integration, while those on the left who live in member states with low income inequality and high state ownership are more sceptical. This is because of anticipated economic effects of European integration in comparison with pre-existing national conditions.

A number of recent studies have shed some light on how citizens of Eastern and Central Europeans countries view European integration. This is pertinent because their lower income levels make them somewhat comparable with Latin American states themselves engaged with questions of regional integration. In some cases, public attitudes were closely connected to perceptions of material gain. Jackson et al (2011), for example, showed that positive attitudes toward the EU among Poles before and after entry in 2004 were related to the size of EU transfers and gains in personal income. Poles viewed the EU in instrumental terms. Herzog and Tucker (2010) show that economic winners in Eastern and Central Europe were consistently more likely to support EU membership than economic losers over the 1991-2003 period, and that this relationship strengthened as membership became more likely. This relationship was also found by Tucker et al (2002): economic winners in Eastern and Central Europe are more likely to support membership, as are those who support the free market. The rationale is that EU membership serves to prevent backsliding on economic reforms by these countries.

On the other hand, some research indicated that citizens in applicant member states had already (during the period before entry) assimilated the European issue into the Left-Right ideology dynamic and into the identity dynamic, much as had occurred in older member states. Cichowski (2000) found that attitudes about joining the EU in applicant countries was most strongly predicted by individuals' attitudes toward democracy and

capitalism, and also by individuals' political partisanship. Thus, utilitarian explanations understood as sector-specific benefits are less predictive in these cases.

Elgün and Tillman (2007) found that public support for EU membership in Eastern and Central European applicant states depends on attitudes toward national politics and social identity (ie, respondents' beliefs about cultural threats). Also, the educational level of citizens affects their attitudes, depending on how much exposure citizens have to the impacts of integration. The more exposure they have, the more important the 'human capital' variable as a predictor of support. They argue that utilitarian attitudes depend on exposure to integration effects and educational experience. Finally, attitudes to the EU in Romania are affected by views of domestic political problems, such as corruption, and perceptions that the EU can improve local governance and reduce corruption by monitoring national politics.

Where does this brief review of findings leave us?

Essentially, it leaves us with a mixed picture in terms of predicting what might cause support for regionalism in the Atlantic states of Latin America. It could well be that non-economic and non-cultural factors drive and structure attitudes—including exposure to the outside world in general, and individuals' attitudes to immigrants and national pride. On the other hand, citizens may perceive regional integration in purely material terms—how much have they benefited from participation in the regional organization? In the next section I set out several hypotheses based on the brief review of literature above. In the section that follows I test these hypotheses using the LAYEM datasets. And in a final section I conclude.

Hypotheses

Drawing from this work to deduce plausible causal relationships, I hypothesize that attitudes toward regional agreements will be structured by several material, ideational, cognitive, or identity variables, including education, income levels, attitudes to globalization, national identity, ideology, and contact with the outside world (such as travel, remittances, living outside, and presence of foreigners in the country).

The dependent variable is attitudes toward regional integration of which their country is part, which means NAFTA in the case of Mexico, and MERCOSUL in the case of Brazil and Argentina. For Colombia, I

test explanations of the US-Colombia preferential trade agreement (which came into effect in 2012), and separately, explanations of MERCOSUL, of which Colombia is an associate member.

I hypothesize that attitudes to these regional accords is explained by:

- *Income levels*. Higher income levels are likely to be associated with higher support for regional agreements because higher-income citizens are more likely to be engaged in international economic activity.

- *Exposure to international economic effects*. Receipt of remittances or time spent in other countries will be associated with higher support for regional trade agreements because of the positive economic connotations of international economic activity. Exposure to foreigners within the country will be associated with lower levels of support for regional agreements because of the competition effect felt by domestic workers.

- *Education*. Those with higher levels of education will be more supportive of regional agreements because their economic opportunities and/or cultural awareness will be higher.

- *Ideology*. Those whose self-placement in ideological space is more to the Right will be more in favor of regional agreements because their ideological worldview accords more closely with liberal trade accords. Those whose self-placement in ideological space is more to the Center in Left-Right space will be more in favor of regional agreements because (following findings in Europe), they are less likely to oppose liberal trade accords for either nationalist reasons (Right) or economic outcomes reasons (Left).

