Destiny, it has been said, is not a matter of chance; it's a matter of choice. It's not a thing to be waited for; it's a thing to be achieved. And we can never safely assume that our future will be an improvement over the past. Our choice as a people is simple: We can either shape our times, or we can let the times shape us. And shape us they will, at a price frightening to contemplate, morally, economically, and strategically.”

These were George H.W. Bush’s words on December 15, 1992 in a speech at Texas A&M University, five weeks before he left office. He had just lost the election to Bill Clinton, and was trying to come to terms with political defeat and the humiliation of going down in history as a one-term president. Using the speech to offer some reflections on history and leadership, Bush was seeking perspective on all that had happened to the world during his whirlwind four years in the White House from 1989 to 1993.

The challenge that faced Bush remains with us today, because the dramatic upheavals he was struggling to come to terms with in December 1992 still preoccupy us, three decades later. In some ways, Bush’s generation of international policymakers did shape change. But in other ways those times shaped them—and still shape us today, in the era of Trump, Putin and Xi.

The Power of the People and the People in Power

During Bush’s first three years in office, the map of Europe was completely redrawn. In 1989, the bicentenary of 1789, an equally momentous surge of revolution swept away the ancient régime of communist dictatorship and command economics, melting the Soviet bloc that had been frozen in place since the 1940s.
The great symbolic moment was the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Over the next year divided Germany became one.

Eastern European states underwent total economic and political transformation, seeking to render their new capitalist democracies viable and sustainable (with Western aid). The Warsaw Pact and COMECON dissolved and the Red Army began to withdraw from the former Soviet satellites—a process to be completed within four years.

By 1991—as the Soviet Union disintegrated relatively peacefully and Yugoslavia exploded violently—the European Community was metamorphosing into the European Union at Maastricht and NATO had established a “North Atlantic Cooperation Council” so that “West” could embrace “East” in what was billed as a new community of “free nations” extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

During Bush’s final full year as President in 1992, “post-Wall Europe” was also in a process of “reunification” as the Central and Eastern countries (CEE), Baltic states and many former Soviet Republics, including Russia, looked west for financial support of their transformation and even aspired to “integration” in formerly “Western” structures: EU, NATO and G7, all of which would undergo consequential changes.

Meanwhile, the GATT—forged after the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II—was being re-formed under U.S. pressure into a more open World Trade Organization (WTO). The new WTO (1995) would eventually include a communist-capitalist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and a post-Soviet Russia—both of which had been keen since the late 1980s to enter the global market.

All this, many contemporaries believed, was a reflection of an overall trend towards some kind of Westernization—both across Europe and on a global plane. The spirit of America’s 28th president was invoked as pundits talked anew about “Wilsonian” values. There were even predictions that the 1990s would be a “unipolar moment” in which the United States would shape a more peaceful, norms-based world.

How had such rapid and peaceful change in the global order come about? Why was there such optimism about the future? What were the new order’s weaknesses and flaws? What are the problems still with us today?
On one level the upheavals had stemmed from major structural shifts in geopolitics and in the global economy. On another, they had been propelled by people power—mass protest and electoral revolution—and magnified by transnational diffusion.

But Bush was not alone in believing that it was leaders who mattered—especially at such a critical juncture in history. Kohl and Gorbachev articulated similar views. In fact, the exit from the Cold War and the entry into what I call the post-Wall, post-Square era, must be understood as a process—“managed” by a group of historical actors who navigated the dramas of 1988-1992 together, each seeking to influence and even direct events.

People power, therefore, was not an uncontrollable protean force; it could be channeled by politicians who dared, like Bush, to “shape” events rather than be shaped by them, politicians who, to quote Kohl, saw history as opportunity, not fate. Each saw themselves as operating at a decisive moment in history.

All these leaders had to make choices. In doing so, they contributed to outcomes that none of them had planned or even foreseen. To avoid anarchy or even conflict, this moment of decision-making required cooperation between leaders. Yet these were men (and one woman) with very different ideological outlooks, historical baggage and domestic constraints.

Such a challenge was, of course, not unique in modern history. In 1814-15 in Vienna and again in 1919 in Paris, leaders had met en masse in an effort to manage historical change. But these were gatherings of the victorious to make peace after hugely destructive wars. After the Second World War, no general peace treaty was ever negotiated. And the summit of victors at Potsdam in 1945 prefigured a shift from wartime cooperation to Cold War confrontation.

