It is well known that victory has many fathers and defeat none. The process of NATO enlargement was no different. Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, to name a few leading figures, without forgetting others who led democratic countries aspiring to join NATO, emerged as key players in a very personalized diplomatic process, involving a plethora of direct contacts and personal relationships.

In France, given the political stakes, the issue became the domain of President François Mitterrand and his closest Élysée aides, especially Hubert Védrine and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, a personal friend of the President, who had a good personal relationship with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Jacques Chirac, who succeeded Mitterrand in 1995 and who had previously been Prime Minister during the period of political “cohabitation” in 1986-1988, also focused on the issue. Both Mitterrand and Chirac were supported by a diplomatic establishment still wary of Moscow. Until the war in Bosnia, the military stayed largely on the margins.

Throughout the process France, as well as most of the other Allies, including the United States, sought to maintain the right balance between the candidate countries’ understandable impatience and the fear of weakening the reformist Moscow leadership under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which was seen as shaky and divided on the issue.¹

The risk of missing what was considered as an historic but perhaps fleeting window of opportunity was preeminent in the mind of Polish, Hungarian and Czech leaders, who were hammering the message in NATO capitals.
The situation in Moscow therefore became a constant preoccupation for Western leaders, and put them in a quandary. The aborted coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the USSR had served as a powerful reminder of the weakness of the Kremlin leadership. It was seen as a call for accelerating the opening of NATO up to the East. At the same time, Mitterrand and other Western leaders, at least until 1994, remained cautious so as not to endanger the political survival of their Moscow interlocutors, who constantly reminded them of the stiff opposition they were facing.

A Cautious Mitterrand

From the outset, Paris was convinced that once German reunification had been achieved on Western terms, Washington would do everything to convince Moscow of the need for NATO’s enlargement, whatever the Allies might think or propose. Mitterrand himself shared this view and told Gorbachev so.

The inclusion of unified Germany within NATO—a remarkable achievement of President Bush and Secretary Baker and their teams in liaison with a determined Chancellor Kohl—led indeed to the Alliance’s widening to Central and Eastern Europe, even if the two issues were separated at the start. The question was therefore not the end game, but the timing (the French were pleading for patience) and the framework. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was considered the obvious place to host such a process, as Moscow was already a member.

As those questions were obviously had great bearing with regard to the new organization of post-Cold War Europe and its implications for the future of NATO, it appeared quickly that Paris and Washington, while sharing the same views regarding the status of the reunified Germany, did not have exactly the same priorities regarding a new political framework.

France opposed the Soviet idea of a “neutralized Germany with no NATO military structures in the territory of today GDR.” In January 1990 in Paris, Mitterrand reminded U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger that “it has always been the wish of USSR and it was unacceptable.”
Within the German SPD, however, the same concept had long been advanced as a way to facilitate reunification. It was somewhat reintroduced into the debate by German Foreign Minister Genscher in his Tutzing speech of January 31, 1990. He was immediately opposed by President Bush, who convinced Chancellor Kohl to distance himself from his coalition partner.

Mitterrand agreed with Bush, using the reasoning U.S. Secretary of State James Baker presented early to Gorbachev: would it not be better for Moscow to have Germany within NATO and therefore anchored into the West, rather than to have a loose neutral Germany, unhinged and likely to raise the anxiety of its neighbors?

Mitterrand used the same line with Gorbachev when they met bilaterally in Moscow on May 25, 1990. Other schemes, denied of any practicality, were also proposed by Gorbachev during the same meeting, when he mentioned to a skeptical Mitterrand that Germany could belong either in both political camps or even adopt what the Soviet leader called “the French model,” i.e. a non-military integrated member within the Alliance. Gorbachev even alluded to the possibility of the USSR being a member both of the still-existing Warsaw Pact and of NATO.

It puzzled many French observers that Moscow did not attempt to throw a spanner into the process at a time when it could have been still possible for the Russians to stop it. This view is shared by historian Mary E. Sarotte: “for a moment in February 1990 the Soviets could have made an agreement with Washington freezing NATO expansion to the East in not including East Germany within NATO. Gorbachev didn’t do it and the opportunity vanished.”

Even so, it took four years more of intra-Alliance debates, the 2+4 negotiations, and many bilateral discussions with Moscow to arrive at the point when the Central and East Europeans could be told that the question was no longer “if” but “when,” as President Clinton stated publicly after his January 1994 Prague lunch with the leaders of the “Visegrád” group—Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

Until 1997, the French were much less confident than the Americans that the Kremlin would accept NATO enlargement sincerely and for the long term. They were not persuaded that President Clinton and the “Bill-Boris” personal relationship was the key to explain the weak
resistance of the Russian leaders. Paris indeed suspected that Moscow would sooner or later try every trick to derail the process, including, under various guises, by using the old theme of the “European Common House.” Hence the repeated French insistence to embed German reunification and the enlargement of NATO into a new general architecture of Europe, which, without isolating Moscow and giving it veto power, would not appear to exclude Russia from the “new Europe.”

The Paris CSCE Summit of November 1990 was considered as a successful first step in this direction. But it was only by 1996 and with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 that it was reasonably possible to put aside the prospect that a last-ditch change of heart of the Kremlin would endanger the process.

Mitterrand knew, of course, that he did not possess any leverage with Moscow similar to that of the United States. The fact that Clinton had stated, right at the start of his first term, that his personal political priority was to build a new American-Russian relationship was reassuring for the men in the Kremlin. They thought that they could still count on Washington to consider Russia as the Great Power it had been until now, at the very moment they were discovering that they were losing their place and role in Europe (this is precisely what Putin would denounce later on in 2007 as Yeltsin’s fatal misjudgment). At the same time, they were expecting, as a quid pro quo, a massive influx of financial and economic aid to redress their floundering economy. They believed that Washington was the key. In point of fact, however, Washington resisted Helmut Kohl’s entreaties at G-7 meetings, considering that an unreformed Soviet system would not make good use of international aid.

