Chapter 15
New Members, New Missions:
NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture in the
Second Clinton Administration

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With the advent of President Clinton’s second term, the evolving security architecture entered a new phase. The essential premise of U.S. strategy—that the United States, as a “European power,” needed to help engineer a new interlocking architecture that could anchor a Europe that was whole, free and at peace—had become foundational to operational policies as well as public statements by the President and senior officials.

Progress had been made on each element of the emerging architecture during the Administration’s first term. The prospect of walking through the doors of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions had accelerated aspirants’ efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; make sure soldiers served civilians, not the other way around; and resolve lingering ethnic and border disputes. With little fanfare, some small steps toward integration had been taken; 17 European countries had joined the Council of Europe, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had acceded to the OECD.

Nonetheless, there was no room for complacency. From Bosnia to Chechnya, more Europeans had died violently in the past five years than in the previous forty-five. Russia’s trajectory remained uncertain. The EU enlargement process seemed stalled. There was very real prospect of renewed bloodshed in the Western Balkans.

President Clinton’s new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, immediately underscored the urgency of the task. Europe’s democratic revolution was not complete, she said. Much still needed to be done. Right after assuming office she asked me and Tom Malinowski to help her with an Economist piece in her name to set the stage for her inaugural visits to European Allies as Secretary of State, and for decisions the Alliance would have to make over the next six months.
In the first term, the “how” and “why” of NATO enlargement had been determined. Now the “who” and “when” had to be answered, after which the ratification struggle had to begin. At the same time, the Administration’s promise of a “new NATO” required the Alliance to complete its own internal transformation by streamlining commands, promoting European capabilities and welcoming Spain and potentially France into the integrated military command. The proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council had to be implemented. Initiatives to integrate Russia, through a more robust NATO-Russia partnership and full participation in the G-8, had to move forward. A special relationship with Ukraine was still necessary.

It was also clear that NATO could open its door to some, but not yet to all, of the many aspirants seeking to join the Alliance. Already in the Clinton Administration’s first term U.S. officials had been clear that enlargement must naturally begin with the strongest candidates, but that NATO’s next new members would not be its last. My long-time friend and colleague Ron Asmus, who had been working informally with Administration officials while outside the Administration at the RAND Corporation, now joined the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, with responsibility for NATO and European regional political-military affairs. He argued successfully that the Administration’s strategy should be “small is beautiful plus robust Open Door.” This meant that only the strongest candidates should be invited for membership to ensure the principle of continued enlargement would be successfully established. That would pave the way for accession by others after that. This required a proactive strategy to reassure those not in the first wave that the door did indeed remain open to them, and to work together to create the conditions that would let them walk through that door.

President Clinton and his foreign policy team were now ready to advance the strategy. Significant decisions were made in a remarkable 44-day period between the May 27, 1997 meeting of NATO heads of state and government at the Élysée Palace with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the July 9, 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, when leaders formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. As U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter noted, the decisions all reinforced each other: “each was indispensable to the success
of the others and to the overall creation of a transatlantic security architecture that can succeed."^4

First, the Alliance chose the first new members because they were judged to be the most likely to gain the support of the legislatures in the 16 NATO member states. Administration officials echoed Richard Holbrooke’s mantra: NATO was not a club, it was a military alliance with high standards. Madeleine Albright drove home the point: “the enlargement of NATO must begin with the strongest candidates; otherwise it would not begin at all. But when we say that the first new members will not be the last, we mean it. And we expect the new members to export stability eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the expense of their neighbors.”^5

Second, the Alliance affirmed that its door remained open to additional European countries ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership. President Clinton stressed that NATO’s next invitations would not be the last. Secretary Perry’s fall 1996 comment set the tone: the answer to those not among the first three was not “no,” it was “not yet.” The Alliance engaged in a new phase of individual dialogues to help aspirants understand the implications of Article 5 responsibilities, work through obstacles to eventual membership, and maintain positive momentum.

Third, the Alliance decided to strengthen the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which then embraced 27 countries, including countries that weren’t even part of the Warsaw Pact, including Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Allies agreed to the U.S. proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council, which they renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), to replace the defunct NACC and become the political voice of the Partnership for Peace: a forum for intensified political and security consultations and decision-making among Allies and partners on common activities.

Fourth, the Allies negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter and its operating arm, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, recognizing tacitly that the future of Ukraine could well be the key to many other Alliance strategic plans and objectives.

Fifth, NATO and Russia signed their Founding Act creating a Permanent Joint Council as the mechanism for Russia-NATO cooperation
on a range of issues, from peacekeeping and theatre missile defense to nuclear safety, terrorism and disaster relief, all as part of a comprehensive and cooperative security architecture. NATO reiterated that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” in the foreseeable future to station nuclear weapons on new members’ soil, but that it may do so should the need arise. NATO further stated that military infrastructure “adequate” to assure new members’ security under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would be maintained on their territory. The Alliance pledged not to place “substantial combat forces” in the “current and foreseeable security environment” on new members’ territory, but underscored an intention to increase interoperability, integration, and reinforcement capabilities with the new states. In Paris, President Clinton declared that the quest for security in Europe “is not a zero sum game, where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss and Russia’s strength is an Alliance weakness. That is old thinking, these are new times.”

Sixth, NATO continued its internal adaptation by creating the means to build the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, rather than separate from it, slimming down NATO’s military command structure, reducing the number of headquarters from 65 to 20, preparing forces for operations under the command and control of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters and comparable arrangements—one of which was represented by SFOR in Bosnia—and to improve its ability to conduct operations with nonmembers. These and related reforms enabled the full integration of Spain into NATO’s military command. France inched closer, although Chirac in the end was not prepared to agree to full reintegration.

Five months after the Madrid Summit, NATO foreign ministers joined their counterparts from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and signed the protocols of accession. In that same week, the European Council agreed to begin accession negotiations with the same three countries, as well as Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus.

The “Litmus Test”

Major pieces of the architecture were now in place, but Secretary Albright pushed on the Baltic issue, which she called a “litmus test” of our overall strategy of integration. She said that there was perhaps no
part of Europe which suffered more from the old politics of the Cold War and the zero-sum philosophy of the Cold War than did the Baltic republics. That was why there could be no better example of our success and the benefits of win-win cooperation than this region—if we got it right. She looked at Ron Asmus at the time and said, “Where is the strategy?” A team of us were put together to develop one. The result was essentially the Baltic Action Plan on steroids. It consisted of two elements: a Northern European Initiative and a U.S-Baltic Charter, anchored by a joint Commission.

During this time John Kornblum had moved on to become U.S. Ambassador to Germany. His successor as Assistant Secretary was Marc Grossman, who had been U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. As one of his first acts Grossman flew to the region in September 1997 to present the Northern European Initiative (NEI). The key goal of the NEI was to encourage stronger cooperation with and among the countries of the region, creating the conditions in which the question of integration, while controversial at the time, could be posed more positively in the future. The NEI was an effort to build closer ties to Nordic countries while embedding our engagement with the Baltic states in a broader framework that sought to create stronger regional cooperation (including the northwestern region of Russia) and cross-border relations in terms of business promotion, law enforcement, civil society, environment, energy, and public health. In each of these areas we established a number of concrete projects and activities. We knew that the United States wouldn’t be the major player in these areas, but we thought we could play a modest and, in some niche areas, a crucial role. We were prepared to be a junior partner or a bigger partner depending upon the issue and depending upon what we could bring to the table.

Like the Baltic Action Plan, the NEI consisted of three tracks. The first was to help Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania help themselves to become the strongest possible candidates for Western integration. Political goals included managing expectations regarding NATO, establishing Partnership commissions, facilitating border treaties, supporting recommendations of the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities regarding inter-ethnic issues, starting EAPC regional discussions on security issues, and promoting inter-Baltic cooperation. Economic initiatives included facilitating Baltic entry into the WTO, promoting an open investment climate, and prodding Baltic-Russian
commercial cooperation. Military goals included support for NATO activities, exploring eventual CFE accession, supporting the decommissioning of the Skrunda radar facility in Latvia in 1999, and increasing Baltic receptivity to Russian participation in regional PfP activities. We also sought to expand regional capabilities to fight transnational organized crime and establish effective export control and non-proliferation regimes.

