Part I

The Cold War Endgame
and NATO Transformed
Chapter 1

Piece of the Puzzle:
NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture
After the Cold War

Daniel S. Hamilton

Much debate about NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement has suffered from three weaknesses.

The first has been a tendency to view NATO and its enlargement exclusively through a Russian prism. Russia-firsters worried that NATO enlargement would exacerbate Russian insecurities and further divide the continent; Russia skeptics supported enlargement because they believed NATO needed to capitalize on a period of Russian weakness and disorientation by expanding its frontiers. What united the two camps was the view that NATO was a threat-based institution whose sole purpose was to deter, and if necessary, repulse, an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its satellites in the Warsaw Pact.1 Now that the threat that had given rise to NATO’s creation was gone, many Russia-firsters asked why the Alliance would even continue to exist, much less expand. Russia skeptics, in turn, asked why the Alliance didn’t expand as quickly as possible; just because the Soviet Union had collapsed didn’t mean that the Russian bear wouldn’t be back.2

These views were short-sighted in many ways. The Russia skeptics only exacerbated the very Russian insecurities the Russia-firsters highlighted. Many Russia-firsters, in turn, treated as secondary the security concerns of hundreds of millions of non-Russian Europeans who lived outside the institutionalized order in which Western societies were free, largely prosperous, and secure. Both camps’ Soviet/Russia-centric, threat-based view of NATO blinded them to the fact that the end of the Cold War did not solve Europe’s security issues. Europe and the United States faced a host of other security challenges for which NATO could be extremely relevant. Some of those challenges did not stem from or even have much to do with Russia; some were not even in...
Europe; and some were such that NATO-Russia cooperation could be of considerable value.³

This one-dimensional, Russia-centric caricature of NATO also ignored the Alliance’s various purposes. Three days after the North Atlantic Treaty gave life to NATO in 1949, the great political commentator Walter Lippman wrote that it would be remembered long after the conditions that provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union and, come what may, will survive it…. [This community] would be a reality if we were at peace with the Soviet government and it will still be the reality when at long last we are again at peace with the Russian people and their government.⁴

Since its inception the Alliance not only provided for the collective defense of its members, it institutionalized the transatlantic link, offered a preeminent framework for managing relations between Allies on issues of security and strategy, and provided an umbrella of reassurance under which European countries could focus their security concerns on common challenges rather than on each other. In the aftermath of two World Wars and throughout a half-century-long Cold War, that latter purpose, so often underplayed or misunderstood, was critical to Europe’s recovery, prosperity and security. As U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented at the time, “Certainly, NATO’s cold-war task was to contain the Soviet threat. But that is not all it did. It provided the confidence and security shattered economies needed to rebuild themselves. It helped France and Germany become reconciled, making European integration possible. With other institutions, it brought Italy, then Germany and eventually Spain back into the family of European democracies. It denationalized allied defense policies. It stabilized relations between Greece and Turkey. All without firing a shot.”⁵ These functions of the Alliance—reconciling adversaries and reassuring allies in a frame of common security—was as relevant at the end of the Cold War as it was at the beginning.⁶ “The security NATO provides,” Albright notes, “has always been essential to the prosperity the EU promises.”⁷
Even today it is difficult to go to any conference on NATO without someone lazily parroting the simplistic—and incorrect—bromide attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General from 1952-1957, that the goal of NATO was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. While the first two purposes were essentially correct, the third evolved to such an extent that by 1989 it was no longer apt. NATO’s role, together with other institutions, had been to embed West Germany within mutually reassuring structures that assuaged doubts by neighbors—and many Germans—about West Germany’s growing weight. Far from keeping the Germans down, NATO, the European Communities and other institutions helped the new Germany stand back up. If this were not true, Germany would never have unified with the support of the four former allies who vanquished Hitler. While much credit must go to the Germans, without the security provided by the embedded framework, neither the Germans nor their neighbors are likely to have had the confidence to reconcile, to integrate, and to reach across European divides.