- *Attitudes to economic globalization*. Those who favor economic globalization will also favor regional agreements because of the role the latter play in fostering economic openness.

- *Identity*. Those who hold attitudes of national pride will be less supportive of regional agreements because the agreements are likely to erode national economic protections or permit the entry of foreign influences, such as products, services, practices, customs or ideas.

Data and methodology

I use data from the 2014 wave of the biennial Las Americas y el Mundo (LAYEM) survey for Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina. These sur-

veys question citizens in numerous Latin American countries about their attitudes to the outside world. I employ simple linear regressions and two logistic models to determine causal probabilities between variables. I used the linear regressions to determine support for MERCOSUL and NAFTA (which are on a 0 to 100 scale) and the logistic models to assess the likelihood of answering that either Colombia or the US benefited most from the free trade agreement between the two countries. The questionnaire used in the LAYEM polls asked a variety of questions about individual attitudes. Some of the responses were on a 0 to 100 scale, while others were on 4-point Likert scales, or were categorical yes or no responses. This required adjustment of the datasets by converting all values of the variables to standard deviation units so the coefficients would be comparable.

Models were constructed in the following manner. First, I test several control variables (gender, household income, education) along with ideology against the dependent variable. Ideology is tested in two ways: first, I look at the effect of self-placement in Left-Right space, to see if more Right-leaning respondents are more positive about regional agreement; second, I look at the effect of distance from the ideological center (extremism), to see if those whose ideologies are more extreme are less likely to support regional agreements.

After these initial tests, I then add a variable to measure the impact of travel abroad on attitudes to regional agreements. The presumed relationship is that more travel abroad will lead to more positive attitudes to regional agreements. I also add a variable on remittances to determine whether this has an impact on attitudes to regional agreements. Here the relationship is also assumed to be positive, given the possibility of more opportunities for regional workers and the material benefits that flow.

Next, I add a variable to measure the impact of national pride on attitudes to regional agreements. Again, the hypothesized relationship is that higher levels of national pride will lead to lower levels of support for regionalism, given the likely foreign influences that flow from membership of regional organizations. Finally, I add a variable on attitudes to economic globalization to ascertain how these attitudes may affect views about regional agreements. Obviously, the more positively an individual views economic globalization, the more positively I expect her to view regional agreements.

I used the Akaike Information Criterion to evaluate model fit of different models using the same data sets. The AIC estimates the information lost in

each model and therefore its outcomes most be interpreted as the lower the number, the better the model (Akaike 1987). For all cases analyzed here, the model with the best AIC score was the one including all variables except one where it scored the second best (Mexico 2014). This result allows us to rely on the interpretation of the models including all variables of the four categories (sociodemographic, exposure, nationalism and attitudes toward globalization).

Results

The results for Argentina indicate that in most respects, attitudes to regional integration are structured differently than in Europe. Neither household income, nor education, nor Left-Right ideological position have an impact on attitudes toward MERCOSUL. However, when the Left-Right spatial position is converted to distance from the Center, the relationship *is* significant at the 0.05 level (See Appendices for all results). As individuals' ideological views move farther Left *and* Right, they become more opposed to MERCOSUL. The effect is very strong—even just slight movements away from the Center have a large effect on attitudes to MERCOSUL. This is consistent with some findings in Europe (Aspinwall 2002) and is explained by reference to the economic nationalism of the Left (preserve state choice on economic matters) and the cultural nationalism of the Right (exclude the foreigner).

Travel abroad is a not significant explanatory variable. Interestingly, though national pride is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, it is in the opposite direction expected—that is, the more important a person feels that pride in Argentina is, the more supportive of MERCOSUL she is. This is the opposite of Europe, where national identity is associated with anti-regional integration views. At the same time, addition of these two variables strengthens the explanatory power of ideological extremism. In other words, controlling for gender, education, household income, travel abroad, and national pride—ideological extremism remains a statistically significant explanation of support for MERCOSUL.