In the wake of 1989, however, there was neither an international conference, nor a conclave of the victorious. Post-Wall was a process, involving a plethora of summits, discussions and phone calls over the next two years that cumulatively negotiated the exit from the Cold War and the coming together of former enemies.

The core group of “managers” in 1989-1991 comprised the leaders of the Western alliance, many of whom had worked together for years.
Bush, as U.S. president, was not only pre-eminent but had been personally close to the center of policy for two decades. As a result, he was also well acquainted with veterans of the European scene, especially Thatcher, Mitterrand, Delors and Kohl. He also managed to build a rapport with Gorbachev, whom he “liked,” and he was a lao pengyou (an old friend) of Deng Xiaoping.

These leaders’ style of management could be termed “conservative,” in the literal sense of that word. Politicians like “known knowns.” Rather than risk creating total novelties, for the sake of stability and predictability they normally prefer to cling onto what already exists and has been shown to work, while adapting and modifying where it seems necessary. This was certainly true in 1989-91. Despite their anxieties, these leaders came to embrace transformative change. But, at least initially, they tried to cloak it in garments from the past—even if in some cases they were later forced to reinvent.

When it comes to the change of the global order and what the conservative managers did, three key stages in the transformative processes can be identified. I call them conserving, adapting, and re-inventing.

This is no rigid template. Some of the leaders—notably Gorbachev—never got to the stage of successful re-invention.

The designs for the future that emerged in 1990-1991 were not so much products of conceptually pre-conceived schemes. They grew out of choices made at what were seen as historically decisive moments. And they evolved while the upheavals lasted—settling into a reinvented and lasting form from early 1992.

There was no pre-made grand strategy—either in Europe, or in the Kremlin or the White House. To be sure the leaders fed off intellectual capital from past success—and while some were more conceptual (Mitterrand, Genscher, Delors), others were more practical problem-solvers working on the basis of political instinct and particular principles (Kohl, Bush).

All had to show some flexibility amid constantly novel situations. But they did not always find it easy to adjust. The bureaucracies worked in overdrive producing situation reports, option papers and blue sky thinking—but it was the leaders who would have to take the ultimate decisions.
At a time of flux, when each leader fixated on national interest and international opportunities (all the while juggling their domestic electoral agenda), they also found it challenging to view things from the other side of the fence. And yet this skill was needed to forge compromises and find a way into—what they hoped—would be a more peaceful post-Cold War world.

The cooperative spirit of 1989-1992, in which agreements were hammered out and decisions made, was a particularly striking feature of these “hinge years.” Indeed, the overriding fixation (of America and the West at large) was ensuring stability and peace, collective action instead of unilateralism.

Marketization and democratization in the Central and Eastern European countries and Eurasia were driven less by ideological zeal (which some ascribed to Wilsonianism) than as a Western reaction to the desires emanating from the transforming states, including the USSR and Russia.

It was in this light (and to counter Gorbachev’s “Common European Home” rhetoric) that Bush spoke in May 1989 in Mainz about a “Europe whole and free” and “a commonwealth of free nations.” The same pragmatic approach was evident in Bush’s engagement with Communist China where hopes for better relations were dashed after Tiananmen. He held on to dialogue “to preserve some kind of relationship” while abstaining from vocally pushing any political “liberalization” or human rights agenda.

Political Improvisation and Management

As regards the process of political improvisation and management, let me draw on a few concrete cases to illustrate the stages of conserving, adapting and reinventing.

One example is Mikhail Gorbachev, who set out to preserve the Soviet Union and to make it more viable. He sought to reform and revitalize the USSR and thereby reposition it for continued but now peaceful competition with the West. He had clear, broad goals, but had little idea how to achieve them. Having started with partial economic reform, he quickly became more radical, persuaded that true restruc-
turing could only work if combined with political liberalization. *Pere-
stroika* went hand in hand with *glasnost*. This was part of the adaptation
process.

His vision for Europe was a common European home. His vision of
future U.S.-Soviet relations was superpower cooperation and partner-
ship despite ideological differences; relations that went beyond liter-
al peaceful coexistence, undergirded by arms reductions (notably the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and START treaties in 1990

He promoted a policy based on universal, common, democratic,
Eastern European freedom of choice, Soviet opening to the world
economy and a desire to work through the United Nations (as evident
in the international diplomacy of First Gulf War).

However, the more he adapted and modified at home and abroad,
the more he lost control—on the periphery and in the heartland. He
finally swung right to the hardliners in the winter of 1990-91. As he
zigged and zagged, Gorbachev undermined the command economy
and the communist monopoly of power without creating stable alter-
natives. And thus, he wound up presiding over the destruction of the
Soviet multinational state. He never got to the stage of re-inventing the
Soviet Union.

