Chapter 11

NATO Enlargement:
Perspective of a German Politician

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In April 1994, at the height of the debate about an eastward enlargement of NATO, the Trilateral Commission met in Vancouver. I was asked to open the debate. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski were asked to comment. Kissinger remarked that this was a historic day. Not only did he agree with me—which happened seldom enough—he also agreed with Brzezinski: all three of us were advocating for an eastward enlargement of NATO. Our motives, however, were different.

My motives reflected predominantly political goals that could not have been achieved in the course of the reunification of Germany, or the need to address challenges that had become clearer in subsequent years.

First, the goal of the reunification of Germany was achieved in October 1990, but the goal of overcoming the division of Europe and realizing a lasting European peace order had not yet been accomplished.

On November 21, 1990, the member states of the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had agreed, with the Charter of Paris, on the basic normative principles of a future, fair, democratic, and constitutional peace. The reality, however, was that those standards were not upheld consistently across the vast space from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This was especially true in the area of security policy.

Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, for most German politicians the CSCE process and arms control policy agreements between East and West, in particular the INF Treaty and the SALT I and SALT II treaties, were the most important instruments for overcoming tensions and divisions in Europe. In the first few months after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, I would not have thought it realistic to strive for membership of a united Germany in NATO. Only after my talks in January 1990 in Washington and then in Moscow did I change my opinion and advocate first internally within my Social Democratic Party (SPD) and then publicly for NATO membership of a unified Germany.

On January 27, 1990, Robert Blackwill and Steve Hadley on the U.S. National Security Council informed me confidentially about the concept of the “Two Plus Four” talks to facilitate the unification of Germany. I agreed with Blackwill that the Soviet Union could agree to NATO membership of unified Germany—if we were careful to ensure that the Soviet side understood the talks were truly “Two Plus Four” and not “Five Against One,” the “One” being the Soviet Union. Only a few days later, on February 2, 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held talks in Washington about the concept of “Two Plus Four” talks. Subsequently, on February 8, 1990, Secretary of State Baker also spoke in Moscow about this concept.

On February 6, 1990, I spoke for the first time in a session with SPD foreign policymakers about the possibility of membership of unified Germany in NATO. At that time, the majority of SPD members were still advocating for overcoming the security-political division of Germany within the framework of a reformed and strengthened pan-European CSCE. Thus, this was still in the draft for my speech for the “Wehrkunde” Munich Security Conference of February 2–4, 1990.

On February 12, 1990, there was another session of the foreign affairs working group of the SPD. Here, Egon Bahr, supported by the leading representatives of the newly-established party of the GDR, including Markus Meckel, Hans Misseiwitz, and Walter Romberg, argued that a unified Germany should belong neither to NATO nor the Warsaw Pact, but rather to a pan-European security system. I objected and argued that the SPD must at least support an effort to sound out the possibility of membership of a unified Germany in NATO.

On February 27 and 28, 1990, Bahr and I flew to Moscow. When the SPD party caucus (Fraktion) asked me to accompany Bahr, I was well aware that he and I represented different opinions. We spoke in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Politburo Member Yakovlev, and Marshall Akhromeyev. Valentin Falin also participated in the talks with Yakovlev. Bahr explained his concept of a reformed and
strengthened OSCE. At this point I interrupted him and explained that it was necessary to at least consider the possibility of NATO membership. Our Soviet interlocutors did not contradict Bahr. His ideas did not seem unsympathetic to them. But only Falin actively supported Bahr. Otherwise, our Soviet partners seemed to be much more interested in economic questions and good relations with the United States.

After our return from Moscow, I was convinced that there was an opportunity to maintain the NATO membership of a unified Germany. After that, I advocated first within the party and then also publicly for this.

Even though such an outcome would be favorable for Germany and Germany’s neighbors, it was important that such a decision not deepen the division of Europe. The CSCE Charter of Paris was one response. But it alone would have been an unsatisfactory solution to the German (security) question. It would have guaranteed no effective multilateral integration of the German military, even though all of Germany’s neighbors wanted this. In addition, due to the veto possibility of each individual CSCE member state, it would not have been in a position to protect CSCE members against the threat of military force in times of crisis.

The SPD was a very early advocate for the inclusion of Eastern European democracies in the Council of Europe and in the European Communities/European Union. Eastward enlargement was of great significance for the consolidation of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Yet neither the Council of Europe nor the larger, post-Maastricht EU carried any significance for military security policy.

The enlargement of the Council of Europe was completed relatively quickly in the mid-1990s. The enlargement of the EU, in contrast, was conditioned on significant economic and social transformations by the former Soviet satellite states. Therefore, contrary to our original conceptions, EU enlargement was realized only much later than the enlargement of the Council of Europe and NATO. In 1995, only Finland, Sweden, and Austria (all firm democracies and successful economies) became EU members and thus stepped out of the shadow of the Cold War.
At the beginning of 1990, individuals active in peace research and on the left of the SPD discussed the possibility of contractual agreements between NATO and a reformed Warsaw Pact and between the EU and a reformed COMECON. In my opinion, however, the dictatorial internationalism in the Warsaw Pact and in COMECON could not be transformed into a voluntary internationalism — and in fact, both organizations soon fell apart. Added to this was that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were pushing for a withdrawal of Soviet and Russian troops from their countries and as close a connection to the EU and NATO as possible.

The membership of post-Soviet Russia in NATO received some support both in Germany and in the United States in the first half of 1990. I never approved of this. In my opinion, a NATO of which Russia was a member would be transformed from a system for collective defense into a system of collective security. In case of larger conflicts in Europe, such a transformed NATO would probably frequently not be able to act, because, due to the principle of consensus, it would always require the agreement of all members, that is, also of Russia.

Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Russia regarded itself as a world power and large European power. This self-image made it unlikely that it would come to terms with the dominant role of the United States in NATO. Russia’s membership in NATO would diminish some problems, but create many new ones. Furthermore, from the very beginning, countries such as Poland saw the United States and NATO as an instrument of protection against Russia. For these reasons, I contradicted Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Strobe Talbott when, during a discussion at the American Academy in Berlin on March 20, 1998, he pleaded for the inclusion of Russia in NATO. It was important, I said, to bind Russia closer to Europe, but not to bring it into NATO.³

At the end of 1991 and in early 1992, I began to advocate for the eastward enlargement of NATO. Two ideas were decisive for me here. First was the multilateral embedding of Germany in the East according to the example of relations with our Western European neighbors in NATO and the EU. Second, at the same time, the enlargement of NATO needed to reinforce the trajectory then underway toward greater security cooperation throughout all of Europe. Therefore, in my
opinion, the step of integration into NATO should be tied to the step of closer cooperation/collaboration with those countries, especially Russia, who were not able or willing to join NATO. In addition, I was convinced that the political and military strategy of NATO and its defense-political deployment would have to be changed so that it would be clear that Russia could be perceived as a partner rather than an opponent of NATO.

Today, NATO regards itself reinforced again as a system of collective defense, especially against risks that originate in Russia. This shift of accent had been required by the Baltic states and Poland since the beginning of their membership. In Germany, this shift of accent was first shared by the vast majority of members of the Bundestag as a consequence of Russian behavior in the 2008 Georgian conflict, and the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.

A second complex of problems arose in connection with the unification of Germany. European politicians such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President François Mitterrand and others sought to reanimate concepts of the “balance of power” and the “concert of powers.” For centuries, these concepts were the cause of conflicts and wars in Europe. German policy regarded it as a European interest to replace these concepts with multilateral systems of cooperation and integration, as had been practiced successfully in the preceding decades in Western Europe, also now in Eastern Europe.

At the 2+4 talks, the four former victorious powers, that is, the large powers at the end of World War II, were in agreement that the defense policy of a unified Germany had to be integrated multilaterally. Because the Soviet Union presented no viable alternatives to this, in the end, the Western concept of the integration of unified Germany into NATO prevailed. Thus, with the agreement of the Soviet Union, the first eastward enlargement of NATO was agreed upon, namely the enlargement of NATO territory to include the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). At that time, this was not called the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO, but in fact it was the first, and a precursor to the subsequent enlargements.

In order to make this first NATO eastward enlargement (I did not yet speak of an initial enlargement in 1990, but only later in the context of the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary) acceptable to the Soviet Union, some special arrangements were agreed: no permanent stationing of foreign troops would be allowed on the territory of the former GDR. Because Germany was forbidden to possess atomic weapons, this meant factually a nuclear weapon-free status for the territory of the former GDR. These agreements about the military status of the former GDR territory later also became the example for similar agreements for the further eastward enlargements of NATO.

The former victorious powers were not the only countries worried about the future foreign and defense policy behavior of a unified Germany. Other neighbors of Germany, e.g. Poland and Denmark, shared these concerns. From their point of view, the integration of a unified Germany into NATO and the stationing of U.S. troops in Germany guaranteed that unified Germany could also not pursue any aggressive or revisionist policies in the future. Because Germany did not have such policies in mind, these arrangements in the interest of “enlightened self-containment” were also in Germany’s own interest. In this manner it was guaranteed that Germany could not do what Germany also did not intend to do. Locking Germany into multilateral structures was a good basis for good relations with all of its neighbors, including those in the East.

A third set of issues arose because at the same time the Eastern Bloc was disintegrating, national conflicts within and between countries increased in Southeastern Europe and Yugoslavia. These conflicts were frequently conducted with force. The 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) was an instrument for moderating the effects of these conflicts. In that the settlement of such conflicts became a precondition for acceptance in NATO or in the EU, it was possible to solve or at least contain such conflicts. The SPD supported the Partnership for Peace.

On the basis of the treaties concluded in 1990, over the next few years Germany and many of its European partners concluded numerous bilateral agreements. It became the declared goal of German policy to strive for just as good a relationship with its eastern neighbors as with its western neighbors. With an eye on this goal, those advocating for closer cooperation between the EU and the Eastern European states grew in number and influence. Full integration into the EU, however,
assumed such extensive economic and social changes that even with the best intentions it could only be achieved after quite a few years.

In this context, Russia only came into question as a cooperation partner for the EU and not as a full member. Its self-image as a sovereign nuclear global power and large European power could not be reconciled with the restrictions on sovereignty associated with full membership in the EU.

When I began to advocate for the concept of an eastward enlargement of NATO at the end of 1991/beginning of 1992, I assumed that Russia would be against former members of the Warsaw Pact joining NATO. There was almost no chance to change Moscow’s mind. However, Russia also had very limited possibilities to prevent it.

As Chair first of the German-Soviet and later the German-Russian parliamentary group in the Bundestag, I was always in favor of close partnerships and relationships with this country, which is so important for Europe. Particularly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, I believed it was important in the interest of lasting stability in Europe to design the eastward enlargement of NATO politically and militarily so that it would at least be palatable to Russia. Despite all differences of opinion, conflicts, and conflicting interests, today I am still in favor of continuing to attempt to find cooperative solutions with Russia.

The idea of an eastward enlargement of NATO did not emerge on one day in 1990, but rather as the result of a lengthy process. Today, Volker Rühe and I each believe that we were the first to advocate for this concept. I no longer remember when we discussed this goal for the first time. However, when we spoke about it initially, we were both aware that we were a minority within our respective parties. It was clear to us that in the beginning there was also no majority in the United States for an eastward enlargement of NATO. Without active U.S. support for an eastward enlargement of NATO, a German commitment would have been futile. And so, both of us, each according to his abilities, sought support in Washington. Leading U.S. foreign affairs policymakers such as Strobe Talbott and Richard Holbrooke, who were reluctant in the early 1990s, later became engaged proponents.