The second track we called “Nordics Plus,” which meant coordinating approaches with the Nordic countries, as well as Germany, Poland and the European Union on Russia/Baltic relations, a U.S. observer role in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), energizing commercial activities in the region, promoting regional energy strategies, and urging Nordic/German mentor roles in NATO activities, including the creation and strengthening of the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTS-EA) Forum of 14 Western nations, which was intended to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania develop their defense and eventually join NATO. We believed our Northern Europe Initiative and the European Union’s Northern Dimension could complement and reinforce one another. 10

The third track was to implement the kind of inclusive policy toward Russia envisioned in the Baltic Action Plan. This included enhanced cooperation among embassies in the Nordic and Baltic states and Russia, engaging regional public/private policy makers, including Kaliningrad in regional cooperation, linking SEED/Freedom Support Act activities, promoting military-military cooperation with regard to the Kola Peninsula, responding to Russian proposals on confidence- and security-building measures, urging joint planning for Baltic ports and other infrastructure projects, regional environmental objectives through the CBSS, coordinating nuclear waste management programs, and promoting the U.S. role in the CBSS task force on organized crime.

As Strobe Talbott put it, our goal was to encourage Russia, over time, “to view this region not as a fortified frontier but as a gateway; not as a buffer against invaders who no longer exist, but as a trading route and a common ground for commerce and economic development—in a word, that Russia will come to view the Baltics Hanseatically.” 11 President Clinton and Secretary Albright believed that Russia would have to make that psychological and political adjustment itself, by its own lights, for its own reasons, in keeping with its own evolving concept of
its national interest. But we and our European partners could help by applying the general principle of inclusiveness. That meant involving Russia to the greatest extent possible in the commercial, political, environmental and other forms of collaboration we were developing among the states along the littoral of the Baltic Sea. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the Arctic Council were models of what was required, and the United States would participate as appropriate.\(^\text{12}\)

The second initiative was to give our activities through the Baltic Action Plan a higher political profile via a U.S.-Baltic “Charter of Partnership,” to be signed by President Clinton and the three Baltic presidents, affirming our common goal of fostering the deeper integration of the Baltic states into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Ron led the negotiating team, which I joined. Initially, each of the Baltic states wanted its own bilateral charter; we had to convince them that a single document signed by four presidents conveyed a stronger message of support than three separate documents.

On January 16, 1998 the four presidents signed the Charter of Partnership, otherwise known as the Baltic Charter—a political statement of common principles intended to guide the deepening of mutual cooperation and advance common objectives, including, explicitly, “Baltic integration into the European and transatlantic institutions, such as the European Union, OSCE, the World Trade Organization and NATO.” While the Baltic Charter did not specifically provide a U.S. guarantee of Baltic security or NATO membership, it did confirm the Baltic republics’ inherent right to choose their own security arrangements. At the signing ceremony, President Clinton left little doubt of his commitment: “America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through [NATO’s] door.”\(^\text{13}\)

The goal of the Charter and accompanying measures was to help the leaders of these countries shift from a preoccupation that they might be left in some kind of a gray zone and instead focus on what they needed to do to make themselves the strongest possible candidates for future integration to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Marc Grossman said,
This administration’s Baltic policy can be summed up in three words: Champion of integration. We want the United States to be the champion of integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic institutions. That is what the Baltic Charter is all about...This is a race that the Baltic states have to run themselves. But they understand that this race is a marathon, not a sprint. The point is to stay in the race and finish. We can help coach them--and make it clear that one day we want them to successfully cross the finish line.\textsuperscript{14}

The Charter created a Baltic Partnership Commission to advance the integration of the Baltic nations into transatlantic and European structures. The Commission continued efforts as set forth under the Baltic Action Plan. It sought to enhance regional cooperation by promoting Baltic, Russian, and Nordic participation in regional and international organizations. It quickly moved forward with a number of initiatives, for instance the Baltic-American Partnership Fund (BAPF), which was established by the United States Agency for International Development and the Open Society Foundations. Each organization initially provided $7.5 million to be spent over a ten-year period on the continued development of civil society in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.\textsuperscript{15} The three Baltic presidents jointly announced that they would establish national commissions to study the period of the Holocaust and of the totalitarian rule in each of their countries. The Pentagon worked with each Baltic state to establish long-term defense modernization plans that would help them develop small but modern and capable militaries. The Administration and Congress also agreed to significantly increase security assistance for the Baltic states under the Warsaw Initiative program.

\textbf{Triple Crown}

As the NATO ratification debate proceeded, the Clinton Administration’s thinking was already shifting to what a larger NATO’s purposes could be, and how NATO should relate to other instruments of U.S. engagement. Secretary Albright wanted forward thinking. In fall 1997 I wrote a memo to her arguing that while the enlargement debate was likely won, size was not purpose. In future the Alliance would not only take in new members, it was likely to take on new missions. The
Alliance would need to maintain the Open Door and help to create conditions by which new members could add their strength to ours, while simultaneously aligning our NATO strategy with our overall architectural effort to position the transatlantic partnership as a geostrategic base from where we and our European partners, acting through and with our various institutions—including the EU—could address new threats to our common values and interests, many of which would come from outside of Europe. Albright liked the idea and asked me to follow up with Marc Grossman and Ron Asmus, with whom I had already been working closely.

Albright then pushed these themes at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in December 1997. Even as the Allies signed the agreements with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to bring them into the alliance, Secretary Albright urged a wider NATO strategy to deal with other looming challenges, including the threat from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or countries like Libya, Iraq and Iran.

My boss Greg Craig asked me to prepare talking points for a new transatlantic bargain and to join him at the Secretary’s annual retreat with her senior advisors on January 9, 1998. There, together with Marc Grossman, we pitched our ideas. She was receptive and asked us to send her a more detailed outline.

I worked with Ron and Marc to formulate a memo sent to Secretary Albright on January 15 proposing that the Administration use 1999 to define a new transatlantic bargain for the 21st century premised on the need for the United States and Europe to work together in an expanded transatlantic framework to solve problems both inside and outside of Europe. The premise of the strategy was two-fold: the United States remained a European power, and the transatlantic partnership remained America’s geostrategic base when it came to global issues.

We prepared a speech for Secretary Albright before the New Atlantic Initiative on February 9 placing NATO enlargement in the context of our broader goals for our relations with Europe. There, she said that

It is my great hope that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be part of a transatlantic partnership that is not only broader, but deeper as well; a partnership that is a force for peace from the
Middle East to Central Africa; a partnership that has overcome barriers to trade across the Atlantic; a partnership strong enough to protect the environment and defeat international crime; a partnership that is united in its effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the overriding security interest of our time.

However old or new the challenges we face, there is still one relationship that more than any other will determine whether we meet them successfully, and that is our relationship with Europe. The transatlantic partnership is our strategic base—the drivewheel of progress on every world-scale issue when we agree, and the brake when we do not.16

The goal was to foster an inclusive, more self-confident and outward-looking Europe as a strategic partner for the United States in all these areas. As we opened our institutions to new members, we needed to expand the scope of our partnership to new areas.

Grossman billed this strategy as advancing the “Triple Crown” of mutual security, prosperity and democratic values. We identified three challenges that the United States and Europe had to address in coming decades.

The first challenge was within Europe: to support the continuing integration of the continent and build a broader Euro-Atlantic community, including new partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. The second challenge was between Europe and America: to deepen the bonds between our societies—the foundation of our relationship—as a positive force for change in the world. That meant building down commercial barriers to foster a closer, more open economic relationship, continuing to foster people-to-people exchanges, and generating closer political ties bilaterally and with the European Union. The third challenge extended beyond Europe and America: to improve our ability to deal jointly with challenges in the wider world—whether political, military, economic, criminal or environmental—that neither of us would be able to confront effectively alone.

We viewed these goals as mutually reinforcing. A safer, freer, more prosperous Europe was more likely to be America’s global partner. And a more cohesive, outward-looking Europe that could act was more like-
ly to be able to manage broad forces of change that could challenge stability, prosperity and democracy on the European continent.

At its core, the Triple Crown was our effort to make more explicit and operational what was, for the first time in European history, broad and implicit agreement across most of the continent that our underlying task—and opportunity—was to create a secure and increasingly prosperous community of democracies. Defining security in this broad sense had enabled us to project a new vision for the United States and Europe building together a “cooperative security space.” This “common space” rested on a foundation of shared values, common norms of behavior and mutually-reinforcing institutions, and reached beyond the outdated frontiers of the Cold War.

Under the Triple Crown strategy, each of the three major pillars of the architecture—NATO, U.S.-EU relations, and the OSCE—would need to undergo further adaptation to reposition the U.S-European relationship so it could stabilize the European continent while advancing U.S. and European values and interests beyond Europe. The strategy required a new NATO with expanded missions, the reorientation of U.S.-EU relations to global challenges, and a retooled OSCE to promote democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. Major summits were scheduled for each of these architectural pillars in 1999; the strategy foresaw using the three summits—Grossman called it the ‘trifecta’—to advance this new bargain.¹⁷

First, however, the U.S. Senate had to agree to let the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland walk through NATO’s open door. As Jeremy Rosner recounts in this volume, the Administration mounted a major effort to secure a successful outcome. On April 29, 1998, by a vote of 80-19, the U.S. Senate ratified the accession of the three countries to the North Atlantic Treaty.