Over the decades the Alliance proved that it could adapt its purposes in response to changing strategic circumstances. In the late 1960s NATO’s original strategy of deterrence and defense evolved to complement the emergence of political détente. In 1991 the George H.W. Bush Administration and all Allies agreed in NATO’s new Strategic Concept that “risks to allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties” arising from ethnic and territorial disputes in central Europe.” The Alliance looked to such new missions as peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. By the end of the Bush Administration, NATO’s static defense posture, anchored by heavy armored divisions, was giving way to lighter, more mobile forces for projection into areas beyond NATO borders.

These evolutionary changes underscore that alliances do not necessarily exist solely to wage or deter war, they can also manage relations among member states. Over decades NATO followed in this tradition; the end of the Cold War afforded it the opportunity to extend its management function to neutral and non-aligned states as well as former members of the Warsaw Pact, including Russia. By reaching out to
Moscow with a range of partnership initiatives, the Clinton Administration and European Allies worked to temper the other third of Lord Ismay’s witticism: keeping the Russians out.\textsuperscript{12}

This relates to a third weakness of the debate: the tendency to focus on NATO alone rather than on the Alliance’s role within a broader framework of European and Euro-Atlantic architecture. Critics who believed the Atlantic Community was nothing more than a creature of the Cold War ignored the fact that at the end of WWII the United States and its partners set forth a vision based not only on the need to contain Soviet power and communism in the east, but also to draw together allies and partners in the West. They were as much focused on the continent’s overall instabilities as on the Soviet threat.

During the Cold War, attention focused naturally on the first goal—containing the East. But the second part—reordering and adapting the West after two world wars, depression and the rise of fascism—was equally important, and in fact preceded the Cold War and the creation of NATO. The vision for this political order was articulated in such statements as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, and the Marshall Plan speech of 1947. The founding of such institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—helped to stabilize and liberalize postwar market economies, structure cooperative relations within Europe and across the Atlantic, and promote unprecedented peace and prosperity. Western Europe’s own integrative mechanisms, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community and leading to the European Communities, both reinforced and gave deeper meaning to these efforts. Even the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was aimed as much at generating confidence among Western European peoples that they could tame their conflicts by binding democracies together as it was an alliance created to balance Soviet power.\textsuperscript{13}

The leaders of the Atlantic Community realized that Europe’s security could not be based solely on external guarantees; it had to be built from within societies. They knew they would be able to deal with the external challenge from the East only if they could draw effectively on
the inner resources of the West. The two goals were mutually reinforcing; the strategic vision was enormously successful. The Atlantic Alliance created an umbrella under which European unity could develop, and together these institutions helped produce unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a century—even if for only half a continent.

This context is important to understand because the decision to enlarge the Alliance was not taken in isolation; it was part and parcel of the Clinton Administration’s broader efforts to update and realign the entire “architecture” of relations between the United States and Europe. The goal was to put to rest residual problems not just of one war, but of all the European wars and instabilities of the 20th century. For President Clinton and his team, opening NATO’s door was not a threat-driven or Russia-centric decision, it was part of a broader strategy of projecting stability, unifying Europe, and positioning the U.S.-European relationship for the opportunities and challenges of a new and uncertain era.