Richard Holbrooke became a proponent during his time as Ambassador in Germany in the year 1993. In talks with him at this time, I
emphasized especially that without an eastward enlargement of NATO and later of the EU that it would also be more difficult for Germany to incorporate our legitimate striving for good relations to Russia into multilateral frameworks. As a matter of course, that would only exacerbate the anxieties with which our Eastern neighbors approached a unified Germany. Locking Germany into multilateral structures would serve German and European interests equally. It would also solve many geostrategic problems from past centuries.

While others saw the Partnership for Peace as an alternative to NATO enlargement, Volker Rühe and I regarded it as a precursor. In these years, I spoke about this several times with Admiral Ulrich Weisser, the head of the planning staff at the Ministry of Defense. As leader of the study group for security of the German Council on Foreign Relations, I regularly invited him to sessions of the study group. I remember that we both explained the concept of an eastward enlargement of NATO in the study group. Over the next years we continued our discussions. In Volker Rühe's chapter in this volume, he emphasizes the important role Admiral Weisser played.

Volker Rühe advocated among the Christian Democrats and as Defense Minister for the eastward enlargement of NATO. I did this as foreign policy speaker for the SPD in the Bundestag, through my intensive contacts with diplomats in other European countries and in the United States, through discussions in think tanks and calculated publicity work.

Throughout this period, I actively sought to shape public and parliamentary opinion to win support for enlargement of the Alliance within a broader frame of cooperative security across the European continent. In the following, based on my notes and my shuttle diplomacy of that time, I offer impressions of this process, which in the end contributed to gaining strong majorities for the eastward enlargement of NATO in the German Bundestag, in other European states, and in the United States.

From January 15-20, 1992, I flew to Jamaica to attend a seminar of the Congressional Program of the Aspen Institute. The topic was relations with the post-Soviet region. Eleven U.S. Senators and five members of the U.S. House of Representatives attended, as did several U.S. specialists, such as Robert Legvold and Robert Blackwill. I was
invited in order to familiarize the U.S. representatives with a German point of view. The presence of Janusz Onyszkiewicz from Poland and Andrey Kortunov and Vladimir Lukin from Russia served the same purpose. Russians, e.g. Vyacheslav Nikonov and Alexei Arbatov, also participated in later seminars in Vienna, Istanbul, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, and Berlin. Onyskiewicz and I took the opportunity to present our arguments for a NATO eastward enlargement; the Russian participants confronted the representatives with their counter-arguments. In this respect, the seminar fulfilled its purpose.

In all of the following years, up to ratification of the NATO enlargement, I continued to participate in these Aspen seminars in different places. The American participants changed. But over the years, prominent Senators and Congressmen such as Lindsey Graham, William Roth, Mitch McConnell, Joe Liebermann, Nancy Pelosi, Jon Kyle, Sam Nunn, and Richard Lugar participated. Professor Michael Mandelbaum was responsible for preparing the content of these seminars. It spoke in favor of his democratic discussion culture that he kept inviting me even though he himself was against an eastward enlargement of NATO.

When it came to working with Members of the U.S. Congress, both through the Aspen sessions and in my work within the North Atlantic Assembly, my cooperation was especially close with the Republican Senator William Roth and his advisor Ian Brzezinski.

In February 1992 I called for a “security partnership agreement” that would include Eastern European democracies in a reformed NATO if they would heed the rights of national minorities and abandon any mutual territorial claims against one another. I believed that there was an opportunity to connect transatlantic ties and pan-European tasks with one another conceptually and practically better than ever before. Since the creation of new security structures in Europe was exceedingly urgent, I argued that it was realistic to utilize existing structures as the basis for the new architecture. Even former opponents of NATO, I argued, now considered the Alliance as a factor for stability in Europe. This was a qualitatively new moment, especially since NATO itself had offered the Eastern Europeans and the former USSR its partnership and friendship. However, I added, NATO would have to transform it-
self from an alliance based on military deterrence into a comprehensive
security alliance.

I called for an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty in which
NATO would state that it was an institution in the service of the CSCE
and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO should deploy its
capabilities in the interest of the CSCE to mitigate crises, prevent con-
fusion, and avoid the re-nationalization of defense. A changed NATO,
I said, should be open to all CSCE states and members of the Coop-
eration Council. I realized that the inclusion of new members and an
amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty with the goal of stabilizing
pan-European security would require unanimity and the formulation
of an overall concept by NATO. But this should not stop NATO from
already declaring its readiness to include stable Eastern European de-
mocracies as full members in the future. The prerequisite would be that
the countries in question could not make any mutual territorial claims
and they would have to guarantee the rights of national minorities. At
the same time, I rejected the idea of security guarantees provided by
the alliance of member states of the CIS (Community of Independent
States). The Social Democratic Press Service commented on my pro-
posal with the words: “It honors the SPD that its foreign policy speaker
Voigt is the first to present a comprehensive concept for the creation of
a security partnership between the Western states and those of Eastern
Europe.”

Before going public with my views, I had discussed this concept with
the foreign policy and security policy representatives of the SPD. Some
embraced it; others opposed it.

Soon thereafter, József Czukor, the Hungarian envoy and later Hun-
garian Ambassador to Germany, visited me to discuss my approach. I
explained my concept of NATO enlargement and requested that Hun-
gary make an application for admission to NATO. As he told me years
later, he then wrote a report to his government. They were very aston-
ished and would have liked him to ask whether I really meant what I
said, and how I imagined such a request could be realized.

I continued my efforts in March 1992 by contributing an article to
the “Entscheidung,” the newspaper of the Christian Democratic youth
organization, about the “Westernization of Eastern Europe as a Mis-
sion.” Each country in Eastern Europe had its own traditions, I wrote.
But it would be foolish to believe that these traditions would lead to better democracies, better adherence to the rule of law or better economic reforms than had already been realized in the West. Therefore, the “Westernization of the East” was a progressive concept.