**New Missions**

Senate ratification was a new high in the Administration’s campaign to reposition the transatlantic partnership for a new era. The ratification debates on each side of the Atlantic, however, revealed some potentially dangerous faultlines when it came to perceptions of NATO’s purpose and its relevance to future security challenges. In essence, dif-
ferences centered over the degree to which the Alliance should take on out-of-area challenges.

President Clinton framed the issue in a speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Berlin airlift on May 13, 1997: “Yesterday’s NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow’s NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.”

A new debate had emerged. Clinton’s ambitious vision for the Alliance was overwhelming to those who believed that NATO’s singular mission was to stabilize the European continent and to provide a hedge against a possibly resurgent or instable Russia. Proponents of this view argued that NATO, at its core, was essentially an insurance policy. Securing the territorial integrity of Europe and North America was an historic achievement. Alliances were inherently fragile, however, and doing more threatened strategic overload. Europeans who subscribed to this view were unenthusiastic about reorienting their militaries away from the traditional, less urgent and now relatively cheap mission of protecting European territory toward a more controversial, distant and expensive—if arguably more urgent—mission of addressing out-of-area challenges.

Having just become accustomed to the notion of a larger Alliance, many viewed this new debate as an attempt to shift the strategic goalposts. They argued that an effort to move NATO towards defending common interests underestimated current transatlantic problems, overlooked continuing dangers in Europe, risked the achievements of the past decade, and was yet another example of inconsistent U.S. priorities. Americans who shared this perspective added that the more successful the United States was in maintaining peace on the European continent at relatively low cost, the freer the United States would be to deal with security challenges elsewhere. Collective defense, together with enlargement, they said, was sufficient glue to hold the Alliance together. Their basic argument, to coin an old American homily, was “if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”

Others, primarily in the United States, argued that while NATO was not yet “broke,” it soon would be if Allies did not wake up to new dangers. The old glue was not enough; to survive, NATO needed to
be capable of addressing new sources of conflict, most of which were beyond Europe’s borders. They contended that in the new century the transatlantic community was more likely to face threats emanating from outside of Europe than from within it, whether posed by weapons of mass destruction, threats of disrupted energy flows, or instability in the former Soviet space or the Greater Middle East. A ballistic missile attack using an agent of mass destruction from a rogue state (concerns were growing about Libyan, Iranian and Iraqi capabilities) would be every bit as much an Article 5 threat as a Warsaw Pact tank had been two decades earlier. Similarly, non-Article 5 threats, if not addressed early and effectively, could grow into Article 5 threats. Bosnia and Kosovo were examples. NATO, they asserted, should be our instrument of choice when Europeans and Americans decided to address military security challenges together. That meant it would need to be further adapted to be capable of addressing a spectrum of Article 5 and non-Article 5 challenges.

A third line of argument began to appear that essentially called for a division of labor: Europeans should worry about security in Europe and Americans should worry about security beyond Europe. Republican U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas (who, by 2017, ironically, had become U.S. Ambassador to NATO) became a prominent proponent of this view as part of the ratification debate.

The Clinton Administration believed the division of labor argument to be a false choice. It would leave the United States with the much more demanding and dangerous assignment. It would deprive Europeans of a voice on out-of-area challenges and relieve them of any broader sense of responsibility for common security dangers, even though Europe was just as wealthy and had similar global interests. It would also end America’s still fundamental role as a European power. It would reinforce European inwardness and resentment, exacerbate American tendencies to pull away from European concerns, and ultimately corrode the Alliance.

For Washington, the real choice was not division of labor but a shared sense of risk and responsibility to respond to the challenges that faced the Atlantic community. The Clinton Administration wanted Europeans to step up and assume greater responsibility for security in Europe—but they also realized that the United States remained an
essential element of stability on the continent. Administration officials understood that by virtue of its global posture, Washington would need to assume much of the burden defending common interests elsewhere—but they also realized that Europe was similarly challenged by such threats, and had resources and capabilities to contribute. Article 5 was and should remain the heart of the Washington Treaty. But Allies had to recognize that Article 5 threats could come from sources beyond NATO’s immediate borders.

“If you ask where U.S. and European forces could face conflict in the decades ahead,” Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering said, “the answer must include scenarios beyond NATO’s borders. During the Cold War, it made sense for Europeans to concentrate on the threat to their own territory and for the U.S. to assume the primary responsibility for defending common transatlantic interests elsewhere. But such an arrangement makes less sense at a time when the direct territorial threat to Europe has diminished, and when new threats to our common interests may come from beyond NATO’s immediate borders.”

In short, ratification of NATO enlargement was an important step, but only a step, toward a new transatlantic bargain. The Policy Planning memo crystallized the debate and argued that on this fundamental question, NATO needed to continue to stabilize the European continent, but increasingly had to be prepared to address challenges emanating from beyond Europe. The Secretary’s January 9 retreat clarified our need to move ahead with this adapted approach. Senate ratification on April 29 enabled the administration to move forward with its broader vision for the transatlantic partnership, in which the two sides of the North Atlantic would continue to build a Europe whole and free while simultaneously developing the capacity to address challenges and threats from beyond Europe. The “trifecta” of major upcoming summits afforded an opportunity to further develop the mutually reinforcing nature of the institutional construct in ways that would not only address Europe’s security challenges, but also position the United States and Europe to deal with challenges of a broader nature.

Administration officials now began to articulate the Triple Crown message. Meeting with her NATO counterparts in Luxembourg in May 1998, Secretary Albright talked about the President’s desire to start a conversation on how we could best build a new and all-encom-
passing Euro-Atlantic partnership for the 21st century—and the role NATO should play as a key pillar in that partnership. The essence of that vision was a deeper form of cooperation with a Europe that could act as a partner—on the continent, across the Atlantic, and in the wider world. NATO would be the institution of choice when the United States and Europe had to act together militarily. The goal should be to create a larger, more flexible NATO committed to collective defense and capable of defending against a wide range of threats to our common interests, both on and beyond the European continent. NATO would need to develop the defense capabilities to provide the forces for Article 5 collective defense and non-Article 5 crisis response missions.

Essentially, Albright was laying out the U.S. vision statement for NATO in advance of the Alliance’s 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999. In our view it was essential to break through the perception that NATO was only about keeping Europe stable, and to get Allies to embrace the idea of a common transatlantic community defending common values and interests.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen forcefully elaborated on this approach at a NATO defense ministers meeting in Villamoura, Portugal on September 24, 1998. The United States wanted to adapt NATO’s defense capabilities to provide forces for Article 5 collective defense and non-Article 5 crisis response missions. EAPC Partners should be involved as much as possible in Alliance activities, particularly non-Article 5 missions. “Risks will remain unpredictable and multidirectional,” Cohen said. “We must...commit ourselves to develop the defense capabilities required to carry out the full spectrum of existing and future missions.” That included addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by both state and non-state actors, which, Cohen contended, “is arguably our most significant potential Article 5 threat.”

Cohen argued that NATO’s new Strategic Concept, slated to be unveiled at the Washington NATO Summit, had to reflect the evolving strategic environment, building upon language from 1991 that stated “Alliance security must take account of the global context” and that “NATO must be capable of responding to multifaceted and multidirectional risks” if stability in Europe was to be preserved. “The crises will no longer come to us,” he said. “We must go to the crises....We
may operate as an Alliance, an Alliance with Partners, or NATO could provide forces to WEU for operations outside Alliance territory.”

Cohen was quick to say that “this does not involve a global peacekeeping role for NATO,” but he underscored that “our history as an Alliance is clear proof that we have interests in common that go beyond Article 5 defense of territory.”

Following these ministerial presentations, on October 28, 1998 I joined Grossman to present the Triple Crown concept to a “chiefs of mission” conference of U.S. Ambassadors posted throughout Europe. The upcoming summits (NATO, U.S.-EU and OSCE) presented a unique opportunity for the United States to articulate and build support for a new Euro-Atlantic partnership that would shape our political, economic and security interaction in coming decades. A Triple Crown task force was organized within the State Department to develop and integrate the substantive policy and outreach activities in the U.S. and Europe. I was asked to work with Grossman’s Principal Deputy Tony Wayne, and Ron Asmus as co-leader of the Task Force, also in my brief capacity as Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

Each of the three major pillars of the architecture—NATO, the U.S.-EU partnership, and the OSCE—now needed to evolve.