**Bush, Clinton and Europe**

In a number of ways neither former Clinton or Bush Administration officials are probably wont to acknowledge, the Clinton Administration’s efforts built on those of the Bush Administration. Both sought to operationalize President Bush’s vision of a “Europe whole and free.” Both were convinced that U.S. engagement on the continent remained essential. So did the Europeans—certainly during the German unification debate. The Germans themselves, as well as their French and British partners, but also other neighbors in East and West, saw NATO as a stabilizer on the European continent. All understood that a single “overarching structure” could not deal with the great variety of security challenges facing such a diverse continent, and so sought to construct an integrated Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which existing institutions such as NATO, the European Union (EU), and the CSCE/OSCE could be adapted and transformed to play complementary and mutually supporting roles across a wider European space. All worked intensively with Moscow to dampen, and where possible, eliminate the most dangerous legacies of Cold War competition and to support Russia’s own democratic reforms.
While both administrations had a general sense of where they wanted to go, neither operated from a pre-set playbook. William H. Hill characterizes Bush Administration actions as “a set of apparently ad hoc reactions to unforeseen and unprecedented events and opportunities, in particular responses to sudden conflicts and emergencies.”\textsuperscript{18} Ronald D. Asmus acknowledges that the Clinton strategy “was not the product of a single decision or a sudden epiphany. Instead, it evolved over the course of President Clinton’s two terms in office into an increasingly coherent policy in response to events on the ground and as the Administration’s own views matured.”\textsuperscript{19}

President Clinton was guided by his political instincts rather than a detailed blueprint. He admired Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman for intuitively understanding what their world required of them; neither had grand strategies but were guided by “powerful instincts about what had to be done.” Strategic coherence, he said, was largely imposed after the fact.\textsuperscript{20} In each administration, even those engaged in one element of the “architecture” often had little time for, or awareness of, how other potentially complementary elements were proceeding. That is how the sausage is made.

Of course, differences were also significant. The Bush Administration was overwhelmingly focused on peacefully managing the Cold War’s denouement and moving to design a “new Europe and new Atlanticism” (as Secretary of State James Baker put it); the Clinton Administration faced the task of peacefully managing the emergence of the post-Cold War world. By the time the Bush Administration came to an end, two states—the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—had dissolved into no less than twenty new countries in Eurasia. The future of violent conflict in Europe seemed likely to stem more from the disintegration of states rather than from disagreements between them.\textsuperscript{21} The Bush Administration, together with its Allies, especially the Germans as “partners in leadership,” had begun the process of updating and reorienting Euro-Atlantic architecture, but the relationship between the various institutions was left unclear, as was the process of potential membership.

The violent breakup of Yugoslavia and a series of conflicts between and within some of the new states on the periphery of the USSR presented an especially daunting challenge for peace and stability in the
rest of Europe. Post-Wall Europe’s remade institutions were untried. It soon became apparent that the EU and the CSCE lacked the mechanisms and institutional capabilities to prevent, suppress or mediate the conflicts arising in this broad area. NATO alone had the structures and forces for engage in such tasks, but many of its members did not have the will to do so. With nations at odds and America initially leaving the ball in “Europe’s” court, NATO appeared to have turned into a bystander, more misalliance than alliance.

Crucially, the Bush and Clinton administrations differed about what all of this meant for U.S. interests. Watching the Yugoslav tragedy unfold, Secretary of State James Baker famously declared “we ain’t got no dog in that fight,” a stance Richard Holbrooke decried as “the greatest failure of the West since the 1930s.” Serbian President Slobodan Milošević later told U.S. diplomat John Kornblum that Baker’s words had electrified him: “That was my go-ahead to start a war.”

The changing domestic context in the United States was also crucial. Despite President Bush’s masterful orchestration of the unification of Germany, the peaceful end of the Cold War, and victory in the Persian Gulf war, enough voters believed he had taken his eye off the ball on problems at home to elect a new President committed to domestic renewal and “the economy, stupid.” The mood was decidedly inward-looking; there was talk of a peace dividend and retrenchment from global exertions. A new case would have to be made for continued U.S. engagement in Europe. This was the context in which the Clinton Administration came into office in January 1993.

**Euro-Atlantic Architecture**

Behind the twists and turns of politics, underlying continuities were visible in the U.S. approach to Europe. A relatively coherent strategic vision was emerging of how the various pieces of Euro-Atlantic architecture had to transform and adapt. That included but went far beyond NATO. The question was as much how NATO should fit as what it should do.

This focus on “architecture” does not necessarily come naturally to Americans, who by tradition and instinct are often inclined to want to solve foreign policy problems rather than manage them. From the end

european security problems, or a U.S. politician, in good Yankee jargon, proclaiming Europe ‘fixed.’ The implication of these pronouncements, of course, was that NATO, mission accomplished, could be dissolved.