Throughout this period, President Mitterrand remained convinced of the need of a cautious step-by-step approach to both NATO and EU enlargement. He spoke of a timeframe of “10 to 15 years.” His stance was utterly disappointing for the candidate countries. The issue would come to a head with them at the time of his ill-fated “Confederation” proposal.

In addition to his personal tendency to put events in an historical perspective and thus, in his formulation, “give time to the time,” Mitterrand had two additional political motivations.
The first was that while NATO and EU enlargements did not need to proceed in lockstep, as everyone understood from the start, Central Europeans needed both security guarantees and urgent economic aid. The Germans, for obvious reasons, were especially keen in stabilizing their immediate neighborhood with the support of the European Community (EC). As early as 1992 the EC was already working through the Commission of Jacques Delors to develop a program to that end.

For the French President, however, consolidating the EC in the wake of German reunification was a much higher priority than NATO enlargement. At the start, Mitterrand didn’t hide his concern about Bonn’s attitude: would reunification make Bonn less interested in the EC’s drive towards political union and the building of a European monetary system? Kohl, who was keen about a deeper political union after the fall of the Berlin Wall, soon reassured Mitterrand, even accepting an acceleration of the preparations for the European monetary union, for which Paris had been pushing. The Maastricht EU summit at the end of 1992 put to rest Mitterrand’s concerns.

He remained much more worried about the implications of EU enlargement rather than that of NATO, however. Premature accession of Eastern and Central European countries to the EU could, in his view, not only divert the political attention and diplomatic endeavors of other Europeans partners from this process, but also “dilute” the EU. Moreover, both Mitterrand and his successor, Jacques Chirac, suspected that London was using enlargement to slow down the European integration project and to continue to reduce it into a free market zone. For Paris, therefore, “deepening” of the EU had to precede its “widening.” As a result, the political and diplomatic work undertaken to implement deeper EU integration at summits in Maastricht in 1992, Amsterdam in 1997 and, for Chirac, Nice in 2000 would overshadow by far in Paris the concerns about NATO preparations for its own enlargement.

As far as NATO was concerned, Paris also proposed “a renovation of the Alliance” as a prerequisite for its actual widening. Given France’s special position as a non-integrated Ally, Paris had a weak card. Nevertheless, France, under Mitterrand, and later more actively under Chirac, tried to establish a link between its support for NATO enlargement and Allied agreement to recognize a “European pillar” within the Alliance. It was a way to reconcile the French view that NATO needed to
renew and revamp its structures in view of broadening its membership with its aim of bolstering the European Defense and Security Identity (ESDI) within the transatlantic Alliance.

Mitterrand’s second political motivation for moving slowly on NATO enlargement stemmed from his personal conviction that NATO, having lost its military “raison d’être” after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, would also slowly lose its political relevance. At that time, NATO’s “existential problem” was indeed common talk in Europe, and not only in Paris. Most of the French political-military establishment was convinced that, even with a different political role, NATO would remain a necessary military organization. Yet, Mitterrand’s personal views were more ambiguous. In 1999 he told a puzzled German President Richard von Weizsäcker that, in his view, “there is a reality: NATO is fading away, and there is a virtuality: European defense is reinforcing itself.”

In retrospect, President Mitterrand underestimated Washington’s willingness to act on what it perceived to be its strategic interest in giving a new role and saliency to NATO by enlarging it externally and renovating it internally.

Already in 1989 President Bush had set forth the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” In 1994 President Clinton called for “a peaceful and undivided Europe.” For Washington, a “Euro-Atlantic approach” was not only the right solution to fill the new security and political void in Central and Eastern Europe, it was also a way to maintain a strong American presence on the continent, at a time when numerous voices in the United States were calling for a reduction of the U.S. troop presence on the continent after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Much to the regret of Paris, the NATO London Summit in July 1990 did not signal that the “Europeanization” of NATO, as advocated by France, could be part of the actual “renovation” of NATO. Allies instead focused their attention eastward. At the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991, the Allies offered institutional cooperation with the new Eastern Europe democracies through the creation of the North Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC), even if, at that stage, it was designed more as a framework for political dialogue than a program for preparation of a full-fledged adhesion. It would be later systematized with the institution of the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
In fairness, one should note that some “historic” members of the Alliance, such as the UK, Turkey, and parts of the German military establishment, as well as East Central European aspirant countries themselves, were concerned about the possible negative military implications of enlargement, the weakening of the Article 5 security guarantee and the prospect of more problematic diplomatic management of a larger and less homogenous Alliance. This line would be later used by the opponents to enlargement during the ratification debates in the U.S. Senate in 1999, including by Henry Kissinger, U.S. Senator John Warner, and George Kennan. Those concerns, however, were not expressed in Paris.

Paris and the “Kidnapped Europe”

Mitterrand’s cautious approach toward the candidacy of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to join the EU and NATO was a paradox, given the President’s own personal history and the steadily growing sympathy expressed by the French public toward the cause of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe.

Especially since the 1970s, and even earlier, France had a tradition of hosting a very active community of intellectuals and dissidents from those countries, which Milan Kundera—himself a Czech émigré from the 1958 “Prague Spring” who had lived in Paris since 1975—described famously as the “kidnapped Europe.”