The United States presented a package of proposals for the spring 1999 NATO Washington summit. They were designed to highlight its view of a new NATO for the new century, as set forth by Albright and Cohen. The core of the package was to be a new Strategic Concept that emphasized a larger NATO assuming new missions to project stability beyond its immediate borders as one central pillar of a new Euro-Atlantic community. Reinforcing NATO as the institution of choice when North America and Europe decide to act together to address military security challenges would keep the United States engaged as a European power, while giving Washington credible and reliable partners to address security contingencies outside of Europe, and giving European countries a greater voice in U.S. regional diplomacy, for instance in the Middle East. NATO would have real and meaningful military missions securely tied to serious threats to Western vital interests, thereby renewing the Alliance’s sense of purpose. And transatlantic preventive diplomacy and deterrence strategy would be deeply connected to NATO’s potential use of force and thereby strengthened. To meet these
goals, force structures and doctrine would need to be realigned. European capabilities would also have to be improved, either as part of a NATO mission or in “separable but not separate” efforts to address security challenges should the United States, or NATO, choose not to be involved.

The other parts of the architecture also needed tending.

The United States, the EU, and the Struggle to be Strategic

U.S.-EU summits were now held twice a year as part of the New Transatlantic Agenda agreed in 1995, and a vast range of operational dialogues now took place among U.S. and EU interlocutors from across many different government agencies. The EU was not only America’s major economic partner, it brought real resources to the foreign policy table, making some of Washington’s most important initiatives possible. U.S.-EU common or complementary efforts were beginning to show some effect, from promoting nuclear safety in Ukraine and Russia to responding to hurricane disaster in Central America and defending human rights in many parts of the globe. The EU’s $1.9 billion aid package for the Palestinians was fundamental to the Middle East peace process, and its aid to Eastern Europe—including Bosnia—was as large in real dollar terms as the amount America gave to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan. Together the United States and the European Union accounted for 90 percent of humanitarian aid around the world.28

Nonetheless, despite best efforts, the U.S.-EU relationship had still not overcome its image as a technocratic exercise with an overabundance of process disproportionate to actual output, a repository of issues dealt with in rather ad hoc fashion by a range of disparate agencies, with little sense of urgency or overall direction. Priorities were often mismatched; the United States looked for efficiency and concrete outcomes, while the EU sought legitimacy and symbolic U.S. validation of the ongoing process of European integration. Relations were beset by competitive impulses, underlying questions of trust, and mutual doubts about relative commitment and capacity.

The U.S.-EU relationship was close, but it was not strategic, in the sense that partners would share assessments about issues vital to both
on a continuous and interactive basis; be able to deal with the daily grind of immediate policy demands while identifying longer-term challenges to their security, prosperity and values; and be able to prioritize those challenges and harness the full range of resources at their disposal to advance common or complementary responses. The U.S.-EU partnership simply punched below its weight.

In other regions of the world, the Clinton Administration was advancing an ambitious economic agenda; it was implementing NAFTA, seeking to open trade throughout the Americas, and advancing APEC’s goal to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. The U.S.-EU New Transatlantic Agenda, in contrast, set forth a relatively modest objective of building down transatlantic commercial barriers and addressing trade and investment obstacles case-by-case. Moreover, even this incremental approach had been completely overshadowed by EU fury with such U.S. laws as the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, U.S. challenges to the EU’s “banana and beef” regimes, and other disputes.

Two U.S. Undersecretaries, Stuart Eizenstat and Thomas Pickering, the lead State Department officials driving the NTA process, sought to move the ball forward. I was involved in an internal working group that sought to give more substantive weight to our efforts to render the U.S.-EU partnership more effective. The premise of our work was that U.S. goals with respect to Europe—our most important trade and investment partner—should be no less ambitious than those in Asia and Latin America.

One challenge was to make the global dimension of the U.S.-EU partnership more operational so that we could act more effectively and quickly together in fast-breaking crises; identify and manage our differences before they impair our ability to work together; and, better anticipate and prevent emerging threats.29 We started work to advance this dimension of the relationship at the spring 1999 U.S.-EU summit in Bonn.

We were also ready to consider again a more ambitious economic partnership, perhaps even revive the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA). We found an ally in Leon Brittan, the European Commission Vice President and Commissioner for Trade, who by spring 1998 was ready to advance plans for a “New Transatlantic Mar-
ketplace” (NTM). The NTM proposal envisaged a political commitment to eliminate all industrial tariffs by 2010, create a free trade area in services, relax restrictions on intellectual property, remove technical barriers to trade through mutual product recognition and harmonization of standards, and conclude a bilateral agreement on investment.

The NTM proposal was adopted by the Commission on March 11, 1998. If implemented, it would have represented a huge leap forward in EU-U.S. relations. In the end, however, Brittan was unable to find sufficient support among EU member states. France was vociferous in its opposition, and Europeans were furious at U.S. sanctions legislation in the form of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato laws directed at Cuba and Iran/Libya, respectively, which had also affected European companies.

The proposals also found only lukewarm support from the Washington trade establishment. Other trade disputes were weighing down the relationship, and Brittan’s plan ruled out audiovisual services and the possibility of negotiating agricultural subsidies, which would have been key incentives for U.S. support.

In the end, the most we could muster was the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), an initiative launched at the London U.S.-EU Summit on May 18, 1998. Elements of Brittan’s proposals were salvaged, but the TEP was a watered-down version of the far more ambitious NTM. Work began to flesh out an action plan, which was launched at the U.S.-EU Summit in December 1998. The action plan initiated what were still relatively ambitious efforts to reduce barriers and improve regulatory cooperation in a dozen areas ranging from biotechnology, services and food safety to trade-related labor and environmental issues.  

Defining the OSCE’s Niche

The OSCE was the third pillar of the architecture. Since the 1994 Budapest Summit it had been engaged in three major ways. The first was via conceptual discussion of the European security model; the second was through the growth and changing nature of its field missions; and the third was as a framework to accommodate Russian concerns and adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect post-Cold War realities.
Partially in response to Russian disappointment at not having the OSCE formally designated at Budapest as the leading European security organization, the OSCE states launched an ongoing dialogue on a comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. By 1996 a rough consensus had formed around a model of common and cooperative security, in which interlocking institutions in the OSCE area would collaborate in a nonhierarchical fashion on the basis of comparative advantage. This approach reflected a general assumption that the major security problems Europe would face at the end of the Cold War would come from conflicts not between but within states. Ethnic and national minority issues and the disintegration of states were major challenges. The principle of cooperation among mutually reinforcing institutions became the central theme of the OSCE’s approach to the new security model for Europe.32

As these discussions continued, the OSCE’s niche in the evolving security architecture was being defined on the ground through the growth and character of its operations in the field, which significantly increased and deepened its conflict prevention and management role and capabilities. Field missions in Estonia and Latvia had helped ensure Russia’s continued fulfillment of its commitment to withdraw its military forces from the Baltic states, a process that was essentially complete by late 1994. The OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh and field missions in Georgia, Moldova and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remained busy. A field mission was established in Kyiv on constitutional law and economics. And as the war in Chechnya developed, Moscow surprised almost everyone by agreeing to accept an OSCE field presence in Chechnya in 1995. In January 1998 Belarus accepted the presence of an OSCE Monitoring and Advisory Group.33

Most significantly, after the Dayton Accords were agreed, the OSCE was entrusted—in tandem with the EU—with some of the most important aspects of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction in the Balkans. The United States gave wholehearted support to the OSCE’s post-Dayton role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, overseeing elections and implementing the Dayton Agreement’s disarmament and confidence-building provisions.34 An OSCE field mission was also established in Croatia in July 1996.
The United States also used the OSCE as a platform to address some of Russia’s most pressing security concerns. For instance, Russia complained that the CFE flank agreement limits were outdated and hampered its response to the security problems presented by the conflict in Chechnya. In November 1995 the thirty states parties, led by the United States, agreed to consider revising the flank provisions, and in May 1996 adopted changes to the areas included as part of the flank and agreed upon what amounted to more generous allotments for Russia for permanent and temporary deployments of troops and treaty-limited equipment in the region. The revisions were ratified by the U.S. Senate in a 100-0 vote, and went into force in mid-1997. Similarly, various CFE review conferences had led to agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty from its now-outdated bloc-to-bloc structure to a system of national and territorial limits. Negotiations began in 1997.