This view not only ignored the fact that Europe’s security issues were not “solved” by the Cold War’s end; it underestimated the continuing relevance of institutions to Europe’s security. Europe’s diversity and historic rivalries remain a determining aspect of efforts to maintain stability. Maintaining peace in Europe has traditionally depended on a complicated set of structures that balanced often-conflicting interests. From the European perspective, the many contradictions and strains in European power relations have become more manageable largely as a result of institutional devices, none more imaginative or successful than NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE.
At one point along the way Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asked for a visual depiction of the emerging architecture. I worked with colleagues to craft a solar system of 13 colored overlapping circles, with the names of countries grouped according to the institutions to which they belonged. It was complicated. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright joked that “you have to be either a genius or French to keep it all straight.”

Despite its complications, this dense web of interlocking institutions and mechanisms was essential to Euro-Atlantic and European security and prosperity. It was how Europeans built their security. Albright said the Euro-chart reminded her of an inscrutable comment a French diplomat actually made once in response to an American proposal: “It will work in practice, yes. But will it work in theory?”

Strobe Talbott later said that “I saw NATO enlargement as an objective that not only made sense in theory but might work in practice—as long as we could avoid causing a train wreck (a phrase common in the predictions of the policy’s opponents) in our relations with Russia.”

This story is how decision-makers sought to align practice with theory.

**Distractions and Divisions**

Bill Clinton came into office in January 1993 focused on his domestic agenda. When it came to foreign policy, the President’s priorities were to ramp up U.S. support for democratic reform in Russia and to raise the profile of economic themes in U.S. engagement abroad by ratifying the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), finalizing the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and jumpstarting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Administration’s attention was further diverted by crises in Somalia and Haiti.

When it came to Europe, the administration was beset by a welter of discrete challenges, most left on the Bush Administration’s plate when it walked out the door. Bosnia preoccupied attention, but there was little appetite for U.S. engagement—in spite of Clinton’s emotive rhetoric and accusation during the election campaign that Bush was doing too little to address the humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia.
Debates over the appropriate role for post-Cold War NATO were inconclusive; at a cabinet meeting on October 18, 1993 the Administration decided, in Strobe Talbott’s words, to “kick the can” down the road.\textsuperscript{30}

Clinton was more preoccupied with growing instability in Russia. Meeting in March of that year, Clinton and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that ensuring Russian democracy was a “paramount challenge” and that “the rest of the G7 countries must cooperate with us and each other to vigorously produce a program of support for Russia.”\textsuperscript{31} Both worried that Boris Yeltsin could be toppled if economic and political transformation did not soon take root. A failed coup attempt in September heightened those fears. “This guy’s in the fight of his life,” Clinton exclaimed.\textsuperscript{32} He was intent on doing what he could to help Yeltsin. He managed to secure Congressional support of $2.5 billion for the post-Soviet nations, two-thirds of which would go to Russia. Kohl urged Clinton to include Yeltsin as a full participant in the G-7; objections by the U.S. Treasury Department, however, convinced the President to distinguish between a G7 without Russia on financial issues and a G8 with Russia on political issues.

Other challenges revolved around defusing potential tensions remaining from Soviet era. One was to persuade Russia to withdraw troops from Estonia and Latvia, which it did in 1994.\textsuperscript{33} The other was to continue the Bush Administration’s efforts to reduce Cold War arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, including dismantling nuclear weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union.