For me, part of this concept of the “Westernization of Eastern Europe” also involved, where possible, leading previously communist parties to the political culture of Western European social democracy. In these years, I was the representative of the SPD to the “Socialist International” and what was called at the time the “Alliance of Social Democratic Parties” in the European Community (today called the “Party of European Socialists”). Here, I advocated for the cooperation with and later membership of these parties. In coming years, many of these former communist parties voted in their respective parliaments for their countries to join NATO.

On March 3-4, 1992, I participated in the first seminar organized by the North Atlantic Assembly (today the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) in Kyiv. In my speech to the seminar participants, I advocated for close cooperation of Ukraine with NATO, however consciously did not speak about membership of Ukraine in NATO. A Russian-speaking German whom I was paying was working at the time—with his cooperation—for a Ukrainian representative in the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament. She organized appointments for me with the foreign minister and the most important party groups in the parliament. At these meetings, we discussed the future relationship of Ukraine to NATO and the EU.

In early April 1992, Polish President Lech Wałęsa visited Bonn. In the course of his visit, he held talks with members of the foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag. In the process, he advocated for the membership of Poland in NATO, at the same time, however, set forth confused ideas about NATO and Poland’s future security-political role.

On May 22, 1992, I flew to Copenhagen at the invitation of the supreme commander of the Danish forces. In my lecture to the Danish Academy for Defense, I explained not just my ideas about an enlargement of NATO. I also advocated for having NATO be available in the future for peacekeeping deployments of the UN and the OSCE. I also made this request because it would make it easier to gain support for
the eastward enlargement of NATO in countries such as Denmark and within the SPD.

On October 1, 1992, I flew to Bucharest as Chair of the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. There I held talks with President Iliescu, Foreign Minister Nastase, Defense Minister Spirou, and the chairs of the most important committees. I also visited Romanian military units. In Romania, agreement on the eastward enlargement of NATO was unanimous. However, my partners in the talks absolutely wanted to be present at the first enlargement round. They feared that there would not be additional rounds.

A letter from Berndt von Staden, our former Ambassador in Washington, had already presented me with similar worries. He came from the Baltic region, and he too that there would not be additional enlargement rounds. If that would be the case, then the political and security position of the Baltic states could be more exposed than without any enlargement. I tried to dispel these worries with a note about additional enlargement rounds. But naturally I was not certain about this either.

At the SPD’s national party convention in November 1992, I advocated for the eastern opening of institutions previously limited to the West. I said that NATO would remain a system of collective defense and would not be transformed into a system of collective security. But in future, NATO could increasingly perform functions of collective security and thus perform pan-European functions. I did not mention the goal of an eastward enlargement of NATO in this speech.

In the following months and years, I continued this exceptionally large number of talks with German, European, and American politicians, diplomats, and specialists. In the process, I used my function in the Bundestag, in German and international social democracy, to think tanks and transatlantic networks, in order to promote the concept of the eastward enlargement. Because there were countless appointments, in the following I will mention only a few talks and meetings.

From June 8-10, 1993, I flew to Slovenia. There, among other things, I met President Kucan. In my talks, there was also discussion of the eastward enlargement of NATO. However, the primary concern was the violent conflicts in Yugoslavia and the possible escalation of these conflicts. Only after Slovenia was recognized internationally as
an independent state did the question of NATO membership become an important goal for this country.

Shortly after my visit to Slovenia, I met RAND analyst Ron Asmus on June 14, 1993, to discuss the eastward enlargement of NATO. We and other American proponents met repeatedly in the following months and years to compare notes and our impressions.

As the Brussels NATO Summit slated for January 10, 1994 approached, it became apparent that NATO governments were ready to adopt the U.S.-inspired Partnership for Peace, but were not yet prepared to offer aspiring countries any real perspective for membership. I felt this was wrong. On December 21, 1993, I issued a statement on behalf of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group about the upcoming summit:

The proposals for a Partnership for Peace previously discussed at NATO fall short in two ways. On the one hand, they are lacking sufficiently concrete and binding proposals that could truly help Russia on its imperiled path to democratic and economic reforms. On the other hand, the perspective of membership in NATO and the European Union is missing, for which the Central European reform states are rightly urging.

As close a partner-like cooperation with a hopefully further democratizing Russia and the integration of those Central European democracies that want this and that are already capable of this should create a stable network of NATO and the European Union with our Eastern neighbors.

At the same time, NATO and the European Union should urge all Central European states to seek good neighborly relations with Russia and one another. However, at the same time, there may be no doubt that none of our Eastern neighbors has a veto right with respect to the membership of another state in the European Union or NATO.\(^6\)

I reinforced the message the next day in an article for the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung}, in which I criticized NATO and EU governments for failing to offer Eastern European states any membership perspective.\(^7\) Partnership for Peace was not enough.
On January 17, 1994, a representative of the German Federal Foreign Office, Wilfried Gruber, reported to the “International Relations” study group of the German Council on Foreign Relations on the NATO Summit conclusions with regard to the enlargement issue. In advance of this summit, the Alliance had been confronted with a dilemma. On the one side were the Poles and other Visegrád states, who pushed hard. On the other were the Russians, who rejected a geographic enlargement of NATO. The Summit result was a double-track decision. On the one hand, Allies affirmed the principle that NATO’s door was open to new members. On the other hand, this would be an evolutionary process—hence the Partnership for Peace.

Not only was I disappointed with the Brussels Summit outcome on membership, I felt it did not go far enough in demonstrating that NATO, too, had to change, and that a new relationship with Russia had to be forged. On February 6, 1994, I wrote another article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. I reiterated my support for NATO enlargement, but underscored that it had to be proceed together with a change in NATO strategy and deeper cooperation with Russia.