A second, contrasting example is offered by the People’s Republic of
China. Deng Xiaoping and the communist party leadership had origi-
nally embarked on a path of deliberately gradual economic reform.
They could not prevent bouts of soaring inflation, which by the late
1980s triggered political protest and demands to change the system.
But faced with an escalating domestic crisis and sobered by the erosion
of communist authority in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist
Party regime cracked down vigorously in June 1989 and reasserted its
control.

Communism and one-party rule were thereby conserved. Seces-
sionist nationalism would be stamped out. And after a brief reaction-
ary phase imposed by Premier Li Peng, the process of economic (but
not political) liberalization resumed in 1992 under reformist party boss
Jiang Zemin. The economy would thus continue to be adapted and
modified for entry into the global market.
The Chinese, in their mind, had learned lessons from what they regarded as Gorbachev’s mistakes—excessive modification and loss of managerial control. The legacies of China’s cautiously managed long-term transformation—from an insular Maoist state into an authoritarian communist-capitalist powerhouse with global reach—are still being played out in the 21st century. From developing country to world power: this has been China’s communist re-invention. Post-Square was not like Post-Wall.

In sum, whereas Gorbachev failed in remaking his Union, Deng succeeded and his PRC was remade.

A third example of the management of change by conserving and adapting existing frameworks was evident over the “German Question.” Here, re-invention was particularly fruitful.

First, Chancellor Helmut Kohl facilitated unification by using article 23 of West Germany’s 1949 Basic Law to incorporate the eastern Länder in the Federal Republic. Likewise, he brought them into the Deutschmark (DM) zone on the argument (being made daily on East German streets) that if the Deutschmark did not come to the East Germans, they would come to the Deutschmark. The March 1990 East German election result confirmed that the GDR would effectively be absorbed into the old West German structures.

Second, adaptation and reinvention were also evident on the European plane. Once the GDR was part of the FRG, that meant it would automatically become part of the European Community—avoiding the danger of endless haggling with Germany’s European partners about admitting a new, socio-economically weak state and, potentially, setting a precedent for admitting others from the former Soviet bloc.

Kohl could not quell dyspeptic mutterings in London about the “Fourth Reich,” but his European solution to the German question did manage to assuage French fears about German revanchism and continental dominance. The DM—cornerstone of the German “economic miracle” since the 1940s—would now be subsumed into a common currency, as the heart of a new European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This in turn would realize the long-cherished integrationist aim of Jacques Delors—to dramatically deepen the Single Market in-
stigated in 1986 while ensuring that it could not be dominated by newly unified Germany.

Other key Western European institutions were also adapted and re-invented to address the new German question. In regard to the emerging post-Cold War European security order, Bush was quick to insist that a unified Germany must remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance and Kohl fully agreed. This meant that NATO would outlive the Cold War for which it had been created. The Alliance would be adapted territorially to include the GDR and re-invented doctrinally through the 1990 London Declaration. NATO’s perpetuation would ensure a continued American military presence in post-Wall Europe and thereby continue to fulfill its key purpose of guaranteeing mutual security. While satisfying Mitterrand and even Thatcher, this NATO solution to the German problem also helped reassure Moscow about the dangers of Teutonic revanchism. Ironically it ultimately suited Mikhail Gorbachev as well—because the German settlement, in combination with the CFE treaty, would take care of the military balance in Europe.

Cumulatively, Germany was unified and the Europe surrounding it transformed on essentially Western terms—incorporating the central features of post-war liberal international order in successfully modified and reinvented form.

Where Leadership Mattered: The Triple Axis of Cooperation

These major structural changes were made possible because of diplomatically creative political friendships, or what we might call axes of cooperation. Three stand out: Bush-Kohl; Kohl-Mitterrand; and Gorbachev-Bush/Kohl.

The warm accord between Bush and Kohl was rooted in four decades of successful “transatlantic partnership” within NATO. Kohl built on the Adenauer tradition of Westbindung, and indeed moved it onto a higher level as Bush welcomed unifying Germany as America’s preferred new “partner in leadership.”

Kohl and Mitterrand could find common ground in fostering the European integration project—despite Mitterrand’s neuralgic spasms about German power and despite the two men’s divergent priorities
about the precise forms of economic and political union. They re-
newed the Adenauer-de Gaulle relationship for a new generation and a new era.