These issues were not easily subsumed under some grand vision for transatlantic partnership, nor was that the President’s inclination. A first effort to define an overarching “Clinton Doctrine” came when President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Tony Lake set forth a strategy of enlargement of the community of democracies and market economies in a speech at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in September 1993. The Central and Eastern European region, located adjacent to the transatlantic community and showing prospects for success, was a perfect place to demonstrate that the Clinton Administration could implement that vision.\textsuperscript{34}

Nonetheless, despite entreaties earlier that year by German Defense Minister Volker Rühe as well as Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, József An-
tall and other Central and Eastern European leaders, given the Clinton Administration’s other priorities it was unclear how committed it was to having the United States integrally involved in European affairs overall, not to mention the particular concerns of Central Europeans.35

Nor had the Clinton Administration translated Lake’s broad doctrine of enlargement into an operational European strategy. While Clinton later said that he had already contemplated the enlargement of NATO as a way to secure the gains for freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe during his election campaign in 1992,36 Tony Lake described the President’s position as “not so much a policy as an attitude.”37

It was within this context that divisions became apparent within the Clinton Administration, as other authors in this volume explain. Differences turned on interpretations of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which became a temporizing compromise—construed as a first step to NATO enlargement by those who were inclined to support it, or as a holding station of undetermined duration by those who were not. The divisions within the administration were reflected by similar divisions within the Alliance.38

The action-forcing event was President Clinton’s first trip to Europe in January 1994. The President set the tone. On the eve of his trip he said that he did not want to give the impression that the United States was creating another dividing line in Europe after it had worked for decades to get rid of the one that existed before. He added, however, that PfP would “permit the expansion of NATO, and I fully expect that it will lead to that at some point.”39

Each side of the debate thought the President had sided with them. Those opposing enlargement focused on the part of his statement about no more dividing lines. Those favoring enlargement focused on the President’s clear expectation that NATO enlargement would happen.

At the January NATO Summit, the President declared that PfP “sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO.” And then two days later in Prague, he said “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Clinton also raised the issue of what he called the architecture of European security with Yeltsin in Moscow, but did not set forth a systematic view of
what that could be. The Brussels NATO Summit had made clear that NATO “plainly contemplated an expansion,” he said, but that was for an unspecified future, and PfP was “the real thing now.”

For several months after Clinton’s pronouncements in January, the issue of NATO enlargement had dropped down the Administration’s priority list. The Pentagon and the State Department had more pressing concerns, including continued denuclearization efforts in the former Soviet Union and the need to get the Partnership for Peace up and running. Attention of senior officials remained on Bosnia after the horrific February bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace. As Christopher writes, “Not only did this conflict occupy much of our time and energy, but psychologically we found it exceedingly difficult to focus on expansion while NATO groped for a way to stop the bloodshed in southern Europe.”

America and the Berlin Republic

“They’ve asked me to be Ambassador to Germany. You have to come with me.”

Richard Holbrooke was on the line. I had worked closely with him when I coordinated two U.S. national commissions on the future of U.S. foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Holbrooke had been a member of the first commission, chaired by Winston Lord and Stephen Bosworth, which in June 1992 issued a report Changing Our Ways, intended as a bipartisan blueprint for a post-Cold U.S. foreign policy. Mort Abramowitz, the Endowment’s president, then asked Holbrooke to chair, and me to coordinate, a follow-on effort to propose ways to restructure the U.S. government’s foreign policy apparatus for a new age. Our proposals were instrumental to the Clinton’s Administration’s creation of the National Economic Council in the White House, the position of Undersecretary for Global Affairs in the State Department, and a variety of other innovations.

Following the 1992 election, Holbrooke and I parted ways—he the Asianist, I the Europeanist. Holbrooke was angling for a senior position in the new Administration—preferably U.S. Ambassador to Japan. In the end, Walter Mondale expressed interest in the job. The next country on the list was Germany—not Holbrooke’s first choice. As he
considered, he called me to say that if he took the job, given his own relative inexperience with Germany he would need someone as his own personal policy advisor on German affairs (Mondale had done the same on Japan). I agreed, but told him that my wife and I were about to have a baby who would most likely need to undergo a bone marrow transplant. I could not come right away. We discussed asking Fritz Stern, an eminent scholar of Germany, to join Holbrooke for the fall of 1993; I would come in early 1994.