The next stage in the OSCE’s evolution would come at its Istanbul Summit, which was scheduled for fall of 1999. We began to lay the groundwork for the Summit. Our major goal was to solidify the OSCE as the institution of choice for conflict resolution, expansion and protection of democracy and democratic institutions, defense of human rights, and identifying and addressing economic issues that could lead to conflict and threats to security. We sought to promote new tools such as police monitoring to allow greater proactive use of OSCE institutions in situations that seemed headed for instability or conflict. We were also keen to encourage the continued use of OSCE field missions. Such missions could serve as useful platforms offering synergies among various institutions and NGOs active on the ground in conflict or post-conflict situations. All of this underscored our approach to build mutually-reinforcing, non-hierarchical relations among complementary organizations.

“Hallelujah!”

On March 12, 1999, I joined Ron Asmus, Dan Fried, a number of members of Congress, and Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan, Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi, and Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek on Secretary Albright’s plane to the Harry S. Truman Library & Museum in Independence, Missouri. There she would sign a paper formally acknowledging receipt of the documents of ac-
cession by the three countries to the North Atlantic Treaty. Albright, a Czech-born refugee to the United States, chose the accession ceremony site to honor Truman, whom she often called “my first President,” and to affirm to the American public the importance of the transatlantic Alliance.

As each foreign minister spoke at the ceremony about the significance of the moment, a palpable hush enveloped the room—but the underlying emotions were electric. Using different turns of phrase, each European spoke of returning home to a democratic community of shared values, and of their conviction that their tragic histories of oppression were finally at an end. Geremek, who as a leading Polish dissident in the 1980s had helped engineer the rise of the Solidarnosc trade union, declared that Poland was “no longer alone. Today it returns where it belongs—to the free world.” Martonyi said the ceremony signified Hungary’s “manifest destiny to return to its natural habitat.” Kavan said “the Czech traumas of this century have now been relegated forever to history.”

Then Albright strode to the table on which, in May 1947, President Truman signed legislation providing $400 million of aid to Greece and Turkey, thereby giving reality to the Truman Doctrine announced that spring, and on which, on August 2, 1952, he signed a NATO protocol which would have brought the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO as part of the European defense community. While that protocol never came into effect, its objective was realized when Germany entered NATO in May 1955.

Albright quickly signed the process verbal, attesting to the fact she had received the instruments of accession document. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were now members of NATO. She captured the emotion of the moment by quoting what she called an “old Central European expression”: “Hallelujah.”

The ceremony marked the culmination of years of intensive effort. Yet Albright was intent on making her audience understand that enlargement was “only one element” of a larger goal. “NATO enlargement is not an event; it is a process,” she declared. She framed that process within our overall efforts to create a new structure of security in which NATO’s door would remain open, in which Russia and Ukraine and Europe’s other democracies could find a place, and in which the
interlocking institutions of Euro-Atlantic architecture would work together in mutually reinforcing ways. “Although NATO stands tall, it does not stand alone,” she said. “The EU, OSCE and NATO and its partners form the core of a broader system for protecting vital interests and promoting shared values.”

Such a structure would not only be essential to ensure European stability, it offered a foundation from which Europe and North America could address future challenges, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, that could emanate far from European shores. The Truman Library event marked “the end of one era and the beginning of another,” she told reporters. She used the occasion to turn attention to NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary summit in Washington, at which the Alliance was slated to present a new Strategic Concept—a blueprint for NATO in the 21st Century.

That blueprint would design an Alliance that was “not only bigger, but also more flexible; an Alliance committed to collective defense, and capable of meeting a wide range of threats to its common interests; an Alliance working in partnership with other nations and organizations to advance security, prosperity and democracy in and for the entire Euro-Atlantic region.” She reiterated that collective defense was the “core mission” of the Alliance. But she was quick to add that

NATO’s founders understood that what our alliance commits us to do under Article V is not all we may be called upon to do, or should reserve the right to do. Consider, for example, that when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman signed the North Atlantic Treaty, he characterized it as “insurance against all risks—a system of common defense against any attack, whatever its nature.”

During the Cold War, we had no trouble identifying the risks to our security and territory. But the threats we face today and may face tomorrow are less predictable. They could come from an aggressive regime, a rampaging faction, or a terrorist group. And we know that, if past is prologue, we face a future in which weapons will be more destructive at longer distances than ever before.

In April at the Washington Summit, Allies approved the blueprint for a new NATO engaged in new missions, with new members, and with stronger partnerships. The Strategic Concept described a larger,
more flexible Alliance, still committed to collective defense, but capable of meeting a wider range of threats to common Alliance interests. These included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, regional conflicts beyond NATO territory, and transnational threats like terrorism. The Strategic Concept recognized non-Article 5 crisis response operations as a “fundamental task” of the Alliance and made clear the expectation that such operations would be conducted with Partners.

Aspirants had made a strong effort to push the Alliance to extend additional membership invitations at the Summit. There was no consensus to do so, however. Instead, Allies adopted a U.S. proposal to develop with individual aspirants a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that could provide a clear roadmap for a strong membership candidacy. The Alliance would commit to setting out clearly the major military interoperability requirements for aspiring members, expect aspirants to step up to challenging defense planning targets, and provide candid feedback on progress.39 NATO leaders pledged to revisit the enlargement process at their next summit, which they said would be “no later” than 2002.

**Integrating Southeastern Europe**

By the time the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles joined NATO in March 1999, we had made considerable progress in our efforts to revitalize Euro-Atlantic security architecture and position it to address future challenges. The Washington Summit unveiled a new NATO as part of that effort.

Once again, however, Slobodan Milošević threatened to destroy what had been accomplished when he sent in troops and police to crush the mostly ethnic Albanian, mostly Muslim minority living in Kosovo, a province of Serbia. The OSCE, EU and NATO worked in concert to head off full-scale war in Kosovo: the OSCE mounted its largest field mission ever, the EU applied diplomatic pressure, and NATO threatened to employ military force against Serbia unless it stopped violence against the civilian ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Milošević responded by stationing 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo. They began to move from village to village, shelling and shooting civilians
and torching their homes. Efforts by Allies and Russia to secure a peace agreement in Rambouillet, France collapsed a week after the accession ceremony in Independence, Missouri. One week later, NATO was at war.⁴⁰

Throughout most of the Administration I had been only tangentially engaged on Balkan issues. Holbrooke told me to work on NATO and the architectural elements of Euro-Atlantic security while he focused on Bosnia. He asked me to scout out possible sites for what turned out to be the Dayton Proximity Talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and occasionally asked me what I thought as his team grappled with the “problem from hell.” Otherwise my focus was elsewhere. As Kosovo descended into violence, however, I was concerned that our overall efforts would be sabotaged by continued Balkan turmoil.

My concerns were shared by counterparts from Germany, who had assumed the rotating Presidency of the European Union in the first half of 1999 as well as the annual Presidency of the G8. In a series of calls with Markus Ederer, at the time head of the Western Balkans office in the German Foreign Office, we agreed that Western efforts to quell violence in this region of Europe had to be better aligned with our overall efforts to project stability across the continent. We had been approaching the region tactically; a more strategic approach was needed.

The day NATO began its bombing campaign, in consultation with my colleagues in the European Bureau I wrote Secretary Albright a memo arguing that despite our best efforts we were destined to keep sliding from one conflict to another in the Western Balkans until we embraced a different approach to the region as a whole. We would win the war, I wrote, but victory would be hollow unless we and our European allies were prepared to offer Southeastern Europeans the same bargain we had offered those in Central and Northern Europe—to stand with them on reforms and to keep the doors to our institutions open, if they created the conditions to make it possible someday to walk through those doors.

At the time, this was a radical notion. Much of “mainstream” Europe still debated whether this region was truly part of Europe. The chronic violence plaguing the region was tragic, but was not viewed as directly relevant to European construction and integration. The dominant talk
in Western Europe and the United States was of “exit strategies” rather than sustained efforts at stabilization.

We had to break this mentality. The Western Balkans were in fact part of Europe, and had to be offered the same perspective of integration as other parts of Europe—the alternative being more violence, conflict, and disintegration. Europe would not be secure, and would be unable to become the global partner we sought, until we transformed this region from a primary source of instability to a fully integrated part of the European and transatlantic mainstream. The only true exit strategy from the Balkans, I argued, was an integration strategy.

This would require us to use our full diplomatic, economic and military toolbox and draw on the interlocking institutional architecture we had created. NATO was important but insufficient. The OSCE would need to play an enhanced role. Most significantly, the European Union would need to agree that its own door was potentially open to Western Balkan countries. This might prove to be our biggest challenge, but it had to be done. Such an effort was not unlike the Marshall Plan, except this time the United States would not need to bear the financial burden alone or primarily. The European Union, our other partners in Europe and elsewhere, the international financial institutions, other international organizations, and the private sector could and should carry the largest share of this effort. Our job would be to mobilize such efforts.

