Chapter 14
Toward NATO Enlargement:
The Role of USNATO

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The story of how NATO took in new members from Central Europe following the end of the Cold War has been told from many perspectives. This chapter looks at what happened from the perspective of the United States Mission to NATO (USNATO), which played a crucial role both in creating the architecture of the “new NATO” and in negotiating many of its elements, at times not only for the United States but also for NATO as a whole. This chapter is in part a personal account, relating to my own service at NATO as the U.S. Permanent Representative from July 11, 1993, to January 1, 1998—the most significant period of NATO’s transformation in the post-Cold War era, building on what had already been done in the George H. W. Bush administration.

This chapter will focus on those developments most relevant to NATO enlargement. That of necessity brings in many more factors. These include NATO’s role in ending the war in Bosnia, but this chapter will only deal with Bosnia as it impacted on the Alliance’s overall transformation and the enlargement issue.

By the time the first NATO enlargement was formally decided in July 1997, the work of transforming the Alliance to deal effectively with post-Cold War security challenges in Europe was essentially completed. The basic design of that era continues to be preeminent in today’s functioning of NATO. Since then, NATO has continued to adapt and to meet new demands, especially those which followed Russia’s seizure of Crimea in February 2014. Unfortunately, in my judgment, some decisions taken since 1997 affecting NATO have had adverse effects, not so much on NATO as an institution but on its ability effectively to meet European and transatlantic security requirements. Most important were ill-thought-out excessive further enlargements of NATO until it now numbers 30 Allies and, related to that, miscues in Western,
especially U.S., policies and actions toward the Russian Federation. Complemented by Russian actions, these essentially ruined the chances for creating a European security structure that might have avoided repetition of some of the historic errors that plagued Europe and international society in the past.

Creating a Grand Strategy for Europe

As a nation, Americans have almost never articulated a grand strategy for the United States in the outside world and then taken steps to implement it—except occasionally at time of war. Usually grand strategy comes into being the other way around: as a summary of individual goals, strategies, and actions which are seen in retrospect as coherent and comprehensive.

One major exception to this general rule was the peacetime effort to restructure European security following the end of the Cold War. The effort began not as a summary of individual elements but as a central proposition for the United States that was contained in a few short words: “to create a Europe whole and free”—to which a few more words, “and at peace,” were later added. They were contained in a speech by President George H. W. Bush in Mainz, Germany,\(^1\) five months before the Berlin Wall opened; but they provided the framework for what followed, certainly in U.S. policy toward Europe and also for most European countries (plus Canada), at least west of Russia and Belarus.

Thus, none of the steps to implement the Bush grand strategy, both during his administration and during much of Bill Clinton’s administration, took place in a vacuum or reflected just experimentation. While the character of each individual policy and action was not predetermined, each did evolve within the broader context of the Bush grand strategy and was judged, at least in the West, in terms of how it contributed to pursuit of that grand strategy, undertaken primarily by NATO and the European Union.\(^2\)
The Core Elements of the Grand Strategy

As efforts to implement the Bush grand strategy moved forward, the key elements, in virtually all of which US mission at NATO played a central role, were as follows:

- Ratifying the United States’ engagement as a European power;
- Preserving key elements of NATO, including the integrated military command structure;
- Confirming the end of the “German problem,” which had begun even before formation of the German Reich in 1871;
- Taking the Central European countries “off the geopolitical chess-board,” and including them in Western and NATO institutions, as independent, democratic nations (NATO efforts were conducted in parallel with those of the European Union);
- Reaching out to Russia, seeking to involve it in wider European security and other institutions and practices without posing threats to its neighbors;
- Ensuring a special place for Ukraine as an independent country;
- Breaking down barriers between NATO and the European Union (including the Western European Union [WEU]);
- Acting, both on its own and with other institutions, to end conflict in Europe (Bosnia and later Kosovo) and to help keep the peace afterwards; and
- Undertaking ancillary efforts (in addition to ongoing NATO cooperative practices), including shifting the primary orientation of post-reduction NATO militaries in Europe (especially those of the United States) from an easterly to a south-easterly direction and moving most USAF assets from north to south of the Alps; creating the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a key element of NATO peacekeeping; expanding NATO cooperation with the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE); and beginning the process of reintegrating France fully into NATO defense and military structures.
Taken together, these steps were designed to follow the theory and practice of the creation of European security, writ large, in the late 1940s, plus development of transatlantic relations: a combination of political, economic, strategic, and military relations, which also included important roles for the private sector and what came to be known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In effect, these are organic, mutually supportive institutions and practices, within a core set of political commitments. They were designed precisely to play these roles.

Before President Bill Clinton came to office, there had been preliminary steps, including a U.S. decision to remain deeply committed to NATO, plus collective allied decisions to continue honoring the Treaty of Washington of April 4, 1949, as well as to preserve the Alliance’s institutions, notably the North Atlantic Council—where Allied decisions are taken—and the integrated military command structure. The latter remains historically unique and is a basic element in the Alliance’s being and, if need be, its ability to implement the Treaty’s Article 5: the “Three Musketeers” provision of an all-for-one and one-for-all response to external aggression. The Alliance had also taken other preliminary steps toward preserving, reforming, and restructuring the Alliance, for example creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 (the first meeting of which coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet Union), “as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries.”

**NATO 1993: Still a Backwater**

In general, however, the NATO Alliance was essentially marking time in a new world without a major enemy (the Soviet Union) and thus without a central organizing principle. While the Alliance and its subordinate institutions were still ticking over, it was essentially in a holding pattern; there were even voices on both sides of the Atlantic (some of which still persist) calling for NATO to be abolished as out of date and no longer necessary or, at least, having no serious purpose to justify keeping it in being, except perhaps as a passive insurance policy in the event that Russia, in particular, would at some point in the future pose an active threat to the alliance or any of its members.
That NATO as an institution was seen at senior levels in Washington as essentially a backwater was marked by the decision of the U.S. Permanent Representative (ambassador), Reginald Bartholomew, to leave that position in March 1993, after only 10 months, to become the lead U.S. negotiator on the Bosnia war, which, as the worst conflict in Europe since the Second World War, was on the radar. This led to my being offered NATO, as opposed to being U.S. ambassador to the European Communities, an appointment that was already in the works. NATO ambassador was certainly not seen as the plum job it later became.

My first step was to phone NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, a friend from my days on the NSC staff in the Carter administration. “What can I do for you?” I asked. “Get me a summit,” he replied. So I worked to get that done. My second step was to ask to see the draft intervention to be given by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the forthcoming June NATO foreign ministers meeting in Athens, although I was not yet in the government. I believed this was particularly important because of Christopher’s first trip around Europe in February, when he asked the Allies what should be done about Bosnia rather than presenting Clinton Administration ideas. There was no sense of American leadership. This reminded me of Vice President Walter Mondale’s first trip to Europe soon after the 1977 inauguration: the same lack of U.S. leadership; the same failure of advisers to provide substance; the same failure with the Allies and thus their wondering about the strength of a new U.S. administration’s commitment to NATO and European security—as well as its competence.

The Athens ministerial draft, prepared by the State Department Office of European Affairs, in my judgment showed virtually no awareness of the massive changes taking place and the challenges that lay ahead. I wrote a totally new draft, laying out key themes, outlining some specific proposals, and demonstrating U.S. leadership. I took it directly to Stephen Oxman, the newly-installed Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, who accepted it as the basis of what Christopher would say at Athens. Most of it survived the State Department bureaucracy. It helped to restore Christopher’s reputation with his colleagues. It laid out, within the overall grand strategy of a “Europe whole and free,” much of the basic framework for detailed U.S. initiatives during that crucial year in creating a new architecture for NATO and Europe-
Starting Out in Brussels

This was background to my arrival in Brussels on Sunday, July 11, 1993 and a meeting of the North Atlantic Council the following day to begin planning for the summit, “penciled in” for the following January in Brussels, for which I had gained agreement in Washington. I met with my able mission team that afternoon to game out our approach for Monday’s meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the “NAC,” to start summit planning and for which I had written most of my formal Washington instructions.