We also agreed that I would use my remaining time at the Endowment to chart how the United States should reframe its relations with a united Germany in the post-Cold War era. I asked a number of senior Democratic and Republican opinion leaders, including a few Clinton Administration officials (in their personal capacity) to join the project. Our deliberations informed a short book I finished in the fall of 1993. Holbrooke, now in Bonn, received my drafts, providing comments and urging policy-relevant recommendations.

In the book I suggested a variety of ways Americans might approach a Germany undergoing a significant transformation. I coined the term “Berlin Republic” to explain that while deep continuities bound united Germany to the West German “Bonn Republic” to which U.S. decision-makers had grown accustomed, it found itself in a profoundly different situation. The “Berlin Republic,” I argued, would not simply be the “Bonn Republic” writ large. It was likely to be a more open yet less settled society, more volatile politically, more pressured economically, and less circumsept internationally than the west German “Bonn Republic” to which Germany’s neighbors and allies—and the Germans themselves—had grown accustomed over forty years. The United States and Germany would remain pivotal partners, but would now need to harness their relationship to shape a new transatlantic architecture.

The first objective would need to be a German-American strategic partnership toward Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states. This would be needed to revamp Europe’s collective defense and security organizations, which in turn would hinge on active U.S. engagement in Europe and a German commitment to establish the political and operational preconditions to fulfill its part of a new security bargain. Germany would need to “transform itself from an importer
to an exporter of security and stability.” I argued that there was a vital strategic convergence between the United States and Germany with regard to the east. “This can and should be translated into a strategic partnership that acts as the drivewheel of progress to export democratic structures, assist market-oriented reforms, secure arms reductions, develop habits of military cooperation and promote civilian control of the military throughout eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states, while facilitating their association and eventual integration into western structures.” Other Allies and partners would of course be included, but the bilateral relationship would be the essential fulcrum of change. The strategy would need to embrace a panoply of security, economic and political instruments, and seek to reshape and reorient the primary institutions of NATO, the U.S.-EU partnership, and the CSCE to these ends.

While NATO’s core purpose of collective defense had to be maintained, “to it must now be added the purposes of collective crisis management, force projection “out of area” and export of stability to the east…NATO will be unable to guarantee security in the West unless it is able to operate with non-NATO members in the east.” While supporting the principle of NATO enlargement, I argued that “precipitous” enlargement “could undermine rather than enhance prospects for greater peace and stability in Europe.” That phrasing captured the prevailing thinking within the Clinton Administration at the time, with Holbrooke parsing the language as I was writing and with other senior officials (and RAND analyst Ron Asmus) participating in the study group deliberations. The “practical reality,” I argued, was that east European nations are not ready to become NATO members overnight. Moving NATO suddenly to the Russian border could easily be misunderstood: It could create a Russian threat where there is not one today.”

At the time, the Partnership for Peace appeared to be a pragmatic effort to navigate these shoals. Joseph Kruzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and a member of my study group, argued strongly for its relevance. Ultimately, however, I wrote that the PfP could only be “a station along the way to a fundamentally new relationship between east and west that will require the United States to clarify whether the consolidation of democracy in the region is of sufficient national interest to extend a security guarantee…It may well be in the U.S national interest to commit men and women from Montana, Wis-
consin and Virginia to defend the eastern borders of Poland, Slovenia and Hungary—but not without a major national debate.” The possibility for enlargement was there, but I argued at the time that such a commitment would be hollow unless anchored by a bipartisan consensus in the United States.

If NATO’s new outreach to the East was to work, it had to be coupled with a rebalancing within the West. “The United States must be willing to allow Europeans to deal with crises on their doorstep should the United States be unwilling or unable. I welcomed the idea of Combined Joint Task Forces and with them the premise that Europe’s emerging defense identity should be “separable but not separate from NATO.”

Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke arrived in Germany in September 1993 with two notions. He was quickly disabused of both.