I increasingly used my function as Chair of the German-Russian parliamentary group in the Bundestag to speak with Russian politicians, specialists, and diplomats about the concept of NATO and EU enlargement. For instance I was in Moscow from February 9-14, 1994 and spoke there with the chairs of all party groups of all parties except for communist party leader Zyuganov and the right-radical Zhirinovsky.

In many talks with Eastern European politicians, the mixture of domestic policy, party political, and foreign policy arguments was striking. The President of the Romanian parliament visited me on April 28, 1994. He requested a private meeting. There, he asked me about the chances for his Social Democratic Party to be included in the “Socialist International.” More important to him, however, was inclusion in the “Party of European Socialists,” because he hoped, not without good reason, that this could facilitate his country’s prospects to join the European Union. In particular, he urged that Romania be included the next round of NATO enlargement.

From July 16-20, 1994, I flew to RAND in Santa Monica. There, I discussed with Ron Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and Steve Larrabee and others conceptual details of a NATO enlargement and the respective
debates about this, especially in the United States and in Germany, but also in other countries. I also explained my ideas about the role of the North Atlantic Assembly (today’s NATO Parliamentary Assembly) in the further process.

In Washington in November 1994, I was elected President of the North Atlantic Assembly. In my inaugural address, I emphasized that while the Assembly had no power, it could exert influence. I made the case that it should use this influence to build support for an eastward enlargement of NATO and incorporation of Eastern European parliamentarians into the customs and culture of transatlantic relations. This way, the Assembly could also contribute to overcoming the division of Europe.10

In the Assembly there was still no consensus about the eastward enlargement of NATO. However, over two years the Assembly working group on this topic had made a significant contribution by clarifying questions to be considered. Shortly before the Washington meeting, the working group’s “Report on NATO Enlargement” was published. Co-Chairs of this working group were Republican U.S. Senator William Roth from Delaware and Democratic U.S. Congressman Charlie Rose from North Carolina.

As Rapporteur, it was my task to prepare this report. As part of this process, I had sent a letter to all leaders of the associate delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. In this letter, I asked them to write to the working group whether they were—beyond the Partnership for Peace concept—interested in NATO membership. If so, I asked them in which type of membership they were interested:

- participation in integrated command structure (not France; special Spanish status);
- deployment of non-indigenous ground and air forces in peacetime (e.g. Germany, UK, Netherlands);
- only deployment of non-indigenous air forces in peacetime (e.g. Turkey);
- no deployment of non-indigenous forces in peacetime (e.g. Norway);
• total integration of all indigenous forces in NATO command structure already in peacetime (Germany only);

• no nuclear weapons deployment in peacetime (e.g. Norway/Denmark).

Each delegation was clear: they wanted to be fully integrated members of the Alliance. In the 10-page report (plus appendix), the working group described and analyzed practically all arguments for and against enlargement and all relevant questions in the context of this debate. I later sent these same questions to those from Belarus and Russia who represented their parliaments at the Assembly. They answered me in February 1995.

The Belarus delegation emphasized the significance of the decision to join the Partnership for Peace. Belarus wanted to be a territory free of nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, however, Belarus did not want to join NATO. Many people in the population, they said, would be concerned if NATO came closer to the borders of Belarus. This would be especially true if troops or, in particular, nuclear weapons were stationed in the vicinity of Belarus.

The Russian delegation emphasized in its 5-page letter of February 2, 1995, “We regard NATO today not as an enemy or as a threat of any nature against the new, democratic Russia. We have the right to rely on a similar approach of the North Atlantic block with regard to Russia... Russia is attempting to set up a broad-based and deep cooperation with NATO based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit, and friendship.” The Russian parliamentarians went on to call for a comprehensive pan-European security model. “A transformation of NATO in the interest of European unity is of vital importance,” they continued. “NATO’s December agreements form a stark contrast against this backdrop...there are numerous other, international organizations such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the West European Union, in which membership would be a much more persuasive confirmation of belonging to Europe than would participation in NATO, which represents a transatlantic organization...it’s time to reject the chronic complex with respect to the role of Russia in Europe.”

On January 24, 1995, I invited all members of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group to a discussion of the topic “NATO enlarge-
ment.” Over previous months it had become clear that a clear majority of foreign affairs policymakers of the SPD Fraktion supported this concept. Our task now was to gain stable majority support in the entire party group.

Meanwhile, I continued discussions on NATO enlargement with members of the “International Security” study group of the German Council on Foreign Relations that I was leading. On February 13, 1995, I invited its members to a discussion on the topic “New perspectives on NATO enlargement.” The discussion was introduced by one representative from the Foreign Office, the Defense Ministry, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Uwe Nerlich of the SWP pleaded for a careful rather than overly hasty NATO enlargement. The representative of the Foreign Office was not specific with respect to the endorsement of an enlargement, however he pleaded against haste—also with regard to Russia. The representative of the Defense Ministry expressed himself somewhat more positively about NATO enlargement, however then concentrated more on the individual questions that would have to be considered in the context of a possible enlargement.

In the discussion, the vast majority of the participants assumed that there would be an enlargement of NATO. In their remarks, they concentrated on the different positions of the individual Central European states, on the interests of the Baltic States, on specific German points of view and interests, and the relationship to Russia.¹⁴

Soon after that, from March 15-17, 1995, I flew to Moscow as President of the North Atlantic Assembly. I met with Russian Foreign Minister Kosyrev, Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin, various parliamentarians, including the Vice-President of the Duma and counsel of the Federation, members of the commission of foreign affairs and defense, and many political analysts. All of my interlocutors, without exception, declared themselves opposed to an enlargement of NATO, with Kozyrev being the most inflexible among them.