I sent the memo to the Secretary under the heading “The Albright Plan.” She responded that she liked everything but the name. She asked to recast the memo—without the name—as a “night note” from her to President Clinton. The President immediately agreed to the effort. I was double-hatted, representing both her Policy Planning Staff and the European Bureau, to coordinate an overall U.S. effort at regional stabilization. I worked closely with Tony Wayne and Ambassador Richard Shifter, who had been instrumental in promoting a regional law enforcement initiative called the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).

Tony and I asked Markus Ederer and Wilfried Gruber, who had just completed his term as German ambassador in Belgrade, to fly to Washington to review our next steps. In those conversations we agreed to use the German-American channel to build consensus, both among countries of the area and by major partners, including the Russians,
to a broad-based effort to stabilize the region, deepen cooperative ties among countries in the area, and to hold out the prospect of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Germany would take the public lead in this effort, partly because senior U.S. officials were focused on the military campaign and partly because Germany’s EU Presidency would be essential to build support in the European Commission and among EU member states, and its G-8 Presidency could be used to draw in support from Russia, Japan, and the international financial institutions.

President Clinton fully embraced the concept and made it his own. In an April 15 speech in San Francisco to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the President framed the Kosovo campaign in the context of a U.S. South East Europe Initiative to strengthen overall Euro-Atlantic architecture, saying “we should try to do for Southeastern Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the Cold War; to help its people build a region of multietnic democracies, a community that upholds common standards of human rights, a community in which borders are open to people and trade, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable.”

We then used the presence of so many leaders at the Washington NATO Summit April 23-25 to secure support for an urgent, broad-based effort to stabilize Southeastern Europe and to give the people of that region a real perspective for integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream. By the time the military campaign in Kosovo would be over, we argued, a broader political/economic framework had to be in place that offered a means to set the entire region on a new course. We could not afford to keep sliding from one disaster to another in the Balkans. We proposed immediate negotiations to secure a political commitment to a “Stability Pact” for the region along these lines.

The response was overwhelmingly positive. Shortly thereafter, Tony Wayne and I led the U.S. team to negotiate the Pact with more than 40 countries and international organizations—including NATO, Russia, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)—at the Petersburg mountain retreat across the Rhine river from Bonn. Gruber, representing the EU Presidency, hosted the negotiations, with
Ederer energetically moving things forward, and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer lending needed political support to close the final deal. The document was agreed and finalized in early June, and then announced on June 10, the day NATO suspended air operations against Serbia.

During the same period Yeltsin’s envoy Victor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari joined with Strobe Talbott to successfully prod Milošević to stop his aggression. Talbott recounts that “Chernomyrdin would be the hammer and pound away on Milošević, and President Ahtisaari would be the anvil against who the pounding would take place, so that Milošević would know what he had to do to get the bombing stopped.”

At its core, the Stability Pact was a bargain between integration and reform: the international community agreed to work to stabilize, transform and integrate the countries of the region into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream; they, in turn, agreed to work individually and together to create the political, economic and security conditions by which this could be possible. It was a political initiative to encourage and strengthen cooperation among the countries of the region, an effort to promote stronger democracies, civil societies, market economies and respect for human rights, and a commitment to facilitate, for those who sought it, full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Notably, Russia was one of the signatories. While our Russian colleagues evinced some heartburn when it came to the Pact’s language about “Euro-Atlantic integration,” in the end they agreed to it.

On July 30 President Clinton flew to Sarajevo to join the other leaders of the participating and facilitating countries and organizations of the Stability Pact to

reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace. We will work together to promote the integration of South Eastern Europe into a continent where borders remain inviolable but no longer denote division and offer the opportunity of contact and cooperation...We also reaffirm the inherent right of each and every state participating in the Pact to be free to choose or change its security and association arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve.
Following the Sarajevo Summit, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder asked the head of his Chancellery, Bodo Hombach, to head overall efforts to implement the Stability Pact. Markus Ederer was his chief of staff and the key to the whole effort. I was asked to lead the U.S. government’s engagement, working with Miriam Sapiro, my Policy Planning colleague who had moved to the National Security Council staff with James Steinberg. A wonderfully talented Foreign Service officer, Rosemary DiCarlo, joined the team and later succeeded me in the position.

The Kosovo campaign and the accompanying Stability Pact underscored the importance of the U.S.-EU relationship as part of the evolving architecture. Through the Stability Pact the United States had pressed the European Commission and EU member states to accept, and also act, on the logic of their own approach to integration, by offering those aspiring to membership concrete perspectives that they could draw ever closer, and eventually join, the Union if they created the conditions necessary to walk through the EU door. Both in the Stability Pact agreement and in the Sarajevo Summit Declaration the EU committed to “making every effort” to assist those seeking integration into EU structures “to make speedy and measurable progress” toward that end.

Despite the best efforts of our German counterparts and also European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and his indefatigable aide Edward Llewellyn, however, getting the European Commission on board was a slog. I found myself flying as often to Brussels as to the Balkans to harangue EU colleagues to act on their commitment.

What seemed like an eternity from a U.S. perspective, however, was lightning-fast for the Commission. By the time we arrived at the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit in November, European Commission President Romano Prodi was able to announce that the Commission would devote close to 12 billion euros to Southeastern Europe over the next six years. For non-accession candidates in the Western Balkans the EU developed a new type of contractual relationship, termed “Stabilization and Association Agreements,” which provided for a closer association with the Union and a perspective of eventual integration.

The European Union was beginning to define itself more expansively and inclusively: in December it invited Romania and Bulgaria to
join Hungary and Slovenia, among others, in accession negotiations; it offered to include Turkey as a membership candidate; and it announced that as of 2003 it would be able to take in further new members.

Within a year the Stability Pact had initiated a series of regional initiatives and secured substantial pledges of financial support from a range of countries and international financial institutions. By the end of the Administration’s term European allies and partners were contributing more than 80 percent of the ground forces conducting peacekeeping operations in the region. They were providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the region in the form of “quick-start” projects worth more than $2.2 billion dollars that were earmarked to rebuild infrastructure, reopen borders, and disarm local militias. EU members were contributing 60% of the funds for Kosovo. The U.S. and the EU were also able to harness their combined influence to leverage additional financial support from international financial institutions; the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, the EIB were all involved. These were all signs of a more balanced partnership in which the United States could exercise leadership but did not need to carry the biggest burden.

Some observers and critics lost the forest for the trees, complaining about the Stability Pact’s plethora of “working tables” and initiatives. In many ways, it was our “Euro-Chart” in miniature. The essential point of the Stability Pact, however, was not to get lost in the process but to keep focus squarely on the basic bargain. From the U.S. perspective, the prime purpose of the Stability Pact was to apply the same logic of integration to Southeastern Europe as we had applied to Central and Northern Europe. We had gained broad recognition that the people of the Western Balkans were not only part of Europe, they had to be offered the same perspective of integration as those in other parts of Europe. They would need to make the hard choices for reform that could make that possible; we would stand by them as they did. The alternative was more violence, more conflict, and further disintegration.

The New OSCE

Post-conflict efforts following the Kosovo war, together with the Stability Pact mechanisms for Southeastern Europe, which were sub-
sequently placed under the auspices of the OSCE, underscored once again the importance of that organization, and the opportunity to advance our Triple Crown effort at its summit in Istanbul in November 1999.