Against all odds, Gorbachev was able to develop a real rapport with both Bush and Kohl. This happened on a personal level but it was ce-
mented by Gorbachev’s fixation with “universal values,” a “common European home” and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

As a result, these three men were able not only to transcend the ideological antagonism of the Cold War but also to heal some of the scars of WWII, leading to real peacemaking in Europe. Adroit “checkbook diplomacy” on Kohl’s part helped smooth Gorbachev’s pullout of the Red Army from GDR soil, one of the most vivid—and livid—legacies of Soviet victory in 1945.

These axes of cooperation, built on political friendships, were es-
sential to facilitate the threefold process of conserving, adapting and reinventing that lay at the heart of German unification. They were, however, less successful when it came to re-invention on the European plane. Two exogenous events in 1991—neither foreseen in 1989—proved critical obstacles: the dissolution of the Soviet Union, albeit peacefully; and the violent implosion of Yugoslavia, which quickly de-
cended into bloody wars of secession. The challenges created by both break-ups would reveal the limits of conservative management and the problems with reinvention under even less predictable and more hos-
tile circumstances. The stability of the post-Soviet space was an issue of long-term concern, but the ferocious Yugoslav wars prompted immediate reactions and laid bare some serious structural flaws in the Europe now being remade.

Reunifying Europe: The Dream, and the Problems, of Western Institutional Reinvention

The new European Union—despite its assertive rhetoric—was nev-
er up to the task of restoring peace in the Balkans. It was not able to speak with one voice, or to move beyond the EC’s “civilian” tradition of trying to mediate and help keep the peace, without developing a real European military capability. Ever since, post-Maastricht Europe has
struggled to re-invent itself in the guise of foreign-policy actor and political “superpower” to which it aspired.

NATO, too, struggled with its reinvention after 1991. U.S./NATO military operations in Yugoslavia only became possible after the Alliance shifted its focus from “collective defense” to “collective security” in order to justify and allow NATO “out of area” operations. This process took four years—from NATO’s “new Strategic Concept” (1991) to the first UN-sanctioned NATO bombing campaign in Bosnia. The outcome of these operations was the Dayton peace accords. But NATO’s doctrinal and military reinvention was deeply flawed. Dayton proved only a partial solution to the wide-ranging problems of the Balkans. And this U.S. spasm of peace enforcement exposed the power asymmetries between America—the only ally with the necessary firepower and lift-capacity—and the Europeans, still haunted by historical ghosts from their dark 20th century. The United States, in turn, struggled between “isolationist” tendencies and its global leadership role—now energized by Clinton’s 1994 national security strategy of “engagement and enlargement.”

Crucially, NATO’s “out of area” reinvention made the Alliance in the long run also more problematic for the Kremlin. America’s show of force in a Slav space (even if under NATO and UN auspices) threatened Moscow’s geopolitical position—and a similar ideological challenge was posed by Clinton’s rhetoric about exerting America’s global weight to promote the nation’s values. Although there was no disagreement with Russia over the Bosnia operation, the 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign by what was then an enlarged NATO (without UNSC authorization) brought these differences into the open.

In the view of many Russians, NATO’s second reinvention through enlargement to the east (in 1999 and 2004) made matters worse. The task of what Bush called “building a Europe whole and free” through a solid security framework had been fraught from the outset. Despite efforts of transforming the pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—the so-called “conscience of the continent”—into an organization (OSCE) that would serve as a tool for greater transparency, for upholding rights, for monitoring elections and in dispute resolution, it failed to develop into the type of muscular mechanism that could put a stop to such atrocities as in former Yu-
goslovania. Likewise, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that first met in December 1991 was really just a loose forum for East-West liaison and information exchange spanning the Atlantic area and across Central Asia to the Pacific. It was later transformed into the Partnership for Peace (1994) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997) as a means of moving beyond information exchange with a then-defunct Warsaw Pact to operational mechanisms for cooperative military activities, including with Russia.

But it was NATO itself that was crystallizing as the only historically successful organization to provide hard security on the continent. And so East looked West—for membership.