The meeting with Kozyrev was more a monologue than an exchange of views. Immediately after Kozyrev entered into the room he began to object, even before he sat down. The 20-page protocol of the secretary’s office of the Assembly notes that “The Minister of Affairs described his position using a very simple formula: no to enlargement, yes to partner-
ship.” He argued that an enlargement of the Alliance would undermine cooperation between NATO and Russia and be incompatible with partnership. NATO enlargement would reduce the NATO-Russia partnership to nothingness. It would put an end to the democratic experience in Russia, and Russian public opinion could not comprehend the expansion of this military alliance. The NATO Enlargement Study underway at that time would in itself undermine cooperation with Russia; the publication of criteria would mark a new stage. Russian opinion would interpret this as an overture to negotiations, like the trigger of an irreversible process (which he qualified as an “avalanche of enlargement”).

I responded by saying that I was personally in favor of enlargement, but did not think that NATO would reach a firm decision about the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ before the Russian elections. I reviewed with Kozyrev the main conclusions of the Assembly’s deliberations, which encouraged the integration of new members into the Alliance in parallel with pursuit of cooperation with Russia.\(^15\)

On May 24, 1995, the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly began in Budapest. It was the first time that such a meeting was held in a former member state of the Warsaw Pact (a meeting was later held in Bucharest from October 9-12, 1997). Public interest was accordingly great. As main speakers, I had invited Volker Rühe and Richard Holbrooke, two committed proponents of enlargement. Both fulfilled my expectations. The speech was very important to Holbrooke, as Daniel Hamilton recounts in Chapter 1 of this volume. He used it not only to argue for enlargement, but to send the East Europeans a “tough love” message that NATO was unlikely to open its door to new members unless and until they resolved their own historical disputes and made real progress on political, economic and security reforms.

Among the Assembly parliamentarians, in addition to the Germans, the Scandinavians professed themselves very early as supporters of an enlargement. The British and French delayed for a long time—if for different reasons.

On June 13-14, 1995, I flew to Sofia as Assembly President. In Bulgaria, the discussion about a possible NATO enlargement had developed completely differently than in Romania. The parliament was deeply divided with respect to this question. A minority of the parliamentarians—the so-called “Euro left” and the conservative opposition—want-
ed to be in the first enlargement round if possible. The socialists who then reigned—a party that arose from the former communist party—was at that point still largely skeptical to dismissive. The proponents of membership in the EU were more numerous. The socialists advocated for close relations with Russia, but due to a possible EU membership wanted at the same time to become members of the “Confederation of Socialist Parties,” the later “Party of European Socialists.”

I had meetings with the President of the National Assembly, Sendeov, with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandrov, Defense Minister Pavlov, with Prime Minister Videnov, with the President of the Republic, Zhelev, and representatives of all political parties. In my talks, I constantly emphasized that Germany as member of NATO would simultaneously maintain good, close relations with Russia and that our NATO membership would not harm our relations with Russia. No pressure would be exerted on Bulgaria to join NATO. Bulgaria would first have to decide whether it wanted to become a NATO member. Important also would be that Bulgaria seek good relations with its neighbors, and especially not let familiar border problems from Bulgaria’s earlier history erupt again. But even then, there would be no automatic acceptance of Bulgarian membership to NATO. It was easy to join the Warsaw Pact, but difficult to leave it again. In NATO, the situation was reversed.

The Bulgarians made me the honorable offer of addressing their parliament. In this speech, I once again summarized the arguments from the foregoing talks into an overall concept.

I had been in Romania as Chair of the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in October 1992. Now I flew to Bucharest from September 12-15, 1995 as Assembly President. I had meetings with President Iliescu, Prime Minister Văcăroiu, the foreign and defense ministers, the leader of the Romanian delegation to the Assembly, the President of the House of Deputies, and all political parties. The Romanian interest in joining NATO as early as possible was even more perceptible than during my visit in 1992. All interlocutors wanted Romania to be considered in the next round of enlargement. They emphasized that they were striving for a similarly long-term reconciliation with Hungary as the one between Germany and France. They would make efforts to maintain good relations with all neighbors and would also respect the rights of national minorities.
From October 17-19, 1995, I flew to Warsaw as Assembly President. Part of the program was a wreath-laying at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. This event was a very special and emotional element for a German politician. My interlocutors were President Wałęsa, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Marshall of the Sejm, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Marshall of the Senate, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Defense Committee, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of all political parties.

All my interlocutors wanted to become members of NATO as early as possible. They were concerned about the slowing down of this process. I remarked that this was “regrettable, but to be expected.” There were four different sources for this caution: those worried about guarantees—the “Article Fivers;” those concerned about Alliance cohesion—the “NATO protectionists;” those worried about Russia—the “Russia-firsters;” and those who saw the strengthening of OSCE as a solution—the “pan-Europeans.” I raised the issue of civilian control of the armed forces several times. This problem was not always taken as seriously as one would have wanted.

History played a direct or indirect role in all discussions. In my meeting with the Marshall of the Senate, my Polish interlocutor mentioned the Russian desire for a sphere of influence. I answered “that if NATO enlargement was seen in terms of spheres of influence, it became a zero-sum game; it should be seen as stabilizing by providing reassurances and confidence. If the Poles and Czechs were alone, they would become nervous if the United States or Germany were to cooperate with Russia. Membership in NATO would give these countries the confidence to cooperate with Russia. Remaining ‘outside’ meant that each offer of cooperation would be seen as a competing influence; the old game in this region would start again.”

My meeting with Wałęsa was dramatic. He was obviously very frustrated with what he considered to be the slow pace of enlargement. He told me he had already obtained a written agreement from Russian President Boris Yeltsin that Russia had no objections to Polish aspirations to join NATO and the EU. When I responded that Yeltsin appeared to have changed his mind, Wałęsa agreed this appeared to be so, but retorted that NATO should have taken a “man’s decision.” NATO
was a military alliance; he had done his military service and knew what it was to take decisive decisions. What he had realized two years earlier would now take three years to materialize.