At Istanbul we sought to promote our concept of mutually-reinforcing, non-hierarchical relations among the key institutions of Euro-Atlantic architecture, and in this context to solidify the OSCE as the institution of choice when it came to conflict resolution, expansion and protection of democracy and democratic institutions, defense of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and identifying and addressing economic issues that could lead to conflict and threats to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. Negotiations on a new security model for Europe culminated in the elaboration and adoption of the comprehensive Charter for European Security at the Summit.48 As William Hill recounts, the push for an all-inclusive agreement and document on European security was a logical outgrowth of and heir to the aspirations for an undivided Europe and comprehensive definition of security embodied in the Charter of Paris and other immediate post-Cold War documents and proposals. In Istanbul, Clinton called the OSCE “a unique institution grounded in the principle that the root of human insecurity is the denial of human rights…the charter we’ve negotiated recognizes that the greatest threats to our security today are as likely to come from conflicts that begin within states as between them.”49

Building confidence and security within societies was what the OSCE had always done best. Election monitoring, peacekeeping, efforts to address trafficking, corruption, national minorities, and arms control/verification were all important aspects. Perhaps the OSCE’s most vital work was being done through its field missions, including a high-profile presence in Chechnya and the largest field mission of its history in Kosovo. We wanted to empower the OSCE to become more operational in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. In this regard, we sought to promote new tools such as police monitoring to allow greater proactive use of OSCE institutions in situations that seemed headed for instability or conflict. We continued to encourage OSCE field missions as “platforms” to synthesize the activities of international organizations and NGOs.
Kosovo demonstrated that the OSCE needed to organize and deploy its resources faster to areas of need. We proposed the formation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), a reserve capability within participating states that would enable the OSCE to deploy experts in elections, law, media, administration and policing rapidly for more effective conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation.50

While the OSCE’s responsibilities extended from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in practice it had become increasingly focused in its operational work in the Balkans. We wanted the OSCE to apply its tools throughout the broader Euro-Atlantic region, a point we underscored in our support for stepped-up OSCE engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

We also sought to establish the OSCE as a comprehensive framework in which arms control and confidence-building could be important elements of our strategy. This was important for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, in which a system of national and territorial ceilings replaced outmoded bloc-to-bloc calculations. The Adapted CFE Treaty was agreed at Istanbul, although NATO allies linked their ratification to Russia’s commitment to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. A related advance came with agreement on the “Vienna Document,” a real expansion and deepening of the commitments of all OSCE states with regard to information exchanges, visits and inspections, and other transparency measures.51

These initiatives and others adopted in Istanbul laid the groundwork for a more action-oriented OSCE whose value added was that it could potentially deal better with conflicts within societies than others, and that was better equipped with relevant tools to do so. By the end of the Administration in 2000, the 25th anniversary year of the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE had twenty missions and about 3,000 personnel in the field, and continued to break new ground with a broad and flexible array of tools for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. By the end of the Clinton Administration, William Hill could write that “the OSCE truly flowered...perhaps reaching the zenith of its activity and influence.”52
“Two Institutions in the Same City Living on Different Planets”

About this time Marc Grossman became Director General of the U.S. Foreign Service and Ron Asmus left the State Department. Secretary Albright asked me to succeed Ron, to work now with James Dobbins in the European Bureau’s front office, with a portfolio that combined our continued work on regional political-military affairs and Nordic-Baltic issues while still overseeing U.S. efforts at Southeastern European stabilization and integration. When I found myself flying rather exotic routes from Tallinn to Thessaloniki or from Iceland to Istanbul, I couldn’t help thinking we truly were experiencing a new Europe.

As the Clinton Administration drew to an end, most building blocks of a new Euro-Atlantic architecture had been put into place, with one curious exception: the strange non-relationship between the primary institutions of the West, the European Union and NATO, which Robert Hunter often described as “two institutions in the same city living on different planets.”

Bosnia, Kosovo and a host of other crises underscored the need for improved European capabilities and better coordination mechanisms to deepen EU-NATO cooperation so that civilian and military efforts at crisis management worked more effectively together.\textsuperscript{53} We believed that American popular support for a continuing U.S. role in Europe was increasingly related to the perception that America’s European partners were willing and able to assume more responsibility not only for their own security but also for defending common interests of the transatlantic community in the wider world. A European defense initiative that bolstered European capabilities, if developed with care, could be a possible expression of that commitment and be mutually reinforcing with NATO initiatives. Common foreign and security policy was a logical next step in the European integration process and could help to avoid renationalization of European defense. U.S. support was also consistent with the premise of the Triple Crown strategy that the United States needed a strong and coherent European Union as a partner on the European continent and beyond.\textsuperscript{54} A more coherent and capable European profile could equip the EU to assume the lead in the Balkans or to engage, if necessary, in areas such as Africa, where the United States was unlikely to play a prominent role. The United States needed
to welcome enhanced European crisis management capabilities in situations where NATO—meaning, in practice, the United States—would decide not to become engaged.

Even those who supported such efforts, however, were concerned that European force commitments and capability pledges too often tended to be little more than empty exercises in European self-assertion. Americans across the board were both wary and weary of repeated European pledges that seemed to melt away with the next spring thaw. In American eyes, the EU effort not just to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), but to move to what would be called European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), was not just a narrow technical topic for policy wonks. It was emblematic of a far larger strategic debate about how—and even whether—Europe and the United States could tackle in more equal and balanced fashion the security challenges posed by the post-Cold War world. If ESDP and the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy were developed in ways that truly created greater European capabilities, not just more European process, they could be vehicles for a stronger, outward-looking Europe and a more balanced, global partnership with the United States.

The key was to shape and condition European initiatives so they would complement, rather than compete, with those of the Alliance.

Meanwhile, French and British experiences in the Balkans and elsewhere had laid bare key military deficiencies. Paris and London each realized they had to do something. Paris had long argued that the EU needed more muscular defense forces. The real change came from London.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had come to believe that Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo were harbingers of a post-Cold War world in which the international community would be increasingly challenged to confront unprincipled actors who were engaging in wonton acts of ethnic cleansing and even genocide, and who believed they could use the principle of non-interference in a country’s domestic affairs to shield themselves from international intervention. Blair, appalled by the failure of the international community to stop the Rwandan genocide, and having seen how the Bosnian tragedy had only been turned around by international intervention, was now frustrated by the threat-
ened continued use of the veto by Russia and China blocking a U.N. Security Council Resolution on intervention in Kosovo.

Blair was convinced that the United Kingdom had to be equipped to act. Britain’s Strategic Defense Review committed the UK to a real defense spending increase for the first time in 15 years. Britain was unlikely to engage unilaterally, however; it would need to work with others. Yet Blair believed that international mechanisms had to be facilitative; they could not be allowed to block what he deeply believed to be the moral imperative of humanitarian intervention. The UK and its European partners clearly needed to bolster their military capabilities, and when they chose to deploy them, they needed to be able to do so via whatever mechanism might prove appropriate given the specific case at hand—through the U.N., through NATO, through European efforts drawing on NATO assets when NATO chose not to be involved, or, if need be, through the EU alone.

Traditionally, the UK had been hesitant to provide the EU with “autonomous” defense structures. On December 4, 1998, however, London and Paris took a decisive step at their St. Malo summit. They concluded in a Joint Declaration that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” It was agreed that the EU should be able to act, whether using NATO assets or on its own “outside the NATO framework.” The declaration also noted both that military action would take place “when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged,” and that these European capacities should be developed “without unnecessary duplication.”

The White House wanted a clear U.S. response to the St. Malo Declaration. It was important to support this new emphasis on bolstering greater capabilities while ensuring that EU efforts could complement, rather than compete, with those of the Alliance. I was asked to draft an opinion piece; working with Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg and with Secretary Albright, the draft was massaged and appeared in the Financial Times on December 7 under the title “The right balance will secure NATO’s future.” The message: Clinton Administration support for greater European efforts would be conditioned by what Secretary Albright termed the “three D’s:” no discrim-
ination against non-EU NATO members, no decoupling of European and North American security, and no duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its command structure. At the same time, the administration pushed hard for NATO to launch its own Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington summit four months later. The DCI was designed to improve Allied forces’ deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability and effectiveness. It identified some 58 areas in which Allies were asked to make concrete improvements in their forces to fill specific capability gaps.

The collapse of the Rambouillet peace effort and the start of NATO’s bombing campaign against Milošević reinforced Blair’s views. To press his case, Blair took the unusual step of flying to Chicago on the eve of the NATO Summit to set forth his doctrine of humanitarian intervention. “The most pressing foreign policy problem we face,” Blair said before the Economic Club of Chicago on April 24, 1999, “is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts.” While framing the issue as a challenge for the U.N., Blair knew that Europe and the United States would have to be the motor behind new multilateral approaches to such issues.

The Kosovo war was the third out-of-area conflict North America and Europe had faced in the 1990s; such challenges indeed seemed far more likely in future than traditional threats to the territorial security of the Alliance. Being equipped to address out-of-area challenges, however, was going to be much easier for the United States, whose forces had been built around power projection rather than territorial security, than for the Europeans, whose Cold War forces had been oriented the other way around. By and large Europeans were unenthusiastic about reorienting their military postures from protecting European territory—familiar but less necessary—to projecting force beyond their borders—controversial but more necessary.