Pavel Tigrid, an aide to Jan Masaryk, a former employee of Radio Free Europe, and a close friend of Václav Havel, was a Paris publisher of a review entitled *Svedectví*, which became the rallying point for the post-1968 Czech dissidents. Earlier, with the remaining press funds of the Polish Brigade, which distinguished itself at the Monte Cassino battle in 1944, a group of Polish intellectuals, meeting in Maisons Lafitte under the direction of Jerzy Giedroyć, had founded the magazine *Kultura* and began to send clandestinely to Poland the works of writers like Czesław Miłosz (who later emigrated to California), Leszek Kołakowski (living in Oxford), Gustaw Herling-Grudziński (living in Naples), and artist Józef Czapski. Bronisław Geremek had been obliged to leave Poland at the time of the anti-Semitic purge of the hard line Natolin faction fighting Gomulka within the Polish Communist Party.
He took refuge in France and was given a post to teach at the College de France. The Hungarians could count on François Fejtő.

Kot Jeleński and Georges Liébert linked the Paris émigrés with the Ford Foundation, the reviews Contrepoint and Encounter, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, as well as international networks such as the Pen Club. Most importantly, in Paris, they were supported by a cluster of well-connected and influential French intellectuals, including the poet Pierre Emmanuel, Raymond Aron, George Nivat, François Bondy and Pierre Hassner.

Following the Prague Spring and the first demonstrations by Solidarnosc, a growing fraction of French public opinion, beyond the Parisian intellectual circles, had started supporting actively the quest for freedom in the East European countries. The reason was not only popular support for human rights and cultural freedom but because it was also a way for leftist intellectuals and politicians to demonstrate that they were breaking from the political grip of communism.

For a long time, communism had held a stronghold on French cultural life, as it had in Italy. The events in Prague in 1968 had a stunning effect, however, and deeply affected the liberal left. The repression and the ideological rigidity of the Soviet Communist Party, compounded by the behavior of a still-Stalinist French PCF party, unleashed a hemorrhage among the ranks of its sympathizers. In 1974 French public opinion was electrified by the appearance of Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn on prime-time television; Soviet dissidents became “des causes célèbres.”

The proclamation in Poland in December 1981 of martial law and the brutal repression of Solidarnosc added to the evolution of French public opinion. Traditional French sympathy for the Poles, reinforced by a large inflow of Polish workers from the 1930s, distant memories of French support for the Polish uprising of 1830, and the spontaneous rise of a wide network of supporters from Catholic and trade union associations, which clandestinely sent material help to Poland, made support of Solidarnosc a popular movement that could no longer be ignored by French politicians.

Mitterrand himself had been involved in those debates as a member of the Council of Europe. He had travelled extensively in Eastern
Europe as a participant in meetings of the Socialist International, a federation of European socialist parties where the German SPD had dominant influence. He supported Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, much to the consternation of the French foreign policy establishment, which was aware that until Mitterrand’s election in 1981 he had not yet distanced himself openly from Egon Bahr’s 1963 proposals for a progressive evolution of Central Europe towards neutralization.

The idea had infuriated President Pompidou and Henry Kissinger, but at the time had been supported by several Central and Eastern European dissidents, including Václav Havel: the “Prague Appeal” of March 1985 called for the dissolution of the two Pacts and the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops.

For President Mitterrand, who had in 1981 gambled on an electoral alliance with the French Communist party and included some members in the government, support for freedom in Eastern Europe and for the dissidents was therefore not only a matter of personal conviction but also a way to distance himself from his temporary communist and leftist political partners. Mitterrand did not hesitate to take diplomatic risks to support the dissidents openly.

In June 1984, during his first official dinner in the Kremlin Great Hall, Mitterrand stunned his Politburo hosts by not hesitating ask for the release of Andrei Sakharov. Later, on his first visit to Prague in December 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Mitterrand made his visit to President Gustáv Husák conditional on a guarantee that he could receive eight well-known dissidents, including Havel, at the French Embassy for a breakfast. Havel said that “he came to Palais Buquoy with his toothbrush,” expecting to be arrested by the police when he left.

Moscow was well aware of Mitterrand’s lack of sympathy vis-à-vis the USSR. He had campaigned against Giscard d’Estaing’s attempts to keep open the dialogue with the Soviet Union after the Afghan invasion. At the beginning of his term, Mitterrand expelled as spies 46 members of the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Therefore, there was never great confidence from either side in the Paris-Moscow dialogue, even if Moscow feigned appreciation for the French position on NATO enlargement, which, as Russians confided on many occasions to other interlocutors, including Americans, “was different from that of Washington.”
In his Moscow meeting with Gorbachev on May 25, 1990, Mitterrand tried to clarify his position: “I am perfectly aware that German reunification and its membership in NATO create very big problems for you. I am also experiencing difficulties in this regard but of a different order. This is why I am stressing the need to create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole. This is one of my guiding goals, particularly when I proposed my idea of creating a European Confederation. It is similar to your concept of a common European home.” He added, however, the question of reunified Germany included as a whole within NATO: “France cannot allow itself to end up somewhere on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Alliance.”

The CSCE Gambit

German reunification in 1990 came as a diplomatic surprise. It is important to recall, however, that for years the West had managed a successful policy towards the East. The principal instrument was the CSCE process, which had long involved the civil society and intellectuals of the new democracies that were now aspiring to NATO membership. The history of EU and NATO enlargement cannot be totally disassociated from this context.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was already a large consensus, officialized in the Alliance’s Harmel Report of 1967, that the West should try to “Finlandize” Eastern Europe, as Lord Carrington used to say, and to “set a policy of controlled, peaceful and piecemeal changes—one that would ultimately alter the face of Eastern Europe without triggering off the defence mechanism arising from the age-old Russian security complex,” as Theo Sommer, editor of Die Zeit, put it.9

Indeed, from the first preliminary talks held in the Helsinki suburb of Dipoli in 1972 until the approval of the Charter of Paris in 1990, the CSCE process became one of the main themes of French diplomacy in East-West relations, for three reasons.10

First, notwithstanding the fact that the alliances remained a reality during the negotiations, the CSCE became the first practical experiment of a common European external policy, and a successful one at that.
Second, the CSCE was a daring experiment with a kind of modern “post-Westphalian diplomacy.” Through pan-European circulation of persons and ideas the aim was to counter the prevailing incarnation, among Warsaw Pact countries, of the old principle of *cuius regio eius religio*.