It was a question of whether or not the West would take a courageous decision, he said. It was essential not to talk of confrontation or of individual countries but of Europe. There was one continent and one civilization, not individual categories. The later enlargement was implemented the higher would be the price. Now was the opportunity to overcome the division of Europe.

In concluding the meeting, Wałęsa appealed for an acceleration of the process. Time would not wait, he said. Life would be safer and collective capabilities greater. “We join you to defend you,” he told me, as we said goodbye.

I continued my campaign to win majority support in my party for NATO enlargement. On November 6, 1995 I sent to all members of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group “10 theses about the eastward enlargement of NATO. I later used the 10 theses as the basis for a February 1996 article in the NATO Review.19

10 theses about the eastward enlargement of NATO

1. So that the principles of Europe—human and minority rights, democratic pluralism, rule of law, and freedom from violence—become the reality of a unifying Europe, beyond the strengthening of the OSCE, the European Union, the WEU, and NATO must exercise pan-European functions in that they open themselves up to the East for cooperation and integration.

2. The eastward enlargement of NATO relies, like that of the European Union, on the principle of the parallelism of integration and cooperation. The integration of new members and the deepening of cooperation with those who are not or not yet in a position or not willing to join.

3. The eastward enlargement of NATO should contribute to stability through integration. It is not provoked by an acute military threat. Therefore, in the new member states, there do not need to be any nuclear weapons or any foreign troops stationed there.
4. The eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union should complete the already completed multilateral integration of Germany into the West. This obligates Germany in the interest of stability in Europe to consider the interests of its neighbors when pursuing its own values and interests. The eastward expansion shall prevent a bilateralism in German politics toward the East that is problematic for Germany’s neighbors in the East and West.

5. NATO is interested in good, close partner-like relations with Russia and Ukraine. The process for accepting new members into NATO must accompany parallels mechanisms of cooperation. A security partnership to be secured contractually between Russia and NATO should allow for Russia’s singular status as nuclear power and as permanent member of the Security Council. Russia should be informed immediately about decisions within NATO and be consulted on questions of collective security in Europe. In addition, the OSCE should be strengthened. Parallel to agreements with Russia, a security partnership with Ukraine should be striven for.

6. Above all, the eastward expansion of NATO is a political decision about whether states that want to join can support the values and principles of the alliance. The minimum conditions that must be fulfilled: democracy and a free-market economy must be anchored; the new member state must be in a position to promote the principles of the Washington Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic territory; its membership must bring a security gain for both sides, which means unresolved conflicts such as territorial and minority problems may not be brought into the alliance, it must be in a position to bear appropriately the costs of membership, each new member must have the agreement of all 16 NATO members in the ratification process, and its inclusion may not prevent the inclusion of other candidates.

7. Adherence to these minimum conditions is required in order to maintain democratic credibility and NATO’s ability to act. This also means that not all states that want to join will join at one time. Accession negotiations should begin in the second half of 1996. This also means that Russia’s fear that NATO will rush into an eastward enlargement is unfounded.

8. It is anticipated that some of the young European democracies will be able to join NATO earlier than the European Union. No conscious obstacles should be placed in the way of their integration efforts. Therefore, there is a conceptual relationship between the
enlargement of NATO and the European Union, but no necessary temporal parallel.

9. The dynamic of the enlargement process should be maintained despite current objections. The enlargement study passed by the NATO council at the start of October [1995] represents an important step even if the study does not make any clear statements about some important questions, for example, with respect to the beginning of the accession negotiations and about partnership relations with Russia and Ukraine.

10. The decision about the enlargement of NATO will be made solely by the 16 member states and the candidate countries; there is no veto right from a third party. The eastward enlargement is not directed at anyone. It prevents the re-nationalization of the security policy of the Eastern European states and thus serves stability and security in Europe overall. A nationally organized security policy of the Eastern European states can become a motive for the arming of these states. Furthermore, an integration of these states into NATO can be used for increased disarmament efforts. For this, first and foremost, additions to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) should result in lower upper limits.

On December 4, 1995 at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, I used the 10 theses to discuss NATO enlargement with German peace researchers, who still harbored great reservations about the issue. I placed the debate in the context of German domestic politics. “With the end of the power and system-political bipolarity between East and West,” I argued, “the basis has been removed for the previous bipolarity between CDU and SPD in the discussion of foreign affairs and security policy in Germany.” I also framed the debate on NATO in the context of broader changes to the architecture of European security. “The OSCE should not just be maintained, but also strengthened,” I said. “However, anyone who proclaims the strengthening of the OSCE not as an additional measure but rather as a substitute for the eastward enlargement of NATO and WEU is really talking about the sacrifice of a deeper integration with and between states that are ready and in a position for a deeper multilateral integration of their foreign and security policy.... An enlarged NATO bound to Russia and Ukraine by a treaty is still not a system of collective security. It is still a system of collective defense, but it fulfills functions of collective security.”
That same day I led another session of the “International Security” study group at the German Council of Foreign Relations on “How do we continue with the NATO eastward enlargement?” I asked NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Questions, Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke and Russian Ambassador Terechov to provide opening statements. Based on the explanation of the official position of NATO and the Russian Federation, subsequently all aspects of the NATO enlargement were discussed.21

From May 25–June 2, 1996, I visited Poland again as President of the Assembly. In addition to talks with most of the leading politicians and in the relevant ministries, I was given the honor of addressing the Sejm, the Polish parliament. In the process, I emphasized that I would speak not just as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, but also as a German politician. From my point of view, the enlargement of NATO was a historical setting in which centuries-old dilemmas in relations between Russia and Poland could be overcome. We Germans could work closely with Russia without having Poland feel threatened on account of this. And Poland, as a member of a multilateral transatlantic alliance, could develop close, constructive relations with unified Germany and in the end also with Russia without requiring reinsurance through bilateral treaties with Western partners. This bilateral reinsurance of Poland in the West would never have proven reliable in the past.