A final independent variable, support for economic globalization, also fails to explain support for MERCOSUL. In this full model, ideological extremism washes out as an explanatory variable, but position toward the Right of the ideological spectrum does become a predictor of MERCOSUL support (significant at the 0.1 level), and with a large effect. Men were also more supportive of MERCOSUL in this model, but it is the only model in

the entire study in which gender made a statistically-significant difference in terms of support for regional agreements.

In conclusion results from 2014 attitudes in Argentina suggest that support for regionalism is not structured in the same way as in Europe. Explanatory variables found in Europe largely fail to predict MERCOSUL attitudes, with the exception of ideological extremism (and in one model, Right ideology).

In Brazil the results are very different. In all but one model, ideology is not associated at all with MERCOSUL support. In the simplest sociodemographic model, household income and education are highly significant and have a large impact on attitudes to regionalism. The higher the household income and the more education, the more positive are people's views toward MERCOSUL.

In a second model, exposure to international influences also contributes explanatory power. In this case, 'exposure to international influences' is measured both by travel abroad and by receipt of remittances. The remittances variable has no impact at all, but oddly, travel abroad is negatively associated with MERCOSUL support—the more a person travels outside Brazil, the less they support MERCOSUL. Education and income remain significant explanations too. In addition, position to the Right on the Left-Right spectrum is associated with support for MERCOSUL. This contrasts with Argentina, where closeness to the ideological Center is what predicted support for MERCOSUL.

The third model considers the impact of attitudes to foreigners living in Brazil and national pride. Neither are significant explanatory variables. However, in the variant which measures Left-Right placement (as opposed to ideological extremism), four variables are significant predictors of support for MERCOSUL—higher income, more education, ideologically Right positioning, and less travel abroad. Finally, in a fourth model, I add in attitudes to foreign trade and economic globalization. Neither help predict regionalism support. In fact, in this model, all variables lose explanatory power.

In sum, explanations for MERCOSUL attitudes are very different in Brazil than in Argentina. Material and cognitive explanations work best, along with foreign travel (though the latter in the opposite direction predicted).

For Colombia, I review the results for attitudes to MERCOSUL first, then look at attitudes toward the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. Attitudes to MERCOSUL are similar to what was found in Argentina. Gender, income and education do not predict MERCOSUL positions, nor does Left-Right ideology. However, in the initial model, extremism does predict support for MERCOSUL, in the direction anticipated—that is, less centrist respondents are more opposed to the regional agreement.

Adding travel abroad and receipt of remittances in the second model does not improve predictability. Neither are statistically significant predictors. However, national pride is associated with more pro-MERCOSUL opinion, as with Argentina. Attitudes to foreigners in Colombia is also statistically insignificant as a predictor, though in this third model, extremism and national pride are significant and have powerful effects.

In the fourth model, I add attitudes to economic globalization and to free trade as variables. Both economic globalization and free trade are significant and strong predictors of MERCOSUL opinion, and the relationships are positive. Ideological extremism in this model remains a significant and strong predictor of MERCOSUL opinion in a negative direction.

In conclusion, like Argentina, closeness to the ideological center helps us understand why Colombians support MERCOSUL. Moreover, national pride is positively associated with MERCOSUL support in some models, and so is attitude to economic globalization and free trade. The latter, unsurprisingly, are positively associated with support for the regional agreement.

Interestingly, attitudes toward the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement are structured differently. Those with higher levels of education are most likely to believe that the *US benefitted* more than Colombia from the Agreement, and the relationship is highly significant in all models. On the other hand, ideological position is not associated with preferences on the Agreement. In fact, the only other variables that explain attitudes to the Agreement are national pride (negatively associated and significant at the 0.01 level in the full model) and opinion on economic globalization (negatively associated and significant at the 0.001 level). What this means is that those who feel national pride and those who support economic globalization do not believe that the United States benefitted most from the trade accord with the United States.

Turning this analysis around, I next examined the probability of answering that *Colombia benefitted* more from the Agreement. In this analysis, ed-

ucation is also highly significant, and is negatively associated with beliefs that Colombia benefitted more. Ideological extremism is also negatively associated with this dependent variable. Ideological extremists (Left and Right) do not believe that Colombia benefitted most from the Agreement, as per my earlier hypothesis. Finally, national pride, positive opinion on economic globalization, and positive opinion on free trade are all statistically significant predictors of beliefs that Colombia benefitted more from the Agreement.