What follows is an account of what was done to meet the needs of European security, writ large, and of transatlantic relations, from the perspective of efforts at NATO and with a special focus on USNATO. To begin with, it will focus in detail on the period through the January 1994 Brussels summit, by which time most of the elements of the new architecture for European security—as I called it from that time forward—had been formulated, though many details and implementation took considerable time and efforts in Washington, other allied capitals, and at NATO to get done. As I noted later, the fact that it took nearly six years from the start of the NATO restructuring process until the first three Central European countries were welcomed as alliance members testified to all the other things that had to be done to increase the chances that enlargement would strengthen rather than weaken NATO and keep open possibilities for accommodation with Russia on European security matters.

As these efforts and roles developed, I believe it represented a virtually-unique engagement by U.S. officials based abroad in the Washington interagency process. Beyond doubt is that, while direct contacts between Washington and foreign capitals were important, as well as an security overall. It also began the process of demonstrating American leadership, a *sine qua non* throughout NATO’s history for Alliance success. Notably, however, it did not occur to me to include one idea that became important: that NATO should take in new members! But Christopher did raise the subject: in his intervention at the foreign ministers’ meeting, he said that “…at an appropriate time we may choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda.”

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ministerial and summit meetings, most of the practical negotiations regarding NATO’s future were conducted in Brussels. Simple math will indicate that this would be difficult to carry out on an iterative basis from Washington—how to get each of the United States’ 14 European allies plus Canada to reach agreement on a round robin basis.

Many times, of course, only a handful of Allies would count—most often the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—with the others trusting their decisions, but at the extreme when all had to be involved, as often happens around the negotiating table at either the ambassadorial (NAC) or subordinate level, the number of iterations from a distance would be staggering. Great complexity was involved even when ambassadors came instructed, if they were to have to compromise to get agreement (consensus) in the NAC. With the necessary give and take, often a compromise would be reached that then got sent back to capitals ad referendum, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Most often each capital, including Washington, would “take it.” With the leadership of USNATO at Alliance headquarters on most issues and being, as the United States, the “800-pound gorilla,” U.S. positions regularly (but not always!) prevailed.

For my fifteen colleagues on the Council, plus the Secretary General and other NATO officials, the important thing was not that “Hunter” had arrived, but that the United States would again be represented by an ambassador after a gap of four months (despite the abilities of the chargé, Alexander Vershbow, who later succeeded me as ambassador in January 1998). Having the United States represented at the level of ambassador was a touchstone for the allies of U.S. commitment and purpose. It was also useful for this individual to be a political appointee, as had prevailed with only a few exceptions until Foreign Service Officer Reginald Bartholomew, as opposed to being a member of the Foreign Service. The notion was that a political appointee would more readily have access if need be to the U.S. president than someone whose onward career would be determined within the State Department. It also didn’t hurt that I had been working on NATO issues for 30 years. Further, I had in the past worked closely with the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, a matter of consequence at NATO, given the nature of the work and the fact that NATO is the only post where the U.S. ambassador has unfettered access to the Secretary of Defense (who also has his own representative in Europe, under the ambassador’s authori-
ty) as well as the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{11} That relationship, which ensures that the NATO ambassador will in effect be part of the interagency process back in Washington, proved invaluable, as did my working relationship with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Gen. John Shalikashvili, who soon became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, in this early period, many of the ideas for NATO’s future were worked out primarily between my mission and the Defense Department, then accepted within the interagency process.\textsuperscript{13}

Throughout my first two years at NATO, Bosnia was a major issue for NATO, although it tended to be dealt with only episodically, generally when the Bosnian Serbs had attacked one of the cities that had been designated as “safe areas,” from which heavy weapons were excluded and which were supposed to be places where civilians could be safe from the conflict. But since Bosnia did not figure prominently in the restructuring of NATO until mid-1995, this account will not delve deeply into that subject.

**Partnership for Peace**

While the persistent challenge of the Bosnia war was always in the background at NATO-Brussels, far greater attention was paid to preparations for the forthcoming NATO summit and the accompanying demonstration of renewed U.S. leadership, which had fallen from its high-water mark of the remarkable diplomacy that had been so critical in the soft landing of the Cold War, the opening of possibilities with Russia in the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and the unification of Germany. These Bush administration achievements (many by the president himself) made possible what we in the Clinton Administration were then able to do. Indeed, the continuity involved highlights one of the most critical aspects of U.S. engagement in NATO since the early days after its creation: U.S. domestic political and public support has always been bipartisan. There have often been disagreements on the details, but never on the basic U.S. commitment to NATO. For U.S. ambassadors to NATO, this has always been a godsend; I found that particularly so during my tenure when the U.S. Senate was controlled for the first year-and-a-half by the Democrats and the last three years by the Republicans.
A key moment came in early September, when the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) held its annual conference in Brussels. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was invited to speak and he planned to arrive with a full Defense Department team. Key was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, Joe Kruzel, a remarkable public servant who tragically died on Mt. Igman in Bosnia in August 1995. He and I planned the visit by Aspin to Brussels and I offered to convene a seminar at my ambassadorial residence, Truman Hall. Joe and I organized it around a morning session that would include a number of the leading strategic thinkers from the ranks of the IISS conference attendees, following by a lunch with Secretary General Wörner, and then an afternoon just with U.S. government officials, who, in addition to key members of my staff, were primarily from the civilian and military sides of the Defense Department, plus key U.S. commanders in Europe.

As we planned the agenda, Kruzel and I, working closely with Gen. Shalikashvili and also with the State Department and NSC staff, focused on what became a central factor both in architecture for post-Cold War European security and for the forthcoming NATO summit. We devised an approach that would embrace within NATO’s purview those Central European and other countries that had emerged from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and then also the Former Yugoslavia. But at the same time this would be without NATO inviting any of them to join the Alliance, with the critical Article 5 guarantees and membership in allied military commands and command structure. We sought to thread several needles: in particular to give these countries, which had just emerged from communist governments and Soviet control, a sense of engagement in the West and especially with NATO, but at the same time without weakening NATO’s military capabilities (notably Allied Command Europe) and sense of common commitment (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). Indeed, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff and SHAPE were strongly opposed to the enlargement of NATO. Concern about weakening NATO militarily was in addition to the added burdens of having potentially to defend more countries, especially when they would not have the requisite national military capacities and infrastructure to make such defense feasible.

Around the table that afternoon on September 11th came agreement among the key U.S. government security officials to finalize a concept
based mostly on the Kruzel-Shalikashvili-Hunter initiative, which came to be called Partnership for Peace (PfP).\textsuperscript{15} It would not include roles for non-NATO countries in the “high end” of military activities, with full integration in NATO commands and military activities, but rather at the “low end” of peacekeeping. The most important tool in implementing this concept would be for military personnel from NATO allies to work with the militaries of what came to be known as “partner” countries. These could include all countries that were members of CSCE, then 52 in number, stretching all the way through to Central Asia.\textsuperscript{16}

As we at USNATO then took the lead (with SHAPE) in elaborating PfP, it developed several principal aspects. Working with Kruzel and his colleagues at the Defense Department, along with the State Department and the NSC staff, PfP was embedded in the NACC and then, at the 1997 Madrid summit, in a successor organization which came to be called the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC): essential differences being that the latter also permitted the inclusion of the European neutral and non-aligned countries, plus enhanced involvement for all members in NATO activities. As I told key officials of the Swedish and Finnish governments when they joined PfP, with their capabilities they would be on the “teaching rather than the student staff” for other partner countries.\textsuperscript{17}

PfP focused on the military institutions of the countries that joined, with the understanding that, with their existing structures, they could in most cases play a significant role in the democratization of these countries, while at the same time being reformed, trained, and equipped to play roles in peacekeeping, in league with NATO allied peacekeeping elements, as well as for potential use by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{18} While the United States played the leading role in sending uniformed personnel to work with national militaries, many of the other allies also took part.\textsuperscript{19}

As Kruzel, General Shalikashvili’s people, and my team and I developed the PfP concept, along with SHAPE/EUCOM\textsuperscript{20} and some input from State and the NSC, we decided on three functions for it to perform, in addition to being a lead element in democratization and confidence-building to underpin economic development:\textsuperscript{21}
It helped to prepare partner militaries to undertake peacekeeping missions, while also giving them access to NATO standards and command practices (plus use of English, the NATO military language) that are essential for the militaries of different countries to work together;

- It helped prepare partner countries to become ready for NATO membership; and

- For those countries that would not join NATO—either by their own choice or because NATO would not invite them to join—it would give them an enduring form of security just by having this engagement with NATO. I termed this kind of arrangement their being within the penumbra of NATO security, even without the Article 5 commitment. My reasoning was simple: that if a non-member of NATO were subjected to external aggression, the alliance might anyway decide to respond militarily (or in other ways) even without Article 5, as happened with U.S. responses against North Korean aggression (1950) and Iraqi aggression (1990). This then might have a quasi-deterrent effect or at least would reduce the chances of miscalculation by a potential aggressor.22

In retrospect, PfP has proved to be one of NATO’s most successful ventures and an essential precursor to enlargement.