Third, the CSCE process was not only about human rights, as has too often been presented. It also involved economic cooperation and security considerations. The latter aspect became the be main objective of French diplomacy at the Madrid Review Conference from 1980 to 1983.

In the United States, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, faced with Congressional opposition to “détente,” were tempted to belittle the importance of the CSCE process, their priority at the time being negotiations to reduce strategic arms (SALT) and conventional forces (MBFR).11

The French, the Germans and other Europeans insisted on receiving precise commitments in the “Third Basket” of issues dealing with human rights, press and culture and freedoms. While Kissinger joked about the “swahili” of those detailed negotiations, the French were battling, among other measures, to secure the right to open “reading rooms” within French cultural institutes in East Central European countries that would be accessible to ordinary citizens. Before 1989, Havel himself valued his regular visits to the French cultural institute on Stepanska street in Prague. The widespread publication of the text of the Helsinki Act in “the principal journals” of all signatory countries, including those in the East, contributed to establish the creation of “Helsinki groups” of dissidents and encouraged contacts with civil society in those countries.

The Helsinki Final Act,12 the result of long and patient diplomatic work, was thus considered in Paris as a great success that should not be abandoned because of NATO enlargement. For the French, the two processes did not collide and could be complementary, especially because the CSCE, in spite of its imperfections and the cumbersome way it functioned, was still at the time of German reunification the only Europe-wide framework available.
A few days after the Berlin Wall fall, Chancellor Kohl seized the political initiative by presenting to the Bundestag 10 points the German government intended to follow. Several of the points referenced an overall European process: (6) “the embedding of the future structure of Germany within the Pan-European process, for which the West has paved the way with its concept of a lasting and just order of peace;” (7) “openness and flexibility of the European Community with respect to all reformed countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, naturally including the GDR;” (8) “energetic progress in the CSCE process using the forthcoming forums.”

Most importantly, the Helsinki Final Act stated explicitly that each nation had the right to choose its own military alliance or remain neutral. At the crucial Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Washington on May 31, 1990, President Bush, referring to the Helsinki Final Act, cleverly advanced the argument that a new united Germany would have the right to choose its alliance. Gorbachev could not find a way to object, much to the consternation of his delegation.

When Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw in August 1993, he would also acknowledge with Lech Wałęsa that the Helsinki Final Act recognized the right of all member countries to choose their alliance: it was immediately interpreted by Wałęsa as the “green light” for Poland to be allowed to join NATO, even if, soon afterward, Yeltsin retreated from his position.

During the 2+4 negotiations on German reunification, the Allies repeated that the “CSCE should be enhanced to ensure a significant role for the USSR in the new Europe.” Gorbachev came back repeatedly to the idea that “the CSCE be the principal mechanism to developing a new security order in Europe.” The London NATO summit in June 1990 echoed the intent of the Allies to diversify and “strengthen the role of the CSCE.”

In the same vein, Yeltsin told Clinton at their Halifax meeting in June 1995 that “NATO is a factor too of course, but NATO should evolve into a political organization.” Moscow was never able to make precise proposals, however, beyond the reference to the need of using the CSCE forum to negotiate the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.
Negotiations to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) originated from a French initiative at the second CSCE Review Conference in Madrid. In November 1980 a proposal had been endorsed by the Atlantic Alliance with the aim to prepare a mandate for opening an alternative to the deadlocked MBFR negotiations in Central Europe, which had been going on for about a decade. Paris had long been hostile to this pact-to-pact negotiation on troop reductions in a narrow band of territory in Central Europe. Paris became even more preoccupied when NATO introduced what it called “option 3” dealing with nuclear-deployed weapons in the zone. The idea to introduce a new approach of conventional arms control in the CSCE framework raised, at first, American opposition. The human rights specialists worried, in the words of the head of delegation at Madrid, Max Kampelman, that “putting the elephant of security in the bathtub of human rights” would unbalance the whole process.

There were also some reservations at NATO headquarters. The MBFR had been seen as an opportunity to establish contacts with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna and as a way to head off the Mansfield amendment in the U.S. Congress, which threatened to reduce U.S. troops in Europe. A French proposal aimed, in fact, to kill MBFR and to start the conventional negotiations over again with a wider framework of 23 countries, beginning with confidence-building measures, was therefore a priori eminently suspect.\textsuperscript{14}

However, even if some NATO delegates went almost apoplectic during the intra-Alliance preparation of the negotiating package, which was further addressed at a Stockholm Conference in 1984, the approach succeeded and led to a complex agreement on conventional forces reductions and transparency measures. The CFE framework proved itself quite useful to settle the difficult issue of troops ceiling for reunified Germany. The adaptation of regional troop ceilings in CFE II would later take into account the massive conventional force reductions resulting from the end of the Warsaw Pact. Signed in November 1990 in Paris, the CFE treaty remained an element of the new European security architecture until Russia withdrew from it in 2008.\textsuperscript{15}

The CSCE as a new pan-European security framework was also widely supported by the democratic opposition in Central and Eastern Europe. As the one institution to which they already belonged, and
with its focus on an all-European approach, it was natural that such a political forum should be attractive for them and that it could possibly be institutionalized. In Prague, Havel and his foreign affairs minister Jiří Dienstbier therefore proposed in April 1990 a permanent OSCE-based “Security Commission,” which would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was obviously not acceptable for NATO and other East Central European countries. Havel demurred at a meeting of the Council of Europe in May.

The idea of semi-permanent structures for the CSCE reappeared in the “Paris Charter for a new Europe,” signed at the Paris Summit of 1990. This CSCE Summit meeting was considered a French success, but Mitterrand didn’t build on it. In the meantime, he had become wedded to his personal pet project: the “Confederation.”