The case of Mexico presents very interesting findings, some consistent with the other countries in this study, and others at odds with them. For Mexico, the dependent variable is attitudes toward NAFTA.

In the initial model, household income and position in Left-Right space are both highly significant and strong influences on personal attitudes about NAFTA. Like with Brazil, higher income in Mexico translates to more support for regionalism. And like with Argentina and Colombia, ideology is strongly associated with support for NAFTA, though in the Mexican case, it is not distance from the ideological Center that matters. Instead, support for NAFTA increases as ideology moves to the Right. Education is significant, but interestingly the relationship is *negative*. The more education one has, the less supportive of NAFTA.

In model 2, adding variables related to foreign exposure (travel abroad and receipt of remittances) does nothing to improve predictability. In fact, controlling for foreign exposure, both income and Right ideology remain highly significant and positively associated with NAFTA support. Education is also significant (though less so), and negatively correlated.

Model 3 looks at the effect of attitudes to immigrants in Mexico and at the effect of national pride. Positive attitudes to immigrants increase support for NAFTA, and education, income, and right ideology also still matter. In fact, ideological positioning to the right is the most powerful predictor in this model. In another version of this model, attitudes to foreigners in Mexico also positively predicts NAFTA support, as does national pride.

Finally, in a fourth model I add two variables measuring attitudes to economic openness. They are economic globalization and free trade. Free trade is insignificant, but views on economic globalization are strong predictors of attitudes to NAFTA. Not surprisingly, the more favourable someone is to economic globalization, the more they support NAFTA.

The Mexican case coincides with findings in some of the other countries. Favourable attitudes to the outside world and to national pride are positively associated with NAFTA attitudes. Material considerations matter—the more income someone has, they more favourably inclined toward NAFTA. On the other hand, Mexico presents a curious picture with regard to education, in that it is the less educated who are more favourable toward NAFTA, possibly because NAFTA benefitted relatively low-skill manufacturing in Mexico. Likewise, Mexico is an outlier on the relationship between ideology and integration. While Argentina and Colombia data suggest that ideological centrism predicts regionalism support, for Mexico it is Right ideology.

Discussion and conclusion

Returning to our hypotheses, those which predicted a material influence on support for regional integration had mixed results. In Brazil and Mexico, income matters, in the expected direction—those with more of it are more supportive of regional integration. In Argentina and Colombia, income did not matter. However, attitudes to economic globalization did matter (in Colombia and Mexico, but not Argentina or Brazil). So material incentives are only partly explanatory.

The analysis of ideological effects reveals some similarities to Europe in that non-Centrist respondents are less supportive of regionalism in Argentina and Colombia (but not in Brazil or Mexico). In Mexico, those to the Right were more supportive of NAFTA, confirming that hypothesis, but in Brazil there was no real ideological effect.

National pride—my proxy for identity—is positively associated with support for regionalism in all countries except Brazil, disconfirming hypothesis 6 and contrary to findings in Europe. Latin Americans apparently see no conflict between positive attitudes to their own country, and support for regionalism. This suggests a positive sum perspective on the national and regional questions.

Cognitive variation does provide an explanation for regionalism support in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, but in different ways. More education leads to higher support for MERCOSUL in Brazil, but lower support for NAFTA in Mexico, possibly because of the kinds of opportunities that NAFTA provides for Mexicans. In Colombia, those with higher levels of education believe that the US benefitted more from the FTA with Colom-

bia, while those with less education believe that Colombia benefitted more. This is consistent with a Leftist=anti-imperialist attitude, though Leftist ideology provides no explanatory purchase here.

In terms of exposure to other cultural influences, there is little to report (and what there is to report is counter-intuitive). Brazilians who travel abroad are *less* likely to support MERCOSUL. Mexicans with positive attitudes to immigrants and foreigners in Mexico are more likely to support NAFTA. Both findings contradict the hypothetical relationship in hypothesis 2.

In conclusion, what is particularly striking about attitudes in Latin America is not simply that the structure of support for regionalism differs between Latin America and Europe, but that there is no common structure of opinion across Latin America itself. Two of the region's most closely associated partnerships—Argentina and Brazil, show quite radically different results.