**NATO, the European Union, and France**

Long before being appointed U.S. ambassador to NATO, I had been concerned about virtually non-existent relations between NATO and what became the European Union. Indeed, I regularly said that these were “two institutions living in the same city (Brussels) on different planets!” That practice of institutional pride and division—which also, of course, represented the differences in membership and of structure and purpose—seemed to me to violate the principle that security had to be a combination of political, economic, strategic, and military activities. This was especially so following the end of the Cold War, when it was necessary to create new bases for European security and the political and economic development of countries that had emerged from communism and, in fact, in some cases had become truly independent for the first time in decades.
From the U.S. perspective, however, shared in particular by Britain, with its sense of special relationship with Washington and ambivalence toward “Europe,” there was also worry that the Western European Union could compete with NATO and lead to a weakening of alliance capabilities, political as well as military. The State Department in the Bush administration had been assiduous in trying to limit the writ and activities of WEU.

I judged otherwise even before I went to Brussels. During the Cold War, the United States did not want WEU (or any other institution or arrangement) to get in the way of NATO and of U.S. strategic leadership because of the need for central direction of confrontation with the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, that argument fell to the ground. I saw virtue in the EU having both a more effective foreign policy and defense component. I argued that if an effective WEU would lead European members to spend more on defense and to build more useful capabilities than they would do just for NATO, that was a net plus. In any event, as I argued and has proved true, if there is ever a disagreement between NATO and WEU as to which would have primacy, NATO, the “big kid on the block,” would always prevail; further, if European security were at risk from external aggression—i.e., a resurgent Russia—only the United States could be effective: that means NATO. My reasoning did not convince some State Department people who continued to fret, wrongly, that WEU (and its successors) would steal NATO’s thunder and U.S. primacy in the transatlantic relationship.

I had also long been interested to see whether France could be reintegrated in NATO’s military command structure. Again, with the Cold War over and thus any incentive in Paris to gain flexibility in dealing with Moscow,23 that incentive had gone away. Further, during Operation Desert Storm (Kuwait/Iraq) in 1991, the French military realized that being outside of NATO military institutions for so long had led it to miss much military modernization. Thus, it had to put its forces under U.S. command. I saw an opportunity for NATO here.

When the French ambassador to NATO, Jacques Blot, invited me to lunch early in my tenure, I suggested that he and I explore a possible deal: that I would work to get the U.S. government to back off on its opposition to a strong WEU if Blot would work to move France
in the direction of rejoining NATO’s integrated command structure. We agreed and sold the basic concept to our respective governments. This led in 1995-96 to complex negotiations between NATO and the WEU\textsuperscript{24} that created a useful and viable relationship between the two institutions.\textsuperscript{25} Fortunately, I was able to prevail with Washington that U.S. relations with the WEU would be run out of USNATO rather than out of the U.S. mission to the European Union. On my initiative and with Washington’s approval, I also organized France’s return to the NATO Military Committee and International Military Staff, necessary first steps toward its full reintegration in NATO’s military structures in 2009.

Resolving this issue also helped with enlargement, as it increased the chances of cooperation/coordination between NATO and the European Union, both as they extended informal mechanisms into Central Europe (PfP and its EU analogues), and parallel processes of taking in new members.\textsuperscript{26}

**Travemünde**

As the Alliance was preparing for the January 1994 Brussels summit, key was a set of U.S. proposals in October, part deriving from initiatives at the USNATO mission and part originating in Washington, more at the Defense Department and the NSC than at the State Department. Following interagency agreement, they were deployed with Allies by both Christopher and Aspin. The former presented the ideas in a cable to U.S. ambassadors for Allied leaders; much more attention-getting was a unique event at NATO to that point, an informal meeting of defense ministers, without all the ceremony and circumstance that tended to circumscribe the semi-annual regular meetings. German Defense Minister Volker Rühe offered to host, and the meeting was held in Travemünde, not coincidentally in Rühe’s part of the country.\textsuperscript{27} With all the allies to be gathered in one room at ministerial level, attention naturally focused on Travemünde and Secretary Aspin, rather than on Secretary Christopher’s cable.\textsuperscript{28}

This was clearly foreseen as the moment when the United States would need to show that it would be both able and willing to lead at NATO, especially for the transformation that the alliance would have
to undergo in order to remain relevant. Already, there were widespread calls for its dissolution, including on Capitol Hill, and questioning whether it could have relevance in the absence of a central organizing principle, as the Soviet Union had been. I argued that NATO’s principal objective was to create confidence in stability—a relatively low-cost but certainly high-value insurance policy. If a major measure of this stability could be achieved—with its heavy dose of psychology—that would enable people to get on with their lives, which I have long argued should be the end of international politics.

Because of the importance of the forthcoming meeting, Manfred Wörner agreed to visit Washington and discuss the key issues with President Clinton. This would also help to lock in the political significance of other developments for NATO and gain U.S. blessing at the highest level. Clinton’s main message was that despite talk about the possibility of NATO soon taking in new members, the United States could not at this time support that course. He deployed some of the arguments advanced by the Pentagon, such as had led to the compromise in creating Partnership for Peace. Notably, however, it had been decided in the interagency process that at some point enlargement would happen.

On the day of the Travemünde meeting, I sat with Aspin on the helicopter from Hamburg Airport and went through his final briefing book. The talking points included an announcement that the United States was abandoning its commitment to use airpower in Bosnia, thus also no longer supporting a NATO role in stopping the war. I told Aspin that, if he made that statement, he might as well forget the other U.S. proposals: any hope for U.S. leadership and a positive response by Allies would be dead. Aspin read the talking points, then said: “You’re right. I won’t do that.”

At the start of the defense ministers’ meeting there was a forest of glum faces, until Aspin laid out the U.S. proposals, from the small (Combined Joint Task Forces—CJTF, as a means for making NATO peacekeeping effective) to the large (NATO peacekeeping itself, Partnership for Peace, and support for the WEU in the form of a European Security and Defense Identity). The mood shifted instantly: here was proof positive that the United States was taking NATO seriously and was reasserting its traditional and indispensable role as leader. There
was rapid agreement on the entire U.S. agenda for the Brussels summit. Enthusiasm was so great that one additional idea that Aspin had only laid down in passing—that NATO should at some point involve itself in limiting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles—was seized upon by his colleagues and added to the summit agenda. All these proposals and the sense that the United States “was back” offset concerns that the defense ministers had little to say about the war in Bosnia. Indeed, Travemünde was probably the most important moment for NATO, at least in the Clinton Administration, except for 1) decisions that led directly to the NATO airstrike campaign in Bosnia in August-September 1995 that ended the war; and 2) decisions taken in 1997 regarding NATO enlargement and relations with Russia and Ukraine.

**The 1994 Brussels Summit**

Still, the Brussels summit on January 10-11, 1994, was not an anticlimax. But the fact that Travemünde (and Secretary Christopher’s parallel presentation of the U.S. proposals to his European and Canadian colleagues) had done so much to show American leadership and set forth a coherent approach to the future of European security meant that the summit itself did not require as much heavy lifting at the level of heads of state and government that is often true at NATO.

In his remarks at the summit meeting, Clinton moved the ball forward on the possibility of NATO enlargement, in line with a public speech he had made the day before in Brussels, when he said about Partnership for Peace: “...[it] will advance a process of evolution for NATO’s formal enlargement. It looks to the day when NATO will take on new members who assume the Alliance’s full responsibilities.” Also, the summit declaration did “reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries”—though at that point that did not connote any decision or haste to arrive at one. However, Clinton advanced U.S. thinking in almost-decisive fashion in Prague immediately afterwards. In a press conference with Visegrád leaders, he said: “While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Notably, however, many subsequent
statements by different officials of the US government, some recently declassified, indicate that the U.S. position on enlargement was not always consistent and was often open to different interpretations. This was to cause considerable difficulties down the road and, in some ways it still does.