From June 15-17, 1996, I flew to Bratislava, Slovakia as President of the Assembly. The talks with the President, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, and the various parties and committees in the parliament were very constructive. My interlocutors urged that Slovakia be considered for the next round of the NATO enlargement. My indication that this also depended on the development of democracy and the rule of law in Slovakia met with resistance. Some partners in the talks even asserted that there was a secret agreement with the Russian leadership to the detriment of Slovakian membership. My talk with Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar were contentious. He did not accept my argument that the decision about inclusion in NATO would not be made based on geostrategic considerations, but also assumed as a prerequisite Slovakia’s adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law.22

From September 14-17, 1996, I flew to Kyiv as President of the NATO PA. I held talks with President Kuchma, Prime Minister Laza-
renko, the Defense Minister, the President of the Parliament, and the relevant committees and party groups of the parliament. In my talks, I remained true to my earlier position. I favored cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, but not membership. With the Foreign Minister, I went through point by point a list I had made of European treaties and organizations of which Ukraine could be a member without being a member of the EU. I did not talk about the question of future membership of Ukraine in the EU. However, this topic was addressed by several Ukrainian interlocutors. Several participants in the talks advocated for a NATO membership of Ukraine. Some of those who desired this believed it was unrealistic. Others advocated for non-alignment, linked to a close cooperation with NATO. Regardless of which position the Ukrainian politicians represented, each discussion was overshadowed by the question about the relationship of Ukraine to Russia.\(^{23}\)

From October 21-23, 1996, I visited Estonia, where I met with the President, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the President of the Parliament, and the most important committees and party groups in the parliament. In Tallinn, all of my interlocutors wanted Estonia to join NATO. The dominant reason for this was the fear of Russian revisionism. I could understand this fear, but I did not share it at that point. I supported the Baltic states’ desire to join NATO, but only in a second enlargement round. Before that point it would be possible to reinforce cooperation with NATO and naturally also with the EU on many levels. President Meri expressed the fear that if Poland entered NATO and the Baltic states did not, this could cause problems with respect to Kaliningrad. In an address to the Estonian parliament, I had the opportunity to give reasons for the overall concept of the policy of NATO enlargement.\(^ {24}\)

I completed the series of my visits to future NATO member states with a visit in Prague from October 29-31, 1996. There, I met all the politicians important for the question of joining NATO. Czech President Havel especially impressed me.

From January 23-26, 1997, I flew to Moscow for a conference of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. After the talks there, I stated again that the members of NATO should not wait for the agreement of Russia for NATO enlargement. At best, Russia would tolerate such an enlargement, but would not explicitly agree to it. I represented the same con-
viction in speeches to the Bundestag on February 28 and June 26, 1997. By the time I delivered these speeches, a clear majority of the leadership of the SPD now advocated for NATO enlargement. At that time, the SPD would also have been in favor of including a larger number of states, e.g. also Romania and Slovenia, in the first enlargement round.

On March 21, 1997, I flew to Tokyo for the meeting of the Trilateral Commission. In connection with this meeting, the Tokyo office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung organized appointments for me with parliamentarians and at the foreign and defense ministries. One of the topics was the possible consequences of an eastward enlargement of NATO on the security situation in East Asia. In September 1998, I flew to Asia again, this time to Beijing and Tokyo. At the talks in both capitals, there was concern about the possible consequences of the eastward enlargement of NATO for East Asia. The greater concern, however, was the future foreign policy of Germany in case of a government coalition between the SPD and the Greens.

To round out the picture: On May 12, 1997, Joschka Fischer and I went to our old favorite pub from the times of the 1968 student movement, the “Club Voltaire” in Frankfurt. There, with moderate success, I defended the concept of an eastward enlargement of NATO. The vast majority of the Greens were still against it at that time. But it became clear: after the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy front lines between the parties in Germany had begun to change.

On July 8-9, 1997 at the Madrid NATO Summit, Alliance leaders invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. On March 26, 1998, 554 of the 621 members in the Bundestag—including almost all members of the CDU, FDP and SPD as well as a minority of the Greens—agreed to the entry of the three countries into NATO. Only 37 members voted against, and 30 abstained. By the time the three new members took their seats at NATO’s 50th anniversary summit in 1999, Germany’s new Chancellor, Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, and Germany’s Green Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, welcomed them into the Alliance.
Notes

1. During the subsequent 2+4 Talks the foreign policy spokespersons of the parties represented in the Bundestag, which included me, were regularly informed of progress by the State Secretary in the Foreign Office Dieter Kastrup. We were informed that the German position was that except for the question of Poland’s western border the negotiations were not to discuss 3rd state issues of any kind. Such an extension of the negotiating framework would be counter to German interests.

2. For details about the talks in Moscow and their context, see my article “Anfang 1990: Die SPD, Moskau und die NATO-Frage,” in Das Blätterchen, Vol. 19, No. 5, February 2016.


4. Parallel to the democracy movements, nationalistic ideologies and national conflicts were increasing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, also in Caucasus, in Yugoslavia, and also in the Baltic states. This thawing of mentalities and conflicts suppressed during the Cold War was of great concern to me at that time. This analysis was also a reason for me to work against these tendencies with effective multilateral structures. For a summary of my remarks, see Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst, PPP, February 25, 1992. In: Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, Depositum Voigt.

5. According to the protocol of the conclave of the speakers of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group on February 21, 1992. it was said quite rightly: “Brigitte Schulte sees significant differences in the question of the enlargement of the NATO alliance and future role of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO overall.” Available in: Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, Depositum Voigt,