More broadly, material variation does matter, though not across all four of the countries studied. As in Europe, regionalism is politicized, but again, not in all four countries studied. Cognitive variation also matters in some cases but not in others. And identity also matters across three of the four countries, but opposite to the expected impact. Those who have pride in their nation also tend to support regionalism.

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Standardized effects on MERCOSUL approval Argentina 2014

Variables	(1) Sociodem	(2) +Exposure	(3) +Nationalism	(4) +AttGlob	(5) All
Gender	0.137	0.157	0.0806	-3.401*	-3.223
	-0.893	-1.046	-1.026	-2.034	-2.11
Household income	1.204	1.148	1.168	-2.118	-1.92
	-0.265	-1.109	-1.083	-2.343	-2.406
Level of education	0.545	0.488	0.674	0.338	-0.456
	-0.621	-1.162	-1.112	-2.218	-2.438
Left-right scale	1.363	1.331	1.101	3.292*	3.550*
	-0.162	-0.99	-0.99	-1.869	-1.947
Extremism	-2.212*	-2.188**	-2.386**	-1.31	-1.192
	-0.0241	-0.994	-0.988	-1.866	-1.919
Times abroad		0.257			1.016
		-1.27			-3.022
Feeling proud of being Argentinian			1.861*		-0.847
			-1.003		-1.774
Positive opinion on economic globalization				-2.878	-3.016
				-2.052	-2.136
Constant	65.91***	65.88***	65.82***	66.65***	66.88***
	0	-1.041	-1.018	-2.032	-2.138
Observations	517	503	512	128	124
R-squared	0.017	0.017	0.024	0.066	0.068

pval in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Standardized effects on MERCOSUL approval Brazil 2014

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variables	**Sociodem**	**+Exposure**	**+Nationalism**	**+AttGlob**	**All**
Gender	-1.347	-2.656	-1.466*	-0.454	2.349
	-0.107	-1.735	-0.836	-1.725	-3.872
Household income	2.635**	3.049*	2.670***	3.347*	3.464
	-0.00291	-1.778	-0.882	-1.768	-4.109
Level of education	3.803***	4.776**	3.878***	3.840*	8.196
	-0.000103	-2.162	-0.977	-2.078	-5.57
Left-right scale	0.75	3.471*	0.778	0.582	1.741
	-0.425	-1.899	-0.939	-1.785	-4.152
Extremism	1.318	0.614	1.326	0.348	-1.08
	-0.151	-1.821	-0.917	-1.833	-4.061
Times abroad		-6.645**			-6.947
		-2.651			-10.31
Receives remittances		0.509			0.394
		-1.753			-4.112
Positive opinion on foreigners in Brazil			-		-
Feeling proud of being Brazilian			0.615		0.132
			-0.834		-4.419
Positive opinion on economic globalization				4.050**	3.88
				-1.693	-3.89
FT is good for Brazil				-0.0535	0.855
				-1.715	-3.597
Constant	52.16***	52.44***	52.12***	52.71***	47.56***
	0	-1.987	-0.856	-1.814	-4.968
Observations	1,161	282	1,158	284	68
R-squared	0.037	0.071	0.039	0.06	0.099

pval in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Standardized effects on NAFTA approval Mexico 2014