After Brussels: The Role of USNATO—Major Themes

Following the Brussels summit, work began in earnest to build on basic architecture for the future of European security. USNATO, which had played a major role in creating that architecture, was in the thick of things. We focused not just on dealing with other parties in Brussels, SHAPE, and the other NATO commands, which collectively make up the NATO organism and are a major source of its strength. We also had to play a role with Washington, which included reporting what was going on in Brussels, making recommendations, and receiving instructions on what to do; we also often played an informal role in the Washington interagency process, even though 3800 miles and six time-zones distant.

The last-named was possible in part because represented at the mission were elements from the Departments of State and Defense (civilian and military), acting on a fully-integrated basis, and because of the many differences of view and priorities within the Washington bureaucracy. I realized we had to balance a series of differing U.S. perspectives, or trade-offs, and if we didn’t do it at USNATO, often nobody else could. In addition to NATO-WEU relations, the most significant of these issues were:

- Preserving the effectiveness of NATO military operations (and decision-making) versus deeper involvement of partner countries;
- Keeping NATO small or expanding it, with the attendant issues of decision-making (consensus principle) and taking on added burdens, including potentially under Article 5; and
- Giving priority to aspirations of Central European countries (membership) or trying to avoid excluding Russia and, by so doing, potentially leading to a new Cold War.
I saw my special responsibility to keep the strength of the Alliance, Central Europe, and Russia all in view and, regarding Washington bureaucratic struggles, to help prevent overemphasis on any one perspective to the detriment of the others, thus to damage U.S. and Western interests.\textsuperscript{41}

In the process, I always shared with all the key people at USNATO everything that I knew, especially when I returned from trips to Washington—something of a rarity in the “knowledge-is-power” part of the U.S. government,\textsuperscript{42} at least on the civilian side. Two benefits resulted: first, after thoroughly discussing issues with senior members of my team, State and Defense, civilian and military, and my making a decision, people in the Washington bureaucracy who had lost the battle of our recommendations would phone their counterparts at the mission, only to be told that they had had a fair shot and would honor my decision. Second, we never had a leak from the mission. That comes from showing trust and confidence in one’s colleagues.

**Partners’ Adaptation**

The first of the three central problems—preserving NATO’s military effectiveness—was easiest to deal with, at least in helping the militaries of non-NATO PfP members adapt to NATO methodology and create military capabilities able to function with NATO. But how could they play a role in taking decisions on peacekeeping operations, given that they would be putting their troops at risk? The solution was to invite non-ally troop-contributing nations to join in decision-making meetings, but not to give them a veto on decisions (they could always elect not to take part). The Pentagon and Allied militaries were particularly sensitive on this point, especially in cases where a NATO ally wanted to include in a peacekeeping operation a neighbor from Central Europe that was not up to speed.

It was also widely recognized that NATO could only do part of the job: the European Union also had a major role to play in the adaptation and modernization of Central European countries, with as much integration with NATO’s efforts as possible; and at USNATO we supported the relevant EU political and economic programs. In my judgment and that of some of my team, what the Central Europeans really needed,
in addition to PfP, was not NATO membership (at the time there was no palpable threat) but close association with the EU and other programs for economic development. Universally, the Central European governments did not see it that way, and they had a major point. With their histories in the Second World War and the Cold War, strategic guarantees were uppermost. Indeed, given a choice between having a U.S. security guarantee without NATO and membership in a NATO where the United States did not give a guarantee, they would all choose the former. This was understandable because of the psychological value of a security guarantee for getting on with economic and other developments; whereas the opposite, membership in the EU, might not produce a serious security guarantee and uncertainties would continue.43

Enlargement

The second problem, relating to NATO enlargement, was far more difficult. Soon after the Brussels summit, when the full import of decisions had become evident—that is, PfP now, membership later and perhaps not at all—almost all Central European states expressed deep reservations about PfP, especially fearing that “later” would indeed mean “never.” There were also people in the Washington bureaucracy who were more anxious to take in new members than to see them be effective allies, militarily or otherwise. For some, that included a belief that, the Soviet Union/Russia not posing a threat, NATO could be converted into a form of CSCE, indeed “NATO-lite.” That view was stoutly resisted by U.S. and Allied militaries and by us at USNATO.

Even for Central European states which understood they had to be able to pull their weight before becoming NATO allies, there was reluctance to put great effort into PfP without a guarantee that membership would follow. I set myself the task of working closely with representatives of these states at NATO and impressing on them the need to develop capabilities that would make them ready to be allies. I held regular meetings with them at Truman Hall, the ambassador’s residence. On the first such occasion, I made the following statement: “Pay close attention. Anyone here representing a country that would like at some point to join NATO, you need to take PfP very seriously: repeat, very seriously.” The message was not particularly welcome but it was understood. The same was true of a more graphic way I put it:
“NATO will only take in new members who are producers and not just consumers of security.” The message began to get across. Thus, a year later the Latvian foreign minister told me that his country would not want to join NATO if thereby the Alliance would become weaker. Several countries did indeed work hard at PfP, including in NATO peacekeeping exercises, the first of which, with partner militaries, was held at Poznan, Poland.

I also delivered another clear message: that NATO membership would be closed to any country that chose to pursue ambitions or historical grievances against another state or ethnic group in Europe. The dead past had to bury its dead. Given the number of grievances that had festered for so many years and in some cases decades or even centuries, this was a critical injunction. It was in general swallowed as the price of getting into NATO.

At the same time, Central European aspirants were worried that NATO and in particular the United States might give Russia a chance to block their entry, given the desire not to drive it away from the West. Thus, we made clear that no outside power—meaning Russia without naming it—would have any influence on NATO enlargement. I summarized that as NATO’s allowing Russia (or any other outside country) “a voice but not a veto” on developments within the alliance.

I further advanced the ideas, though in retrospect this might have been a vain hope (this may be debated forever), that the overall architecture of European security and efforts to implement it—with a respected role for Russia—might be able to move European security beyond centuries’ old concepts: the balance of power and spheres of influence. This ambition was consistent with George H. W. Bush’s concept of a Europe whole and free. Obviously, it didn’t work; but I remain unconvinced that it was given “the old college try”—by either side!

As the various processes developed, NATO also created Membership Action Plans for each aspirant country, to underscore the need for preparation to undertake full allied responsibilities. At the end of 1994, NATO also decided to conduct an Enlargement Study, related to preparing countries to join. As I wrote in NATO Review:

Allied agreement to take in new members is a fact; debate now centres solely on the means. This year, the 16 Allies are delving
into questions of the how and the why of formal NATO expansion. They know they must answer these critical questions before they can either logically or beneficially proceed to the next level of decision: the who and the when of taking in new members.

The NATO enlargement study has two major, declared purposes. One is for the Allies to gain a clear knowledge of how NATO will function once it expands its membership—put simply, what they must do to ensure that a larger NATO will be the same strong defensive military alliance it is today. The other major purpose is to show prospective members precisely what they can expect as Allies—both their rights and their duties within the Alliance.

The study also has an unspoken purpose—to build confidence among the 16 Allies that, when they do decide on the who and the when of expanded membership, each of their several parliaments will give a strong and positive assent—and will mean it.48

However, despite the efforts underway to get aspirants ready to be allies in terms of military and other capabilities, and despite all the talk about criteria for membership, none of that really mattered, even though a country that was progressing in terms of capabilities would be easier to defend and would be demonstrating seriousness of purpose. In fact, there was and is only one criterion for NATO membership: that all of the existing NATO Allies are prepared to honor Article 5 of the Washington Treaty if the new entrant suffers external aggression. If so, membership is possible; if not, membership would be folly. Full stop.49

Russia

The third major problem of perspective and trade-offs led to the most intense disagreements in Washington: how to balance extension of NATO’s formal writ into Central Europe with the desire not to drive Russia away or give it cause to believe that it was being taken advantage in its weak condition or was being “disrespected.” There were two camps in Washington, each with strong views. The camp that was more concerned with bringing Central European countries into NATO had the advantage of President Clinton’s support which I judged, rightly or wrongly, had a lot to do with domestic politics. Indeed, it always appeared to me that he was more concerned with domestic than foreign
policy issues—a choice that a number of presidents make. For instance, on a visit to the Oval Office with Secretary General Willy Claes, Clinton did an excellent job in discussing NATO issues. After 15 minutes, the White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, tapped on his clipboard to bring the meeting to an end. I signaled to Claes, who started to get up but then asked Clinton: “How is the economy, Mr. President?” Clinton promptly sat back down. It was as though he had received a huge injection of adrenalin. For the next half hour, he expatiated vigorously on the U.S. economy: at that moment, I understood where his heart really lay.