The first was that as Ambassador to newly unified Germany he should devote priority attention reaching out to the 16 million East Germans whose views of the United States had been shaped by life in the Soviet bloc. He soon understood, however, that it was the West Germans who needed tending. West German elites were deeply unnerved by the prospect that the United States might disengage from Europe, which might also mean that NATO could also eventually disappear and with it the very foundation of Germany’s security. Holbrooke spent a good deal of his time reassuring primarily West Germans that the U.S. remained committed to Europe and would not abandon Europe for home or for a Pacific vocation. The Germans no longer feared a massive invasion across the Central European plain. But they were concerned that the aftershocks of the political and economic earthquakes that had shaken Europe’s East threatened to spill over into its West in the form of mass migration, xenophobia, economic dislocation, secessionist movements and regional instabilities. German officials became increasingly concerned that their Western partners, including Washington, did not share their sense of urgency.

Holbrooke did share this urgency, especially with regard to the unfolding tragedy in the Balkans, which he often called the greatest failure of the West since the 1930s. Yet his second notion was that EU membership was the most important and quickest potential bond for East Europeans who had freed themselves from the Soviet em-
pire yet found themselves in a grey zone—no longer “East,” but not yet “West.” NATO membership would come later. He was again disabused of this notion:

What turned me around was the realization that the EU, mired in its own Euro-mess (the common currency, the endless arguments about process, its inner-directedness, and its failure on Bosnia), was not going to invite any of these countries in, at the earliest, before 2003. They had lived through a terrible century, and were still plagued by instability, insecurity, and immaturity. In short, they were vulnerable to a number of different scenarios that would have sent them back into new darkness.

I concluded it would be irresponsible and potentially dangerous to leave these countries outside the “West” for so long after the fall of communism. Close association with the West seemed the best inoculation against such an outcome—but only if it could be accomplished without a setback to Washington’s efforts to forge a productive relationship with Russia, the administration’s most impressive and sustained foreign policy achievement. In short, could we have our cake and eat it too?47

Holbrooke’s considerations had been shaped by his conversations with German leaders, particularly Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defense Minister Volker Rühe. Rühe had come out publicly to support NATO’s opening to the east. Kohl was more cautious, believing that such efforts had to be balanced with attention to Russian insecurities. Nonetheless, Holbrooke often cited Kohl’s powerful phrase that Germany “cannot remain indefinitely Europe’s eastern border,” straddling a new front line between stability and instability, as an important consideration.

On Track . . . and Then Off the Rails

During the winter and spring of 1994, as the crisis in Bosnia continued to deteriorate, the Partnership for Peace was announced, and President Clinton issued his famous statement that the question of NATO enlargement was no longer “whether, but when,” there was a growing sense among the President’s senior advisors, principally Tony Lake and
Strobe Talbott, that the Administration’s Russia policy and its Europe policy were coming unstuck.

Talbott had been appointed Deputy Secretary of State in February 1994 and so now needed to focus on how to make his Russia portfolio align with overall U.S. foreign policy goals, particularly regarding Europe. He and Lake convinced the President that Holbrooke needed to come back to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. As Holbrooke told me upon breaking the news, “Dan, we’ve got two jobs to do: Bring peace to Bosnia and enlarge NATO.” He asked me to come back to Washington with him, as his policy advisor, to direct the European Bureau’s office of policy and public outreach.

Holbrooke and Talbott agreed that they would need to reach a common position on NATO enlargement and its relationship to Russia policy and other elements of Europe’s security landscape before Holbrooke arrived back in Washington. As Holbrooke recalled, they agreed that “Central Europe needed the reassurance of an American commitment to their security; the issue was whether or not this could be accomplished without wrecking the emerging U.S.-Russian relationship.”

Meanwhile, Lake was frustrated that at such an historic moment for the U.S.-European relationship the Administration was not showing how various U.S. initiatives fit together into a coherent vision. He wanted to use the President’s visit to France on June 8, 1994 to move the ball forward. Speaking before the French National Assembly, the President alluded to the need to adapt the broad range of Europe’s security institutions “to meet new imperatives.” He expressed understanding for “the historical anxieties” of Central and Eastern Europe. He then declared that “The security of those states is important to our own security. And we are committed to NATO’s expansion.”