The Confederation: A Bridge Too Far?

At the end of December 1989, Mitterrand surprised everyone by introducing a proposal for a new East-West forum, which he called the “Confederation,” whose link with the CSCE was ambiguous. The stated purpose was to develop concrete long-term cooperative projects in a flexible framework, allowing nations, firms, institutions to build bridges between the two sides. Those projects could be advanced with different combinations of participants (“variable geometry”) so as to avoid institutional rigidities. Military and security issues were not to be addressed in the Confederation.

The subtext was that the Confederation would serve as a bridging mechanism between the present economic and social condition of aspirants to the EEC and the ultimate date of accession to the EC, which Mitterrand saw as a more distant objective. It had also the purpose of harmonizing the various agreements between the concerned candidates. Mitterrand had pointed out to Havel that accession to the EC (later EU) would require time; aspirants would need to meet the substantial conditions of the acquis communautaires. It was better to start with a series of practical cooperation initiatives, which could lead progressively to the required level of readiness to accession.

As soon as the details emerged, however, many began to question the very rational for this French proposal. The Germans started to distance
themselves from an initiative that they saw as duplicating the Second Basket of the CSCE and possibly complicating the ambitious national policy they were about to implement in an area in which Germany historically had been present. While the inclusion of the already weakened USSR was mentioned (Mitterrand argued it was important “not to isolate them” just when the Soviet Union was being dismantled), U.S. participation was not anticipated, at least at the start: civil society representatives and economic actors would represent them. Washington was furious and began a campaign against the whole idea. The European Commission was also worried about potential competition in its own area of competence.

Havel, who at first applauded at the project and had agreed to host it in Prague, began to retract, not only because the United States would be absent, but also because of the negative reactions he was getting from around Europe. The legitimate suspicion that the Confederation was designed as a way station before enlarging the EC, or even worse, as a permanent holding pen, could only generate negative reactions. Mitterrand himself, to the utter dismay of his staff, bluntly confirmed these suspicions in a radio interview on June 12, 1991, on the very eve of the opening of the conference, and so, essentially, sank the whole idea.

The ensuing debates in Prague were considered as “useful” but, as Havel put it at the closing of the conference on June 14, somewhat “futurological.” The small secretariat supposed to be created in Prague was forgotten and the follow-on anticipated for the conference attracted no takers. Two months later, the attempted putsch in Moscow diverted attention from the already-stillborn Mitterrand project.

The failure of the Confederation had no real political impact in France. By the end of the year the success of the Maastricht Treaty silenced the criticism of a bungled diplomatic venture. It could have been anticipated, but the personal involvement of the President and his close staff had made the forewarning of failure not an easy task for the diplomatic apparatus. It was a disaster for the influence of France in East Central Europe and had a lasting effect on Paris’ credibility as far as the EU enlargement was concerned. It would be up to Mitterrand’s successor, Jacques Chirac, to redress the negative impressions creat-
ed, even at the price of a rather demagogic competition with Kohl for promising a fixed date for the accession of new candidates to the EU.

Some diplomats argued that the Confederation could have played a useful role, and that it was a “good idea too soon.”16 Paris had however misunderstood that Washington’s policy toward the new Europe was not simply geared to preserving NATO and the U.S. military presence but to redefining American political influence on the continent. Trying to separate the two tracks was indeed consistent with the French view about the role of the EC, but was not acceptable to Washington.

**Bosnia and the NATO 1997 Madrid Summit: Who Would Be Next?**

The enlargement debate clearly could not be isolated from external crises. The Bosnian war, which began in 1991 after Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared independence from the Yugoslav Federation, was critical. As Ron Asmus wrote: “NATO enlargement would never have happened absent the U.S. and NATO’s all-out and eventually successful effort to stop the war raging in Bosnia.”17

Bosnia had a decisive impact on the Paris-Washington relationship and on the way the French would see the need for NATO to adapt its structures and missions. While the Americans supported in principle the goal of European integration, they were determined to prevent the emergence of European security arrangements they feared could undermine NATO and particularly arrangements related to the Alliance’s integrated military structure. Persistent endeavors by the French to raise the profile of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO were therefore not welcomed. Since France simultaneously was putting much needed troops on the ground in Bosnia and hinting at its rapprochement with NATO in military matters, Washington was also eager not to confront Paris directly.

The Balkans were a huge shock for the candidate countries, who discovered that the end of the Warsaw Pact was not the anticipated recipe for stability and democracy in Europe and that NATO and the EU, because of the Gulf War and then Bosnian crisis, were not prioritizing enlargement in the way they had first assumed. The Bosnian wars would in due course represent an opportunity for some candidates to show
Beyond NATO Enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary

their contribution to NATO through the Partnership for Peace. A few of them sent small contingents to IFOR. Hungary distinguished itself by welcoming on its soil a useful logistical hub for NATO-led forces.

When Jacques Chirac was elected President of France in May 1995, he found the Bosnian crisis on the doorstep of his mandate when Serb forces took hostage 300 UNPROFOR soldiers, including some from France. UNPROFOR, set up in 1992 at the level of 14,000 troops, had limited operational flexibility and few military powers, due to political constraints introduced by the U.N. Security Council. Chirac ordered immediately a strong military reaction by the French contingent, bypassing U.N. local representative Yashusi Akashi. He also began, with the help of London and of a new European “Contact Group,” to develop plans for a Rapid Reaction Force to try to contain the growing ethnic conflict between Serbs and Muslims in the Balkans. Eventually the French would deploy up to 7,000 troops and suffer one-third of the casualties.