In early 1992—as Russia assumed the Soviet seat on the UN Security Council—even Yeltsin declared Russia’s partnership ambitions with the United States and NATO. Yet no seat for Moscow would materialize at the table inside the core of the Euro Atlantic community.14

Undoubtedly Western leaders did try to sustain the Russian state as a second key player in the international system. They became deeply involved in Russia’s flawed transition into a market democracy and both Bush and Clinton made conscious efforts not to “isolate Russia” or turn it “from potential friend to potential adversary.” But over the long term it became clear that it was not possible to keep Russia on side (not least because Russia had no intention of giving up even an iota of its sovereignty in order to integrate into what was effectively a US-led club) and to address the desire of the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Balts for full membership of NATO as well as the EU (as they sought to escape the fate of remaining as part of Russia’s “near abroad”).15

For its part, the United States—feeling it had “won” the Cold War—became increasingly assertive in its “unipolar” moment. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11) were, of course, a turning point, but the early 1990s were of critical importance. Bush ’41’s campaign in 1991 to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait was characterized by alliance cooperation and operational self-restraint: the President would not go “all the way to Baghdad.” The Bosnian war was also a limited mission and had Russian approval. But the Kosovo war and a growing feeling that the U.S. could and should have finished off Saddam for good fed into the post-9/11 passion for liberal inter-
ventionism—an expansive policy direction increasingly resented by the Kremlin.

Indeed, during Putin’s reign (from 2000), and especially since his return to the presidency in 2012, Russian alienation from the West has intensified and a heightened nostalgia for the country’s great-power past, back to the glory days of defeating Napoleon after 1812 and overcoming Hitler in the Great Patriotic War, has re-emerged with a vengeance.

So, while re-inventing NATO (and the EU) as a Europe-wide entity was always going to be problematic, the combination of Russian *amour propre* and American ideological self-assertion made matters toxic. These issues could probably never have been resolved, even by the most sensitive diplomacy. But it is true that the confrontation became undoubtedly more direct and more dangerous in the Putin era.

**Conclusions**

What conclusions may America and the West draw from the story of global transition and international management that we have explored in this book?

Today we live in an era of erratic U.S. behavior and a changing balance of power with both a revisionist Russia whose president claims that “liberalism is obsolete” and an ambitious post-Square China und Xi Jinping challenging American leadership. To quote Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, they are seeking a “post West world.” We also have a U.S. president who seems unwilling to lead—or at least to do so as part of an alliance, rather than throwing his weight about unilaterally. Indeed, he claims that America “must as a nation be more unpredictable.”

The effect has been to unsettle the Atlantic Alliance. Can America afford to become isolationist, turning its back on Europe? And is it worth throwing away allies that are run by norm-governed regimes? Trust is easily broken. Re-establishing it is much harder and takes much longer. The same goes for arms control regimes.

Examining the end of the Cold War yields a few pointers for the future:
First, given the difficulties in creating new international institutions, there is much to be said for the process of conserving, adapting and reinventing those that work. This was particularly efficacious in facilitating German unification.

Second, this process depends for its success on fruitful axes of cooperation between leaders. In 1989-91 the relationships between Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand and Gorbachev stood out.

Third, reinvention seems to have been much less successful when it came to NATO’s out-of-area role and the process of NATO’s and the EU’s eastern enlargement. But these processes did help to bring much of the former Soviet bloc into Europe “whole and free” and thus served to stabilize a highly volatile part of the old continent. And arguably NATO’s traditional “containment” role remains applicable in the Putin era. In other words, the jury is still out—it’s too early to judge.

Fourth, as regards the future, a new process of adapting and reinventing will be necessary to address the challenges of right-wing populism to democracy, the digital age and new forms of aggression, notably cyber warfare.

Fifth, the crux is to sustain the cooperative relationships on which consensually-based leadership must rest. George H.W. Bush understood that; Donald J. Trump does not.

Some of Bush 41’s words in that farewell speech in Texas now look strikingly prescient when he warned that “economically, a world of escalating instability and hostile nationalism will disrupt global markets, set off trade wars, set us on a path of economic decline.” Future challenges, he believed, “must be met with collective action, led by the United States, to protect and promote our political, economic, and security values.” And, he added, “A retreat from American leadership, from American involvement, would be a mistake for which future generations, indeed our own children, would pay dearly.”
Notes

1. Remarks by President George H.W. Bush at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, December 15, 1992.


4. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth (New York: Twelve Books, 2019)


12. For various views on NATO enlargement, see Hamilton and Spohr (eds), op. cit.


15. GHWBPL, NSC, Gompert Files, ESSG (CF01301-009), Memorandum from Lowenkron to Howe—Subj.: ESSG Mtg 30 Mar. 1992 SitRoom 26.3.1992, p. 2 (‘Handling Russia’). See also Hamilton and Spohr (eds), op. cit.