Variables	(1) Sociodem	(2) +Expo	(3) +Natio1	(4) +Natio2	(5) +AttGlob	(6) All(1)	(7) All(2)
Gender	-0.862	-0.906	-0.577	-0.0358	-0.346	-0.564	-1.127
	-0.244	-0.745	-1.056	-0.0454	-1.467	-1.514	-3.028
Household income	2.923***	2.995***	2.597**	0.109**	2.012	1.718	0.712
	-0.00027	-0.805	-1.178	-0.0504	-1.733	-1.832	-0.759
Level of education	-1.675	-1.712**	-2.386*	-0.043	-0.744	-0.478	-0.111
	-0.0512	-0.87	-1.27	-0.0506	-1.78	-1.842	-0.429
Left-right scale	3.851***	3.750***	4.368***	0.138***	4.463**	3.251*	1.212*
	-2.40E-07	-0.75	-1.099	-0.0449	-1.748	-1.868	-0.696
Extremism	0.368	0.208	0.849	0.00274	0.755	0.132	0.0734
	-0.625	-0.759	-1.069	-0.0463	-1.62	-1.74	-0.971
Times abroad		-0.496				5.152	0.328
		-1.007				-4.937	-0.314
Receives remittances		0.636				-2.021	-6.243
		-0.701				-1.645	-5.083
Positive opinion on immigrants in Mexico			1.975*			0.353	0.398
			-1.032			-1.604	-1.809
Proud of being Mexican			0.685	0.0879**		-1.711	-2.681
			-1.08	-0.0419		-1.567	-2.456
Positive opinion on foreigners in Mexico				0.114**			
				-0.0456			
Positive opinion on economic globalization					4.196***	4.627***	5.524***
					-1.515	-1.64	-1.957
FT good for Mexico					0.854	0.328	0.494
					-1.519	-1.599	-2.406
Constant	61.68***	61.65***	61.87***	0.012	62.43***	63.16***	48.69***
	0	-0.781	-1.13	-0.0473	-1.56	-1.666	-16.37
Observations	994	985	479	507	192	183	183
R-squared	0.046	0.047	0.064	0.059	0.11	0.117	0.117

pval in parentheses   *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Standardized effects on MERCOSUL approval Colombia 2014

Variables	(1) Sociodem	(2) +Exposure	(3) +Natio1	(4) +Natio2	(5) +AttGlob	(6) All(1)	(7) All(2)
Gender	0.462	0.574	0.879	0.769	0.609	1.270	1.126
	(0.595)	(0.871)	(0.901)	(0.885)	(0.927)	(0.975)	(0.954)
Household income	0.687	0.592	0.749	0.422	0.125	0.0812	-0.264
	(0.425)	(0.866)	(0.886)	(0.864)	(0.935)	(0.974)	(0.945)
Level of education	0.518	0.550	0.564	0.398	0.307	0.467	0.263
	(0.610)	(1.021)	(1.045)	(1.028)	(1.082)	(1.127)	(1.100)
Left right scale	-0.520	-0.673	-1.033	-0.950	-0.734	-1.618	-1.286
	(0.576)	(0.935)	(0.973)	(0.937)	(0.974)	(1.040)	(0.994)
Extremism	-2.020*	-1.999**	-2.005**	-1.815**	-2.098**	-2.182**	-1.889**
	(0.0242)	(0.897)	(0.932)	(0.899)	(0.947)	(0.998)	(0.960)
Times abroad		2.013				0.411	0.977
		(2.679)				(2.821)	(2.799)
Receives remittances		-1.426				-1.762*	-1.612
		(0.917)				(0.983)	(0.979)
Opinion on immigrants in Colombia			0.592			-0.636	
			(0.893)			(1.000)	
Proud of being Colombian			1.856	1.834*		1.236	1.305
			(1.163)	(1.091)		(1.325)	(1.221)
Opinion on foreigners in Colombia				0.567			0.204
				(0.920)			(1.001)
Opinion on economic globalization					2.762***	2.542**	1.980**
					(0.949)	(1.016)	(0.984)
FT good for Colombia					0.921	2.031**	1.689*
					(0.974)	(1.034)	(1.001)
Constant	54.30***	54.52***	54.83***	54.58***	54.81***	55.92***	55.43***
	(0)	(0.969)	(0.985)	(0.958)	(1.004)	(1.095)	(1.062)
Observations	685	682	639	653	603	557	573
R-squared	0.010	0.014	0.016	0.014	0.026	0.038	0.030

pval in parentheses   *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Standardized Pr of answering USA benefits the most in USA-Col FT