Notably, the only foreign policy speech Clinton gave in his 1996 reelection campaign was in Detroit on October 22, following a campaign stop in Hamtramck, a town surrounded by Detroit and heavily populated by people of Central European nativity or ancestry. Clinton said that “By 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should be full fledged members of NATO.”

He also tried to thread a needle by reaching out to Russia: “NATO will promote greater stability in Europe and Russia will be among the beneficiaries. Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help to build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and respected and successful partner in that sort of future.” It was an important effort and, even today, it is not possible to judge whether it might have worked or was doomed to fail: whether reemergence of great-power politics, based on competition if not also confrontation, was inevitable or not.

Even as the United States and key Allies were attempting to turn an historical page with Russia and the conduct of international relations, Russian leaders remained skeptical. This included Boris Yeltsin, who was president throughout the key period.

It was obvious to us at USNATO that the two camps in Washington—Central Europe-heavy and Russia-heavy—would have a difficult time in pursuing both objectives; indeed, discussions, even in the White House Situation Room, sometimes became acrimonious.

In Brussels, meanwhile, my team and I detected early-on that the Russian leadership was skeptical even of PfP: they could read as well
as anyone else that one theme for PfP was as a precursor for NATO enlargement. But who would be included and how fast it would happen was obviously as opaque in Moscow as it was in Washington and elsewhere in the Alliance. There was also some skepticism about PfP in the U.S. government, including the U.S. ambassador in Moscow. As a result, I got the NAC to propose a mission to Moscow at the beginning of March 1994 to explain what PfP was and what it wasn’t, both to try convincing the Russians that it was in their interest to join (thus, of course, giving them a hearing and respect by NATO), and to get the U.S. ambassador on board. The sheer fact of the visit was a plus: while we were not paying court to Russia, we were showing that it was not just being shunted aside in what (PfP) was to that point the leading edge of NATO reform.

After a good deal of nurturing, Russia did indeed join PfP in June 1994, when Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev visited NATO. Moscow also sent officers to take part in a military Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at SHAPE. The alternative, of course, was that it would be self-isolating and, among other things, would have no influence at all on the NATO enlargement process.

I worked in particular with Vitaly Churkin, in 1994 Russia’s new ambassador to Belgium, who, after PfP accession, also represented it at NATO, to explore possibilities for NATO cooperation with Russia. When he arrived, he was “full of beans,” but soon realized that he would have to mind his manners to be taken seriously: the days of the Soviet Union were over, and he had to be civil even to representatives at NATO from the three Baltic states, carefully-chosen individuals who knew how to take care of themselves and their nations’ interests. As part of my relationship with Churkin, designed to show that Russia could have a productive role with NATO, I was able to get a positive response from Washington to Churkin’s request that Russia be allowed to bid on equipment contracts for Soviet-era aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s) that still dominated air forces of former Warsaw Pact states.

The person in the U.S. government who led the “Russia-firsters” and worked hardest to forge a productive relationship with Russia was Strobe Talbott, senior State Department person on Russian matters and from 1994 onward Deputy Secretary of State. Despite his seniority in the government, however, plus a close personal relationship with
Clinton, he faced intense opposition from the “Central Europe-firsters.” One of my jobs, even though on the other side of the Atlantic, was to try to find common ground, as well as to help reconcile the military side of the Pentagon to NATO expansion, through emphasis on aspirants’ undertaking needed reforms.

The NATO-Russian relationship even progressed to the point that Moscow was prepared to conclude an Individual Partnership Programme (within PfP), as well as a paper on “NATO-Russia Relations Beyond PfP.” This was to be done at the Alliance’s foreign ministerial meetings on December 1, 1994. But in the interim, the enlargement camp in Washington had been reinforced by a new Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, who was deeply committed to bringing in new members as fast as possible, come what may and without concern for other matters then in play. His efforts on enlargement at times were well out in front of the tolerance of a number of Allies, as I heard from them in Brussels; they also went beyond what the Pentagon and some allied military leaders believed was the time needed to develop the partners’ capabilities to the point of adding to allied security rather than detracting from it, i.e. becoming producers and not just consumers of security. The bureaucratic balance in Washington among different NATO goals was thus upset. Further, in mid-November Holbrooke was quoted publicly as saying that NATO would soon take in new members. Allies were disconcerted. His comments also struck a nerve with Yeltsin, who had already developed concerns about what he thought he saw developing with enlargement and that, I later learned, he had expressed directly to President Clinton.55

Thus, when Foreign Minister Kozyrev arrived at the NATO ministerial, he was—he told us—pulled back by an angry Yeltsin and instructed to deliver in closed ministerial session a strongly-worded rejection of the Individual Partnership Programme, plus blistering comments about enlargement. Afterwards, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel publicly rebuked Holbrooke. “Satisfied, Dick?” he asked.

The Russian reaction happened despite NATO’s carefully nuanced ministerial statement on enlargement, which could hardly have been less specific or forward-leaning, out of deference not directly to Russia but to some skittish allies:
We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes, would be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no one and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe. The enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.  

In the NATO drafting sessions, every word had been haggled over and every one counted. The first sentence of 34 words, buttressed by the next two, was the most carefully-crafted and heavily-compromised NATO statement of any during my four-and-a-half years as ambassador. Given the U.S. desire to get the alliance fully on record for enlargement and to create a basis for launching the Enlargement Study, while also not going beyond the tolerances of several NATO allies (wary either of new security responsibilities or of driving Russia away), my team and I earned our keep in this drafting exercise. Nevertheless, President Yeltsin was not mollified.

There was even worse to come in striking a balance between Russia and Central Europe: a week later at a Budapest summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (at that meeting it was renamed as an Organization rather than a Conference, i.e. OSCE), Yeltsin laid into President Clinton: “Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust?...Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace...History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital.”

It took considerable time and effort, with Talbott in the lead in dealing directly with the Russians, aided by individual NATO allies, to put this particular genie as much as possible back in the bottle. That never totally succeeded.

A big moment to test possibilities in NATO-Russian relations came at the time of NATO’s air campaign in August-September 1995, when the Alliance finally received approval to conduct a sustained air cam-
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...campaign, which ended the war in 18 days. This was pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution which, for reasons of its own, Russia did not veto (neither did China), despite historic Russian ties to Serbia and their common Orthodox Christianity.60

Following the Dayton Accords, when NATO created an Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia, the Russian military indicated a desire to be part of it: not to be left out of this most important venture in the center of Europe. To the Pentagon and us at USNATO, that seemed an ideal opportunity to work directly with the Russians within the framework of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation. But how to achieve it? Secretary of Defense Bill Perry invited the Russian defense minister, General Pavel Grachev, to meet in Brussels. In a session in my office at USNATO, the deal was struck, but there was a problem: Russia was not willing to put its troops under the command of NATO, the former enemy, while, from NATO’s perspective, there could be no troops in IFOR that were not under a common command.

SACEUR, Gen. George Joulwan, came to the rescue. He recalled that U.S. and Soviet forces had met on the Elbe River at the end of World War II, and that this was the first time since then that Russian and American forces had had a chance to work together. He accepted that the Russians could not be under NATO command, but how about U.S. command? That would show that Russia was being treated more-or-less on the same plane as the United States. Grachev immediately accepted the idea, even though representatives of the Russian foreign ministry in the room tried to stop him.61

Arrows on charts Joulwan displayed thus showed the proposed chain of command. Russian troops would report to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) rather than to NATO. The key element: SACEUR, the NATO commander, was the same person—General Joulwan—as the commander of U.S. Forces in Europe! Respect would be shown by the superpower, the Russians would have a major role, and they would not be under NATO. The Russians then sent highly-qualified troops to Bosnia, and Russians and Americans worked closely together, on different occasions rescuing one another from misbehaving Bosnian Serb soldiers. This was a high-water mark in Russia-NATO relations, even though achieved through a transparent sleight-of-hand.
Bosnia

Throughout the months in which NATO was being reorganized to deal with the key issues of European security—implementing the architecture, as I had dubbed it—Bosnia came in and out of prominence at NATO Headquarters, almost never “in” except when the Bosnia Serbs committed a military outrage, especially against one of the safe areas. But each time (a total of 8 decisions in the NAC), the alliance advanced its commitments, but to no overall effect until the very last set of decisions, following the horrific Bosnian Serb slaughter of more than 7,000 Muslim civilians at Srebrenica in July 1995.