The Clinton Administration used these concerns to frame and guide its support for a more cohesive and responsive European foreign policy and above all, for more capable European defense. The Kosovo war affirmed to U.S. leaders and the U.S. military that not enough European armed forces were ready for the diverse, rapidly-evolving challenges of the post-Cold War world. In American eyes, Europe had been sluggish in its efforts to manage the shift away from the massed, terrain-based
forces necessary for the Cold War toward more mobile, deployable and sustainable forces and improved lift, logistics and intelligence capabilities. Kosovo underscored European dependence on the United States for precision-strike capability, surveillance and intelligence assets, refueling, lift, logistics, and high-end command and control systems. European forces would need to become more mobile, deployable and sustainable. “A central lesson” of the Kosovo campaign, Secretary Albright and UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook warned, was that “not enough European armed forces are ready for the diverse, rapidly evolving challenges of the post-Cold War world. Too many are trained and equipped to defend against a threat that no longer exists.”

The widening capabilities gap threatened Alliance unity by widening the faultlines we had sought to repair as we crafted NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The U.S. military had been irritated that it had to provide 80 percent of the useful capability in the Kosovo air campaign, while needing to negotiate a consensus with 18 other countries on operational methods. Unless the Europeans could bolster their capabilities to fight alongside Americans, there was a danger that each side of the North Atlantic would address such challenges separately—the U.S. unilaterally, unconstrained by “war by committee,” the Europeans via the EU or perhaps not at all.

The dangers were apparent. The United States was carrying virtually all the risk of defending common vital interests where they were now most threatened—beyond Europe’s periphery. To take just one example, U.S. military plans included defense of Persian Gulf oil supplies without reliance on NATO Allies, even though the Allies depended more on Gulf oil than the United States.

It was time to jettison traditional U.S. concerns about a stronger European profile. The danger was European weakness, not European strength. It was time to end the counterproductive competition that had long existed between the EU and NATO; Secretary Albright wanted a “true strategic partnership.” In a joint article, Secretary Albright and UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook affirmed that “NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members,” but added it was important to craft “new arrangements to link the EU and NATO in unprecedented ways, laying the foundation for a true strategic partnership between the two key institutions of the West.”
Those new arrangements would mean that European contributions to NATO operations, in the Balkans and perhaps elsewhere, could be stronger and more effective. It meant that where NATO as a whole chose not to become engaged, the EU would be able to act in response to humanitarian crises, to provide disaster relief and also undertake peacekeeping tasks. It meant that European nations, inside and outside the EU, would be ready and able to offer forces for EU-led operations and be afforded the opportunity to participate, just as they had in NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

In such a context, Albright’s 3D’s could be addressed. To minimize duplication of effort, NATO had offered the EU assured access to NATO planning, which the EU welcomed. To address the danger of discrimination, the EU proposed new arrangements for close and continuous involvement of non-EU European allies. With such arrangements in place, there was less risk that North American and European security would be decoupled. Europe’s contributions to NATO would be strengthened, relations between the European Union and non-EU European allies enhanced and Europe’s ability to support the activities of the OSCE and the U.N. improved.60

The turnaround in British policy facilitated the transformation of the ESDI into the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999. At Helsinki leaders also announced a Headline Goal of bolstering European military capabilities with the aim of developing a future European Rapid Reaction Force by 2003 of 60,000 troops deployable in 60 days and sustainable for a year. It was intended to be a force capable of undertaking the full range of so-called “Petersburg Tasks,” that is tasks ranging from rescue and humanitarian missions, through peacekeeping to that of combat troops in peacekeeping. By December 2000 forces to meet the Headline Goal were offered by EU countries, non-EU European allies and EU candidate countries. EU nations committed themselves to the capability improvements necessary to achieve the goal in full by 2003. NATO and the EU would work together to ensure that shortfalls were met and that the planning to meet capability goals of both organizations was coordinated.

To highlight the changing nature of relations I had pressed hard for a joint session of NATO and EU foreign ministers while NATO foreign
ministers were in Brussels for their semiannual meeting in December 2000. It was a bridge too far; EU qualms prevented a formal meeting. As one of our last acts in office, however, we managed a work-around: Canadian and European foreign ministers would host an informal farewell event for Secretary Albright. Her counterparts from both NATO and EU member states agreed. After five decades, the two institutions had finally come together, if only over dinner.

Conclusion

The Clinton Administration’s effort to recast Euro-Atlantic architecture for the post-Wall world went through three phases. The first was a period of distraction, division and indecision during the President’s first year in office. A decisive second phase, punctuated by war and then imposition of peace in Bosnia, began with the NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994 and culminated in a flurry of summits in 1997 that resulted in special NATO partnerships with both Russia and Ukraine, internal and external adaption of the Alliance, including membership invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and enhanced political and military cooperation with NATO’s growing list of partners. The third phase, which lasted until the end of the Administration, was again punctuated by war, this time in Kosovo, even as the Administration sought to equip NATO for new missions, further energize the OSCE, and build a more effective and outward-looking U.S.-EU partnership.

As the 21st century dawned, the United States and its European Allies and partners had developed a Euro-Atlantic architecture of cooperative overlapping, and interlocking institutions that enabled new members to walk through the doors of NATO and the EU in ways that were not at the expense of other states or institutions.61 A democratic peace had taken hold across much of the continent; Europe was more secure than at any time in the previous century. Yet Europeans were approaching with uncertainty and apprehension challenges of a generation. America’s European Allies were more prosperous than ever, but the benefits of that prosperity were not yet shared fully among all Europeans. The Baltic republics remained anxious about their future. Slobodan Milošević, whose toxic brand of nationalism had inflamed the Balkans, was out of power, yet tensions still afflicted the region. Europe
would not be secure until its northeastern and southeastern corners was transformed from sources of insecurity and instability into fully integrated parts of the European and transatlantic mainstream. And the transatlantic community’s efforts to develop a new and sustainable partnership with Russia—itself in the midst of a generational transformation—remained a formidable work in progress.

The United States had a major stake in the outcome of these generational choices. During the 20th century American leaders learned the hard way that America’s interests are deeply intertwined with the security and prosperity of Europe. Whenever we failed to make the investment required to protect those interests, we always ended up paying a higher price later. As the Clinton Administration left office, however, it was unclear whether the United States would sustain that investment.

America, a European power? Today, the question mark has returned.
Notes


5. Albright, “Why bigger is better,” op. cit.


17. For Asmus’ view of these discussions, see Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 279.


19. Iran was buying and developing long-range missiles. It had flight-tested a 1,300-km Shahab-3 missile and, within a decade, would be in a position to test a missile capable of reaching all NATO territory and much of the United States. Tehran had chemical weapons and was seeking nuclear and biological capabilities. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological weapons into missile warheads, and was close to achieving a nuclear capability. U.S. analysts believed that UN sanctions slowed, but probably had not stopped, Iraq’s efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction and develop or buy long-range missiles to deliver them. Libya also had chemical weapons capabilities and was trying to acquire missile capabilities. North Korea was building and selling long-range missiles and had assembled an arsenal with chemical, biological, and probably nuclear capabilities. It had developed and was on the verge of testing the Taepo Dong 2 missile that could reach U.S. territory. The United States projected that all of these states would have missile forces in the next 5 to 15 years that could be used to threaten the homelands of all NATO members. See White House, A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century, Washington, DC., 2000.


22. Ibid., p. 290.


24. Ibid.


26. Asmus, op. cit., p. 304


32. Ibid., pp. 122-123.

33. Ibid., pp 126-127.

34. Ibid., p. 125.


38. “Remarks on Accession…,” op. cit.


44. Ibid.


46. Through the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) the countries of the region worked with the United States and other European partners on a long-term plan to upgrade customs facilities, improve border access and fight cross-border crime and corruption. SECI’s efforts laid the practical foundation for broader Stability Pact cooperation in these and other areas. The SECI-initiated regional Anti-Crime Center in Bucharest served as a locus for active cooperation among regional law enforcement officials against organized crime and corruption.


50. Remarks by the President at Opening of OSCE Summit, Ciragan Palace, Istanbul, Turkey, November 18, 1999.


56. See Madeleine K. Albright, “The right balance will secure NATO’s future,” Financial Times, December 7, 1998. “No duplication” was neither defined nor intended to mean that the EU should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the Alliance; indeed much of the Clinton Administration’s efforts, such as the NATO Defense Capability Initiative, sought to prod the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost on many analysts. The three D’s were subsequently amended by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson into the three “I’s;” indivisibility of the transatlantic link; improvement of capabilities; and inclusiveness of all Allies. See Daniel S. Hamilton, “American perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy,” in Jess Pilegaard, ed., The Politics of European Security (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004), pp. 143-158, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/16947/politics_European_security.pdf, which updates an earlier chapter by the author in Esther Brimmer ed., The EU’s Search For A Strategic Role: ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002).


59. Albright and Cook, op. cit.

60. Ibid.