Variables	(1) Sociodem	(2) +Exposure	(3) +Nationalism(1)	(4) +Nationalism(2)	(5) +AttGlob	(6) All(1)	(7) All(2)
Gender	-0.0702	-0.059	-0.0611	-0.0409	-0.115	-0.0789	-0.0681
	-0.304	-0.0686	-0.0717	-0.0719	-0.0775	-0.0815	-0.0817
Household income	-0.104	-0.106	-0.107	-0.0741	-0.0286	-0.0282	-0.00314
	-0.167	-0.0764	-0.0777	-0.0791	-0.0863	-0.09	-0.0912
Level of education	0.533***	0.524***	0.507***	0.574***	0.518***	0.502***	0.581***
	0	-0.0792	-0.0813	-0.0821	-0.0867	-0.0913	-0.0922
Left-right scale	-0.0859	-0.108	-0.101	-0.0648	-0.0711	-0.0932	-0.0894
	-0.206	-0.0691	-0.0727	-0.0715	-0.078	-0.0846	-0.0835
Extremism	0.0398	0.0563	0.00538	0.02	-0.0173	-0.0158	-0.0445
	-0.56	-0.0689	-0.0721	-0.0712	-0.0771	-0.0824	-0.0814
Times abroad		0.499*				0.444	0.438
		-0.283				-0.273	-0.279
Receives remittances		-0.0299				-0.0125	-0.0329
		-0.0716				-0.0831	-0.0826
Opinion on immigrants			-0.0589			0.0297	
			-0.074			-0.0827	
Feeling proud of being Colombian			-0.165*	-0.204**		-0.157	-0.204**
			-0.0898	-0.0899		-0.102	-0.103
Opinion on foreigners				-0.128*			-0.102
				-0.0758			-0.0853
Opinion on economic globalization					-0.251***	-0.263***	-0.226***
					-0.0808	-0.0864	-0.0861
FT is good for Colombia					-0.0587	-0.0452	-0.0129
					-0.0822	-0.0879	-0.0878
Constant	1.006***	1.047***	0.996***	1.039***	1.089***	1.098***	1.151***
	0	-0.0769	-0.073	-0.0734	-0.0782	-0.0881	-0.0891
Observations	1,147	1,138	1,038	1,063	947	856	878

pval in parentheses *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Standardized Pr of answering Col benefits the most in USA-Col FT

Variables	(1) Sociodem	(2) +Exposure	(3) +Nationalism(1)	(4) +Nationalism(2)	(5) +AttGlob	(6) All(1)	(7) All(2)
Gender	0.0238	0.012	0.0165	-0.00799	0.0714	0.0407	0.00576
	-0.773	-0.083	-0.0863	-0.0866	-0.0915	-0.096	-0.0961
Household income	0.108	0.105	0.0851	0.062	0.146	0.125	0.087
	-0.236	-0.0917	-0.0938	-0.0957	-0.0987	-0.103	-0.106
Level of education	-0.449***	-0.447***	-0.414***	-0.467***	-0.501***	-0.487***	-0.551***
	-1.61E-06	-0.0948	-0.0967	-0.0974	-0.101	-0.106	-0.107
Left-right scale	0.167*	0.192**	0.164**	0.124	0.0706	0.0673	0.0754
	-0.0304	-0.0784	-0.082	-0.0805	-0.0864	-0.093	-0.0921
Extremism	-0.253**	-0.267***	-0.234***	-0.240***	-0.209**	-0.247**	-0.206**
	-0.00214	-0.0833	-0.0863	-0.0854	-0.0907	-0.0962	-0.095
Times abroad		-0.299				-0.343	-0.334
		-0.235				-0.255	-0.261
Receives remittances		0.0919				0.0625	0.0706
		-0.0841				-0.0964	-0.0969
Opinion on immigrants			0.0566			-0.0779	
			-0.089			-0.0959	
Feeling proud of being Colombian			0.248**	0.280**		0.325**	0.369**
			-0.124	-0.124		-0.151	-0.153
Opinion on foreigners				0.101			0.0239
				-0.0913			-0.0988
Opinion on economic globalization					0.208**	0.260**	0.204**
					-0.0961	-0.103	-0.102
FT is good for Colombia					0.272***	0.264**	0.198*
					-0.0991	-0.106	-0.105
Constant	-1.744***	-1.768***	-1.728***	-1.776***	-1.747***	-1.760***	-1.811***
	0	-0.0906	-0.0916	-0.0925	-0.0969	-0.108	-0.109
Observations	1,147	1,138	1,038	1,063	947	856	878

pval in parentheses *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$