However, much more than Srebrenica was involved in the change of views by some key Allies on the use of NATO airpower. Since Trave-münde in October 1993, NATO had been significantly transformed to meet post-Cold War challenges. By the summer of 1995, almost all the pieces were moving into place, including the prospect of enlargement. Only one key element—Russia—was still not clearly on track. There was widespread satisfaction at NATO Headquarters about its major achievements as a job well done. I also discovered that, when other ambassadors at NATO talked about its new architecture and practical steps, all said more-or-less the same thing as was in my script. I had made sure that all of them could claim a share in bringing about the new NATO: it was a corporate achievement.

Bosnia, however, stood in the way of unalloyed celebration. The challenge was clear. As RAND’s Steve Larrabee put it, “How can you be so proud of what you have done when you can’t even stop the war in Bosnia?” This crystallized the issue: along with the triggering event at Srebrenica, there was realization that little of what NATO was doing for European security with its transformation could have political validation unless NATO (finally) acted in Bosnia.

Foreign ministers of key Allies met in London on July 21 and issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs. The baton then passed to us at USNATO to codify with the NAC what became the last of the air strike decisions. The special NAC on July 25 that authorized bombing if triggered by impermissible Bosnian Serb military actions was one of the longest on record and stretched far into the night. It was successful in issuing a warning to the Bosnia Serbs, who ignored it and conducted further military actions against safe areas.
The NATO bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, started on August 30. At NATO headquarters, there was a major shift of mood: finally, the Alliance was acting. There was an almost universal sense of accomplishment, even on the part of people from countries that had been most reluctant for NATO to act.

The mood was short-lived, however. Late that night, I was phoned by the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Holbrooke, by then chief Bosnia negotiator, was demanding a bombing pause so he could go to Belgrade and get Slobodan Milošević to end Bosnian Serb military action. I couldn’t believe it; the chances of its working so soon after the bombing had started were absurd. And, once stopped, could we get the bombing started again?

I woke up Secretary General Claes and relayed the request from Washington. He, too, was furious. Further, Holbrooke had asked that the call for a pause come not from him but from Claes! A good soldier, Claes agreed to do so.

In the morning, the Allies soberly absorbed the news but had to comply. Thus, Holbrooke went to Belgrade and, as we had predicted, came away empty-handed. Then there was a problem: how to get the bombing restarted. I proposed a method to Claes that, as Secretary General, he would declare that the original NATO decision was still in force and that the technical pause could be automatically ended. In other words, a new NAC decision would have to be taken to turn off the renewed bombing, and that would be subject to a veto (mine!). The NAC met and there was no objection.

Sixteen more days of air attacks and the war was over. Left was the wrapping-up in the Dayton Accords, which many of us at NATO saw as having the virtue of bringing the conflict to a formal conclusion, but also allowing Milošević to gain at the bargaining table much of what he and his Bosnia Serb proxies had lost in battle.

1997: On to the End Game

The rebuilding of NATO in all dimensions then continued apace into 1997, to be crowned by a summit. To accommodate the Secretary General, Javier Solana, it was agreed to hold it in Madrid. Only one
key element was missing: a way to include Russia in some way and not exclude it, keeping the door open to cooperation but not letting Moscow affect NATO decisions, especially enlargement. This led to proposals for a NATO agreement with Russia, setting out principles and specific areas for cooperation, while also steering clear of any hint that this would give Moscow a way to side-track other NATO efforts.

Unique among the steps toward remaking NATO, diplomacy with Russia was developed and orchestrated from Washington, led by Strobe Talbott, with little input from NATO-Brussels, other than formally. The fiction of full Allied involvement was preserved but the reality was Washington-Russia, although with a role for Solana as front man and me as the Alliance conduit with Washington. Thus, when the NAC had considered all the issues in the proposed NATO-Russia agreement, Solana said he would take all the ideas, ponder them over the weekend, and propose his own draft for the NAC on Monday. Over the weekend, the State Department produced its own consolidated draft for negotiations with Russia and cabled it to me. What Solana then tabled with the NAC was therefore, in fact, “made in Washington” and, with his imprimatur, was approved unchanged by the Council.  

Solana then took the lead in formal negotiations with the Russians on behalf of NATO. But, to be sure he kept on track, the United States quietly held his hand. The result was agreement on a NATO-Russia Founding Act, a remarkable document in terms of possibilities for cooperation. In addition to general principles to govern the relationship, the Founding Act listed 19 areas for practical cooperation. It also sought to resolve some difficulties the Russians had with NATO’s potential military involvement in Central Europe. It was clearly unacceptable, both to the United States and to allies, for Russia to have a role in determining NATO policies. Yet the need was recognized to relieve some legitimate Russian security concerns about NATO’s moving eastward.

As a result, at U.S. prompting, the NAC unilaterally agreed on two self-abnegating provisions, which were then imported into the Founding Act, untouched by Russian hands. In brief, these were:

- The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.…\textsuperscript{72}

- NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.\textsuperscript{73}

As ever, there was some caviling in the NAC over the final agreement. Most came from the French. I suggested a work-around: that NATO propose that the summit-level signing of the Founding Act take place in Paris (at the Élysée Palace). All French objections instantly disappeared, and President Jacques Chirac hosted this prestigious event.

We still had a problem regarding architecture. Ukraine was in an anomalous position. It was clear to everyone (including the Ukrainians at that time) that it could not aspire to join NATO, certainly under prevailing conditions and perhaps never. Also, opinion in Ukraine was deeply divided. It was also necessary to reassure Russia that NATO membership would not extend that far but without at the same time leaving Ukraine in limbo.

The answer was to negotiate a special arrangement for Ukraine with NATO. The Secretary General delegated the task to us at USNATO and, working with Washington, my team negotiated with the Ukrainians. Final provisions were worked out between me and the Ukrainian representative to NATO, Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, who later became Ukraine’s foreign minister. The result, signed on July 9 at the Madrid NATO Summit, was a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{74} Like the NATO-Russia Founding Act, it included general principles designed to reassure Ukraine and a list of areas for practical cooperation. It also provided for “NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed…” a Ukrainian military mission at NATO, and NAC meetings “with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year.”\textsuperscript{75} The Commission was thus created at the Madrid summit.\textsuperscript{76}
Whom to Invite to Join NATO

The final significant matter was which countries to invite to join NATO. This was done at a foreign ministers’ conference in Sintra, Portugal, on May 29-30, 1997. At USNATO, we provided Washington with our best assessment of the thinking of key allies, notably Germany, the UK, and France. From the beginning of the process, Germany had been concerned to surround itself with NATO, as well as with the European Union. That meant Poland and the Czech Republic as the minimum and could also include Hungary and Slovakia, the other two from the so-called Visegrad Group, named for the Hungarian city where leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary came together in February 1991. Slovakia, however, had been scratched from the list because its prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar, was judged to be less than committed to democracy.

Britain’s objective, we at USNATO determined, was to have as little enlargement as possible, in order primarily to keep from weakening NATO, both militarily and in its ability to take decisions. Its list, therefore, included all four Visegrad countries plus Slovenia, but then with a “hard stop:” an end to further NATO enlargement. For its part, we learned, France wanted Poland and the Czech Republic (the “surround Germany” factor), plus Romania.

Thus, only five Central European aspirants were in play: the Visegrad three, Slovenia, and Romania. Obviously, the decision whether to admit a country was the United States to make, since its strategic commitment to new allies was most critical. Secretary of State Albright’s comment was simple: “We believe in a small number; that number is three; so, we support Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.” So that was it. Part of the U.S. reasoning had to do with gaining U.S. Senate ratification: it would be easier to gain approval—the strategic commitment of the United States to more allies—if there were only a few.