During President Chirac’s first visit to Washington on June 14, 1995, he was able to convince the Clinton White House and the Congressional leadership that the credibility of the West and NATO was at stake in this first open military conflict in Europe since World War II. It led to an important shift in U.S. policy.18

In the wake of the Serb attacks on Sarajevo, widespread ethnic cleansing and the atrocities of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, President Clinton decided upon greater American involvement, but still without any troops deployed on the ground (save some special forces in Croatia).

After the Dayton peace arrangement, when the conflict restarted in Kosovo, a massive NATO air operation began. For the first time since its creation, NATO was engaged into a real military operation. It proceeded with difficulties, especially regarding political control of the intervention by the North Atlantic Council. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, would later complain about “waging a war by committee,” and objected to the way British General Michael Jackson disobeyed his orders to stop the rush of the Russian contingent towards Pristina airport; Clark was particularly incensed by Jackson’s comment that he didn’t “want to be the first to begin the Third World War.”19
The Europeans, who bore the brunt of military actions on the ground while the American were deployed in the air, were unhappy with the whole affair and the new mood indirectly affected the debate about NATO enlargement.

It was unavoidable that the Balkans crisis would keep the French pushing the issue of the “European pillar” (ESDI) within NATO. Paris believed it had secured London’s support (as would later be confirmed in the French-British bilateral declaration at their St. Malo Summit on December 4, 1998). In exchange, France signaled its readiness to move closer to full integration into NATO military structures. In Paris, the Elysée had been convinced that progress had been made through confidential Franco-American conversations throughout the spring and summer of 1996, including at a foreign ministers’ meeting in Berlin in early June. Therefore, Paris was severely disappointed by Washington’s negative reaction to new and ambitious French proposals to reorganize NATO military commands, including that France would assume command of AFSOUTH in Naples, one of the two major NATO commands in the Mediterranean area, from the United States. On August 28 President Chirac made the tactical error to send a letter to President Clinton, detailing the proposals prepared by his staff, boxing himself into a hardline position. The letter would eventually leak. The Pentagon, which was in no mood for any concessions to Paris, was infuriated. Chirac was extremely upset and made it a personal issue in his relationship with Clinton. Washington began to fear that the French would make enlargement hostage to the reform of NATO. It poisoned the atmosphere for preparation of the Madrid NATO Summit of 1997.

Meanwhile, the work within the Alliance on enlargement was continuing. In December 1994 the North Atlantic Council started a “process of examination” inside the Alliance to determine how NATO would deal with enlargement. By fall 1995, based on a set of criteria set forth by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry (which came to be known as the “Perry principles”), Allies had agreed that candidates had to make commitments to democracy and market economy precepts, recognize the sovereignty of other countries, agree to NATO’s decision-making by consensus, develop interoperability, and to defend other Allies.
The Russians were cooperative enough at the time, while still opposing the enlargement of NATO. They agreed to send a military contingent to implement the Dayton Peace Accords, under the proviso that Russian forces would be under the “tactical command” of U.S. General George Joulwan in his U.S. role, rather than as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.

The mood begun to harden, however, after the Russian Duma elections of December 1995, the reelection of Yeltsin in 1996 and his choice of the more conservative Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister, replacing the Western-oriented Andrei Kozyrev.

As Moscow was again presenting alternative plans for postponing the enlargement, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded by stating publicly in Prague the unwavering U.S. commitment. It was only after the Clinton–Yeltsin meeting in Helsinki on March 21, 1997 that the Russians began to yield.

Worried about the prospect that Yeltsin might not remain in power for long, and in order to consolidate this progress, Washington decided to accelerate the diplomatic processes, setting as the goal a NATO Summit in June 1997, in order to take into account the need not to weaken Yeltsin by the time of the Russian elections in 1996.

Chirac was, however, still pleading to slow down the process, seeking to reassure Moscow about the meaning of enlargement, now that fractures were appearing within the Russian leadership.

Many in Washington shared this view of a “double track”—pushing for enlargement while trying to appease Russia with carrots of special arrangements. It was thus proposed to Moscow, as a demonstration of good will, that a “new relationship to NATO” would be announced. After intense discussions in and among European capitals and with Moscow, the “NATO Russia Founding Act” was signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.

The Founding Act stated that NATO and Russia “do not consider each other as adversaries,” and intended to develop “a strong, stable and enduring partnership.” The Act went as far as to envision “goals and mechanisms of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action,” and developing a broad program.
A key provision, which still resonates in the public debate more than two decades later, was a unilateral statement by NATO members that they “have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.” The Act also called for an adaptation of the CFE agreement to consider further conventional reductions. As far as the conventional posture was concerned, “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.”

Having thought that they had placated Moscow, the Allies had to decide whether to select a broad number of candidates or only a privileged few, and in the latter case, what to do with those not accepted in the next membership wave.

At the May 29-30, 1997 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Cintra, Portugal, differing views were expressed. The United States was steadfast in its support only for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, excluding Meciar’s Slovakia from the first round. Italy, France and some other Allies declared themselves also in favor of including Romania and Slovenia, given their internal political evolution and the need not to consider in the first round of enlargement only a “German security belt.” The United States, in turn, was concerned that the larger the first round, the more difficult it would be not to consider at the same time the Baltic countries. No agreement was reached. As Ronald Asmus recalled, “the Cintra meeting was a public relations disaster” and U.S. behavior was denounced in Paris “as hegemonic.”

Chirac, still bristling from the rejection of the French proposal about AFSOUTH, proved himself unyielding on including Romania at a June meeting with Clinton in the margins of the G-8 in Denver.

The NATO Madrid Summit on July 7-9 1997 opened therefore on a split: France and Italy, supported by 7 other allies, opted for a broader first round while the United States and 6 allies favored a smaller group of new members. Considerations about easier Congressional support for a limited number of candidates, the willingness to guarantee a sec-
Beyond NATO Enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary

ond round later for those excluded from Madrid, and strong ethnic lobbying by Polish and Czech minorities in the United States were important factors for Washington.