All this was ratified at the Madrid NATO summit, July 8-9, 1997, which also included the first meetings of the simultaneously-created NATO-Ukraine Commission and of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (the latter having been created at the Sintra ministerial). President Yeltsin declined to attend, however: enlargement was on the agenda. Nevertheless, I believed that, especially with the NATO-Rus-
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As the Founding Act, Moscow had become reconciled to the first round of three countries to join NATO. That its complaints were muted had a lot to do, I concluded, with the basic policy that Russia had adopted toward Germany, beginning with its unification at the end of the Cold War and the entry of united Germany into NATO. This was consistent with a judgment I made about Germany’s surrounding itself with NATO and the EU. In my words: “This generation of Germans wants to make it impossible for its children and grandchildren to do what its parents and grandparents did.”

I also arranged for Senator Bill Roth (R-Del) of Delaware, the head of the U.S. Senate NATO Observer Group, which I had helped to create, to speak at the summit, and I also gained NAC approval for defense ministers of Allied states to attend, in order to increase the chances of integrating the different aspects of security and to increase support for NATO with the U.S. Congress and European parliaments. I also arranged for some other members of Congress to be present and encouraged Allies to do likewise.

The only major business done at the summit that had not already been completed or at least decided (e.g., Ukraine and the EAPC), related to the future of enlargement beyond the first three countries. Most important was a debate that took place just among foreign ministers, about the eligibility of the three Baltic states at some point to join NATO. In order to avoid provoking Russia regarding states that had been part of the Soviet Union (and with two of them contiguous to Russia), Deputy Secretary Talbott opposed any mention of these states in the summit communiqué, but the Danish foreign minister said that there would be no NATO communiqué and no NATO enlargement if they were not mentioned. His views were thus included, as innocuous as they sound:

We will review the process [of enlargement] at our next meeting in 1999... The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members [emphasis added]. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these ob-
jectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.83

Responsibility for implementing the decisions of the Madrid summit was given to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, which included us at USNATO. In the period ahead, many more decisions were taken that deeply affected the future of NATO and of European security overall. Most consequential for the near term were more decisions on further enlargement with their impact on NATO’s relations with Russia. European security is still being affected by the consequences. Also, during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tx) proposed to me (I was then out of government) the creation of a mechanism at NATO to deal with any new Allies that might backslide in terms of their responsibilities, including falling short on democracy. The person heading enlargement on Capitol Hill for the State Department instantly rejected this suggestion when I proposed it to him. In view of recent developments in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland, this was a most short-sighted view.
Notes


3. A phrase I invented.

4. See North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (Archived), at: HTTPS://WWW.NATO.INT/CPS/EN/NATOLIVE/TOPICS_69344.HTM?

5. Like some other observers, I had publicly taken a strong public position on the need for the United States to be actively engaged in trying to end the Bosnia War.

6. Nevertheless, the appointment process went rapidly, and I arrived at post on July 11, only the second Clinton Administration ambassador to do so, after Pamela Harriman to Paris, who proved to be an outstanding representative of our country.

7. This is a constant concern of European Allies with a new U.S. administration, even today so many years after the end of the Cold War. It betokens the critical role of the United States in European security. Beginning with my time on the NSC staff in 1977, I noted that the Allies always complained if the United States did too little; and they often complained if we did too much. I prefer that we be criticized for doing too much.


9. No votes are ever taken in the North Atlantic Council or its subordinate bodies. Any ally can object to any proposal and it then fails. This is an important provision for building political cohesion and ensuring that, after a decision is taken, allies will not fail to carry out assigned military tasks. No ally ever has.

10. I was, of course, careful that we never made a formal proposal at the NAC or in subordinate committees for which we did not have written instructions by cable from Washington, other than in the midst of hot and heavy negotiations—e.g., on Bosnia air-strike decisions—where oral instructions from the State Department had to suffice. It was the State Department’s task to get interagency clearance for the oral instructions.

11. This was established by DOD Directive 5105.20 of 1952, which is periodically updated. See https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/510520p.pdf.
12. Even at SHAPE, adaptation to new circumstances was slow. Soon after arriving in Belgium, I visited General Shalikashvili at his headquarters at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and received a command briefing. It included the projection that Russia could field at least 99 army divisions by the year 2000. I was uncomplimentary (!) and Shalikashvili was embarrassed for this idiocy by his staff briefer. Following that, we forged a good relationship that paid dividends throughout our mutual terms of service.

13. USNATO is also the only fully-integrated U.S. foreign mission/embassy. It includes State and Defense personnel (military and civilian) plus some other smaller elements (in those days the later-abolished United States Information Service). It was a single team, under the ambassador’s authority, without the stove piping that so often occurs in embassies with representatives of a multitude of Washington agencies. The United States, like the other allies, was also represented by a military delegation that reported to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in common NATO parlance the Chief of Defense or “CHOD”) and formed the NATO Military Committee. See Structure of NATO, at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_NATO.

14. Key NSC staff were Alexander (Sandy) Vershbow and Jennone Walker.

15. There were different names at different times. One was Peacekeeping Partnership; a second, based on Partnership for Peace, was P4P. The finally agreed acronym was PfP.

16. The CSCE standard was later used to denote those countries that the United States, at least, would see as potentially eligible to join NATO.

17. I was even able to stimulate Irish interest in joining PfP. After lengthy consideration, it finally did so in 1999, after I had left Brussels. This was a remarkable departure for Irish foreign policy, where in 1949 it had rejected a U.S. offer of membership in NATO, unless Britain were excluded (!). The Truman administration opted for the UK.

18. An essential objective was also the massive reduction of Cold War-era military formations and equipment, as both irrelevant to peacekeeping tasks and as burdens on national economies, an essential element both of democratization and development of these societies: functions of security, writ large.

19. In 1995, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) told me that the “pers-tempo” of all the people in his command—that is, how were they spending their time—was more than 50% at any time engaged in PfP activities with partner militaries.

20. EUCOM is the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, also commanded by SACEUR in his solely U.S. “hat.” In parallel with PfP, SACEUR (U.S. General George Joulwan) developed what he called the U.S. European Command State Partnership Program, which fostered cooperation between the National Guards
of individual American states and the militaries of PfP countries. Thus, the Illinois National Guard partnered with Poland, the Maryland National Guard with Estonia, etc. These efforts were an effective supplement to PfP and are continuing.

21. This was not, however, a matter of creating civilian control of the partner militaries but rather the democratization of the broader societies. Indeed, in the Cold War, all of the Warsaw Pact militaries were under civilian control with the political commissar system.

22. This obviously did not work with regard to Ukraine and Crimea in deterring Russian aggression in 2014. That begs the question, however, whether what the United States was doing in Kyiv contributed to the Russian decision to invade. The crisis also took place against the background of the unthought-out 2008 Bucharest NATO summit’s declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO,” thus clearly crossing a red line for Moscow.

23. I had always believed this to have been a central motive for President DeGaulle’s expelling Allied Command Europe and NATO troops from French soil in 1966-67.

24. The key Washington official on this issue was Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

25. I was also invited to lunch by the British ambassador, Sir John Weston, whom I had known well when he had been posted to the British Embassy in Washington. His single message: stifle WEU. Ironically, British opposition to significant elements of European integration was still alive and well in the 2016-19 British folly over Brexit!

26. Unfortunately, after I left NATO in 1998, opponents of a strong EU (and its successors) at the Departments of State and Defense undercut some of the key NATO-WEU provisions. The debate, which was settled in the mid-1990s, has also been (uselessly) revived during the Trump administration. See Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion — or Competitor?*, RAND Corporation, 2001, free download at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463.html.


29. Ahead of Wörner’s visit, I went to Washington and learned the White House was not prepared to provide a scheduled time for Wörner to meet with Clinton or
even to guarantee that one would take place. He could meet with National Security Advisor Tony Lake, and the president might “drop by.” Wörner threatened to cancel his trip. I talked him out of it, made clear to Lake the political damage at NATO if there weren’t an Oval Office meeting, and it did take place.

30. Sciolino, op. cit.: “The United States has decided to support an expansion of NATO that could eventually include Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe and other former members of the Warsaw Pact, a senior aide to Secretary of State Warren Christopher said today.”

31. Usually, the secretaries of state and defense got their first look at the staff-prepared briefing books for ministerial meetings on the plane on the way to the conference site.


34. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.