For Paris, close links with Romania and the wish to reestablish a balance between Central Europe and Southeast Europe was considered to be equally important. Italy was also keen to have Slovenia, a neighbor, on board.

During the Madrid meeting Clinton was able to rally German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to his side. After tense discussions, Clinton—who did not want to put Chirac into a difficult position (after he had recently lost parliamentary elections and was saddled with a “cohabitation” government largely hostile to a NATO rapprochement)—managed with the help of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to obtain a presentational change of the final communique, which was a face saver for France and Italy.

The option for a limited first round enlargement to the 3 Visegrád countries (minus Slovakia) was therefore adopted. As a way to demonstrate that NATO was willing to keep “an open door,” NATO agreed to intensify its individual dialogues with candidate countries. As Daniel Hamilton recounts in this volume, as a complementary effort Washington developed a Northern European Initiative and in January 1998 offered the three Baltic states a “Charter of Partnership.”

The long battle of ratification in the U.S. Senate saw foreign policy establishment luminaries such a U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, former defense secretary Robert McNamara, Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock, and Henry Kissinger criticize aspects of the Clinton Administration’s approach to NATO enlargement. George Kennan denounced NATO enlargement as an error of historic dimensions. Eventually, however, as Jeremy Rosner recounts in this volume, the U.S. Senate voted 80 against 19 for the ratification on May 1, 1998. An amendment asking the candidates to first join the EU before joining NATO was defeated on the floor. Senator Warner’s amendment to delay a second round of enlargement by three years received 44 votes, but was also defeated. At NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington on April 23-24 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary made their official debut in NATO as full members.
In France, the three protocols of accession by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were ratified on June 19, 1998. While debates focused on the implications for Russia, the Kosovo crisis and the costs involved (they were differences between NATO’s estimates and those of the U.S. administration’s General Accountability Office), they did not attract much attention. The French debate about further NATO enlargement also remained low key in ensuing years for the next few years, unlike those about the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU.

Consequently, it was not surprising when the Prague Summit of November 21-22, 2002 formally endorsed the candidacy of a second group of candidates, including the three Baltic countries as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Their accession was completed in May 2004. Albania and Croatia acceded in 2009 and Montenegro was admitted in June 2017.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, NATO had shifted its principal mission to the fight against terrorism and begun preparations to intervene in Afghanistan, where some candidate countries were already ready to deploy troops alongside the Alliance. At the Prague Summit, the main issue for the French was no longer enlargement but the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of some 21,000 troops that could be rapidly deployed. President Chirac, now in his second term, decided to participate in this initiative. For the first time, French troops were included into a NATO military force on a permanently rotating basis. He also offered to deploy French forces as part of NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan.

By 2002, the element of excitement and novelty that had surrounded the entry of the first group of Central European countries had evaporated. Each of the new candidates had gone through a long bureaucratic examination, often verging on the inconsequential.23

Soon, however, the problem of the Ukrainian and Georgian candidacies would split the Alliance and show that it was easier to speak about a “NATO Open Door policy” than it was to implement its implicit promise.

At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, President George W. Bush pushed Allies to offer a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine.
A majority, including France and Germany, was not convinced it was wise to go beyond the NATO-Ukrainian Charter of 1997. This was not just because of worries about Russia’s probable reaction, but also because of divisions within Ukrainian public opinion at the time. The most important consideration, however, was that NATO was not, at that time, ready to provide a security commitment either to Ukraine or to Georgia.

The dynamism of NATO enlargement in Europe was losing steam. Priority attention was devoted to NATO’s partnerships in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf (the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative proposed at the Summit of June 2004), and in Asia. The very concept of membership and association with NATO was thus evolving. As shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, the new focus was consistent with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s preference for “coalitions of the willing,” given that the “mission determined the coalition” and not the reverse.

At the same time, tensions grew between France and the United States due to the progress of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and of the severe rift over the 2003 Iraq war. The idea of Europe “whole and free” and NATO unity would be forgotten during this diplomatic crisis. In fact, by an ironic twist of history, the Bush Administration considered NATO enlargement to be a useful weapon against the stubborn French.

Rumsfeld was increasingly annoyed by what he saw as “French machinations” when it came to the intra-Alliance dispute over Iraq. He decided to take the offensive. In an interview with a Dutch journalist on January 22, 2003, he divided NATO into a cantankerous “Old Europe” and a “New Europe” that he characterized as more loyal to the United States:

> Now you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that it is old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members.²⁴

On February 5, 2003 Rumsfeld’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman wrote:
It is now clear that that our counterstrategy (against the French)—
bringing Central Europe and Eastern Europe in the game—is
winning. Your reference to old Europe not only brought into pub-
lic consciousness what has been evolving for some time. When
Central and Eastern Europe get into not only NATO but also the
EU, the French game is over!\textsuperscript{25}

On February 18, 2003, in a letter to President Bush, Rumsfeld as-
serted that “France is clearly trying to destroy NATO, in favor of the
EU.”

A few days later, Central and Eastern European ministers from the
self-designated “New Europe” published a letter of support for the
U.S. position on Iraq in the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, resulting in a strong
French reaction.

Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning at the State De-
partment, observed that U.S. efforts to forge alliances with the “new”
members could “break up an EU already diluted by its own eastward
enlargement.”\textsuperscript{26}

It was up to President Barack Obama in Prague in 2009 to reverse
this rhetoric and policy approach (which would however yet again be
resurrected by his successor Donald Trump): “in my view there is no
old Europe or new Europe. There is only a united Europe.”

Some years thereafter, however, the Russian interventions in Georgia
(2013) and Ukraine and Crimea (2014) were a wakeup call for NATO.

A new and much more fundamental debate opened up about the
cohesion of the Alliance. It was reminiscent of Alliance discussions in
the 1970s between the Central European front and the flanks, albeit in
a changed geostrategic context. The Baltic countries, Poland, Romania
and Bulgaria, with the support of Ukraine, were understandably de-
manding military “reassurance” and a new set of priorities for NATO.

While agreeing with the need to deal with those Allies’ security con-
cerns in Eastern and Central Europe, France and Southern European
Allies called for renewed attention to the situation on the southern rim
of the Alliance—the Mediterranean and the Sahel. In an era of global,
regional and local instabilities, the growing issue was whether NATO
should continue to deal primarily with threats stemming from Russia
or those emanating from its southern and southeastern periphery.
Who Lost Russia?

In contrast to the years when the West and Russia sought to find a role for Moscow as a partner of NATO in a new European order built around a larger NATO and a larger EU, today we are faced with a complete turnaround in Moscow’s position.

The shift was clearly expressed by Vladimir Putin in his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, when, among other accusations, he lambasted the expansion of “NATO infrastructures” up to the borders of Russia. Putin claimed that the West had purposefully exploited post-Soviet Russia’s state of weakness and that the Alliance’s open-door policy vis-à-vis the East was in contradiction “with the assurances given at the time.”

Putin’s 2007 revisionist views—constantly repeated since, and apparently shared by a large segment of Russian society—represented a complete reversal of his proclaimed solidarity with America in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and on the Pentagon in Virginia, and his promises to join George W. Bush in his fight against terrorism, including offering logistical support for NATO’s Afghanistan operations, opening its airspace, and granting Allies the use of Russia’s Central Asian airbases.27

From today’s perspective, it is perhaps hard to recall the positive atmosphere surrounding the first NATO-Russia Summit hosted by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at Pratica di Mare, near Rome, in May 2002. The Summit’s joint declaration stated that “today we are opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security.”

Such cordiality was short-lived. Within 5 years, Putin had grown hostile. NATO became “the enemy”—justifying in Putin’s mind a rebalancing of forces in Europe that, he hoped, would provide Russia with a new security zone and sphere of influence beyond its current post-1991 borders.

The Kremlin thus proved immune to the attempts of Obama Administration in March 2009 to achieve a “reset” of the Russian-American relationship. The Western decision to intervene in Libya worsened
the relationship. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014 deepened the break. Putin even justified Russian actions by suggesting they were equivalent to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. NATO-Russia Council meetings became largely irrelevant.

Did Moscow feel it was deceived by the West on enlargement? Or, more simply, did it believe, at the time, that it would never come? The answer to each question is no. Russia accepted the new larger NATO and even worked together with it.

The downward spiral in relations with the Kremlin since 2007 was triggered by a different series of events, including the planned deployment in Europe of missile defenses against a possible Iranian threat and, most certainly, U.S. and European support of the democratic movements in and around Russia. U.S. and EU help to the “Orange Revolution” and the later “Euromaidan” in Ukraine are the top items on Putin’s long list of grievances, due to the Kremlin’s fear of democratic contamination.

In sum, Moscow’s change of course vis-a-vis the West, after 20 years of NATO enlargement and attempts to build a stable relationship with Russia, has led to a situation in which NATO has become both a proclaimed enemy and an alibi for the Kremlin’s revisionist policy.

It also highlights the fact that for the Kremlin, NATO has been the security institution with the most far-reaching influence on the remaking of a post-Cold War order in Europe with which Russia has not yet resigned itself to live.
Notes


3. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn’s summary of the speech in a cable of February 9th (012107Z FEB 9) was that “Genscher warned that any attempt to extend “Nato military structures” to the territory of today’s structures would block German unity. In his vision of Europe, Genscher sees the Alliance continuing but assuming role a political than a military role. Genscher also stressed the need to maintain NATO as a framework for a continuing-and necessary-US presence in Europe.”


7. On the basis of information given to Paris by a KGB defector, Vladimir Vetrov. A large batch of intelligence (the Farewell files) were shared by Mitterrand at his first meeting with Reagan as a demonstration of the continuing Western orientation of France, notwithstanding the inclusion of communists in the government.


11. Moscow had made the signing of the Helsinki Act a precondition of the opening of the MBFR forces negotiations sought by Kissinger as a hedge against the Mansfield amendment on reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. The Europeans insisted on bringing the human rights element as a condition of the language of the Act on the “peaceful change of borders” (i.e. a reference to the eventual unification of Germany).


18. Secretary Baker had proclaimed that the whole affair was a European responsibility,” adding that “the United States didn’t have a dog in this fight.” Meanwhile European minister Jacques Poos had famously declared that “it was the “hour of Europe.” The key issue was the protection of the European troops on the ground, who needed U.S. support.


20. At the start there was a misunderstanding about the possibility of a European SACEUR, then the debate centered around AFSOUTH in Naples, possibly divided, and given to a French commander.

21. Thomas Friedman wrote that the “French want to control the 7th Fleet,” which of course was out of the question.

22. Asmus, op. cit., p. 221.

23. For example, when it was Romania's to be examined before the North Atlantic Council, the United States insisted, under pressure of an adoption lobby, that Romania continue to propose visas for those children. The same morning, the EU had castigated Bucharest for the practice of this very same trade. The defense expenditures of each country were evaluated according to whether they reached 2% of their GDP—a meaningless benchmark, if only because the inheritance of
bloated Warsaw Pact military structures and manpower. Security services had also a free hand to denounce alleged former pro-Soviet officials and require for demotion experienced army officers (they even accused the King of Romania, and future Prime Minister of the country, to have benefited during his Madrid exile from KGB subsidies).

24. Forgetting that the negative reference to “Old Europe” comes from Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848.

25. Rumsfeld Library. Feb 4 2003. (USDP Dep Sec I-03/001420)


27. The French Air Force flying into Afghanistan shared the same airport in Dushanbe with Russian planes.