36. In a press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on January 14, Clinton emphasized Partnership for Peace, which Yeltsin looked at somewhat favorably, though he hedged his position: “...the idea may prove just one of the scenarios for building a new Europe.” Clinton apparently misheard that as “Russia’s intention to be a full and active participant in the Partnership for Peace.” Clinton did add that PfP included that “NATO plainly contemplated an expansion.” The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow, January 14, 1994, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1994-01-24/pdf/WCPD-1994-01-24-Pg41.pdf.

37. See “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” National Security Archive, March 16, 2018, at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard. This account contains some documents that were not shared with USNATO at the time and thus did not directly affect our dealings with the issue.

38. These include at NATO Headquarters the U.S. Delegation to the Military Committee, which worked for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other 15 national delegations, delegations from PfP countries, the Secretary General and his Private Office, the Deputy and Assistant Secretaries General, and the seemingly
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myriad other NATO bodies (notably the civilian International Staff and the military International Military Staff).

39. At NATO Headquarters, we also received on average 7,000 official government visitors each year for meetings of the alliance’s various bodies.

40. In 1994, less than three years had passed since the USSR dissolved; its forces had not that long before departed from Central Europe; and it could not be said for sure that military confrontation, which had ended, would stay ended.

41. I worked particularly closely with Joe Kruzel, until his death on Mt. Igman, and Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, one of the most effective holders of that office and a strong supporter of NATO and of what we were trying to achieve at NATO Headquarters. Both had clear-sighted perspectives on what needed to be done.

42. I found this to be mostly on the civilian than the military side (with some notable exceptions) of the U.S. foreign policy/national security bureaucracy. Regarding the latter, I was struck with how open U.S. officers were with one another and with their Allied counterparts, until I realized that, if there is not a full exchange of information, in combat people may die.

43. Many Central European states have argued that joining NATO would help them gain foreign investment. This has been a factor in what I believe to have been excessive NATO enlargement, but there is no evidence to support the proposition.

44. I asked him if he had ever heard of Groucho Marx.

45. Notably, at that exercise, which I attended to show the American flag, peacekeeping troops from Ukraine performed particularly well.

46. One notable example was Hungarian claims on Transylvania, which had been incorporated into Romania in 1918. Hungary was told it had to give up this claim in order to join NATO and it did so.


49. This was a major reason why the NATO summit at Bucharest in 2008 was grossly irresponsible in declaring that “Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO.” It was clear that not a single ally was prepared to fight for Georgia—and, when the short conflict began with Russia, none did; and that judgment also likely applies to Ukraine, as well. The upshot of that decision was to give credence to Vladimir Putin’s domestic propaganda claim that NATO was seeking to “surround” Russia, but with no security benefit for Georgia, Ukraine, or the alliance. See Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating


51. I saw this first hand during a trip to Washington that included a meeting of senior officials in the White House Situation Room, when members of the two camps personally insulted one another.

52. Although I had proposed the mission, it was properly led by the dean of the NAC, Spain’s Ambassador Carlos Miranda. This was actually an advantage since it showed that PfP was not just a U.S. venture.

53. Ironically, the PCC occupied a small building that had been used for Operation Live Oak, Cold War-era coordination by the three Western occupying powers in Germany—the U.S., UK, and France—plus the Federal Republic of Germany, regarding possible Soviet/East German threats or military action against West Berlin. When we took officers from the PCC nations to tour the building and to choose offices, the Russian delegation took the best for themselves.


55. There is also still debate, including U.S. diplomats who were present, about whether the United States had promised Yeltsin at the time of German unification that NATO would not expand into Central Europe. When we were first considering NATO enlargement, I formally asked the State Department whether any such pledges had ever been made. I was assured that that had not happened.


57. See Leonid Velekhov, “Russia-NATO Betrothal Didn’t Happen,” Sevodnya, December 3, 1994, translated in CDPSP 46(48). In a late December letter to Clinton, Yeltsin explained the Russian reaction: “I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington [in September 1994] not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia’s full-scale partnership with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement.” Kozyrev later wrote that “[p]rior to the meeting, as a result of arduous and protracted negotiations, representatives of the 16 NATO member-states worked out a compromise communiqué. The Russian delegation had the text of the paper only a few hours before the official inauguration of the cooperation program between Russia and NATO. We did not even have time to translate the document into Russian, much less to analyze it in order to report to the president of Russia. How-
ever, the communiqué recorded positions on issues of direct concern to Russia. It described the future evolution of the alliance, including its eventual expansion eastward, with the emphasis on the expansion rather than on partnership with Russia. This created a new situation for Russia, which we needed at least to examine. Thus, it was decided to postpone signing the partnership instrument.”


59. See Sciolino, op. cit.

60. At least one reason Russia opposed he 1999 air campaign over Kosovo was that there was no U.N. resolution. Whether it would have vetoed such a resolution if the Western powers had proposed one is not clear.

61. Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov said in Russian that this must not be done. Grachev told him, in Russian, to shut up.

62. Britain worked hardest to prevent any use of NATO airpower to protect safe areas, to begin with at NATO and, if it was cornered there, at the U.N. through the Secretary-General or, if even that failed, on at least one occasion by instructing its military commander in the field not to act.

63. At a conference attended by senior NATO leaders organized by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Ebenhausen, Bavaria.


67. As is any ambassador’s right, I asked for formal instructions by cable, which arrived a few hours later.

68. See Javier Solana, at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Solana. Having been Spanish foreign minister and with ambitions for the future in Spanish politics—never realized—this was a logical proposal.

69. The British ambassador, Sir John Goulden, took me aside after the NAC meeting and said: “Robert, when your people in Washington produce a draft and pass it off as Solana’s, you could at least change American spellings to the British spellings we use here at NATO!”
70. Talbott sent Sandy Vershbow to Moscow to make sure that Solana got things right.


72. Key elements of the wording of this paragraph were literally written on the back of a napkin at the NATO Headquarters restaurant at a U.S.-officials-only lunch, including me and key members of my team, plus Sandy Vershbow of the NSC staff. Vershbow was the chief draftsman.

73. The qualifiers “current and foreseeable security environment” became an escape clause for NATO following the Russian seizure of Crimea and military activities elsewhere in Ukraine, beginning in 2014. They permitted NATO to do military things in Central Europe while arguing that it has not violated the Founding Act.


75. Regarding a name for the agreement, I told Tarasyuk we had proposed calling the NATO-Russia agreement a “charter,” but Moscow had rejected it. “We’ll take it,” he said.

76. There was nearly a snag. I was back in Washington to go over final details for Madrid and mentioned to Strobe Talbott that NATO would meet with Ukraine at the summit in the context of the new Commission. Worried about the impact on the Russians, he disagreed vigorously. But he was overruled by Secretary of State Albright.

77. See Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970529/home.htm. Notably, he communique also said: We also recommend to our Heads of State and Government to make explicit our commitment that the Alliance remains open to the accession of any other European state able and willing to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to our common security.

78. See History of the Visegrád Group, at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/history/history-of-the-visegrad. Slovakia acceded to the group as an independent country, as did the Czech Republic, following the velvet divorce of December 31, 1992.
79. At USNATO, we believed French inclusion of Romania was calculated more to “get the U.S. goat” as anything else, since the Romance language connection was not serious.

80. Hungary’s inclusion by the United States in the first enlargement was affected by its contribution to U.S. military efforts to keep the peace in Bosnia with the post-Dayton Implementation Force (IFOR). I was tasked to ask the Hungarian ambassador to Belgium, who represented his country to PfP, whether the U.S. First Armored Division could use the Hungarian military base at Tászár for transit to Bosnia. When I approached him with this request, the Hungarian ambassador, András Simonyi, asked: “Would tomorrow morning be too late for us to agree?” From that moment, Hungary was on the U.S. short-list to join NATO. President Bill Clinton visited the base in December 1995.

81. For documents, see NATO Summit, Madrid, Spain, 8-9 July 1997, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm.

82. At the end of the summit, President Bill Clinton had a private meeting with leaders all of the Central European aspirant countries. It concluded with a “family photo” of all of them. Just before that, Madeleine Albright deliberately button-holed Prime Minister Mečiar of Slovakia, the “anti-Democrat,” and proceeded to lecture him at length in Czech. As a result, he missed the family photo and saved Clinton the embarrassment.