The President had again publicly expressed his support for enlargement of the Alliance. Those statements, however, had yet to be translated into operational policy. With the interagency debate at a standstill, Lake asked his own staff for a blueprint, which he received and sent to the President in late June. Talbott had commented and supported. It argued that the Administration had to make the case that expansion was not a threat to any other country, would be stabilizing and reduce the security vacuum in central Europe. It argued that the President had to take the ball forward on his July trip to Europe, which he did in War-
saw on July 1 when he said “in my view, NATO will be expanded, that it should be expanded.” He characterized the Partnership for Peace as a “first step toward expansion of NATO,” and “now what we have to do is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be.”\(^{51}\) He reiterated his stance a few days later again in Berlin, meeting with Kohl and with Holbrooke at his side.

As Alexander Vershbow recounts in this volume, he and his NSC colleagues then moved the ball forward again with a memo to Lake on July 15 entitled “NATO Expansion—Next Steps.” He proposed launching exploratory discussions in September with key Allies on the issues of criteria and a timetable to be followed by a broader discussion in the Alliance as a whole. He suggested using the December meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers to launch a NATO enlargement study to start spelling out in greater detail U.S. and allied thinking on a NATO-Russia relationship. Lake agreed.\(^{52}\)

Holbrooke was also concerned that the foreign affairs and defense bureaucracy was bucking the President’s wishes when it came to enlargement. By the time he returned to Washington, he and Talbott had reached a common position: “it was possible to bring new members into NATO, slower than the Kissingers and the Brzezinskis wanted but faster than the Pentagon and some others desired.”\(^{53}\)

The first job was to tame the bureaucracy and get it pointed in the direction of the President’s policy. The first occasion came on Labor Day weekend in early September. Vice President Gore was to give the keynote speech on the occasion of the departure of the storied Berlin Brigade, which had safeguarded the city’s safety during the Cold War. Holbrooke wanted to ensure that Gore would reaffirm President Clinton’s statements that year in Brussels, Prague, Paris, Warsaw and Berlin that NATO enlargement was moving forward. I worked with John Kornblum, now the Principal Deputy of the European Bureau, to craft strong language.\(^{54}\) The Pentagon wasn’t buying it, as Wesley Clark recounts in this volume. Drafts kept flying back and forth to Holbrooke, who was in Berlin for the speech. I was in Berlin with Holbrooke, who asked me to work with Kornblum and Tom Malinowski, a talented member of the Policy Planning Staff, to make sure the language remained robust. In the end, Holbrooke prevailed. Gore tore his Achilles tendon and did not make the trip, but he still gave the speech via video
link. The key sentence was Gore’s public statement that “We will begin our discussions” on NATO enlargement “this fall.”

The next opportunity came with the interagency grouping Holbrooke was now leading in Washington. At the group’s dramatic first meeting, I watched as Holbrooke asserted clear control, as described by Wesley Clark and other authors in this volume. “When Holbrooke sat down with his colleagues in September and October 1994,” James Goldgeier recounts, “he was not reopening a discussion of the issue; rather, he was presenting his counterparts with a fait accompli.”

Meanwhile, the President continued to define the policy. At a private lunch in the White House on September 27, Clinton told Yeltsin directly that “there will be an expansion of NATO.” He sought to reassure Yeltsin that the issue was about addressing Central European fears “of being left in a grey area or purgatory,” and it was about maximizing the chances of “a truly united, undivided, integrated Europe” in which Russia would be included. Clinton emphasized that there was no timetable, and that U.S. policy would be guided by “three no’s”: no surprises, no rush, and no exclusion of Russia.

Holbrooke was now accelerating NATO expansion discussions. When General Clark, Joseph Kruzel and other Pentagon officials expressed concern at the difficulties of enlargement because new members would have to fulfill over 1000 standardization agreements, Holbrooke asked them to prepare a study on the “how” of enlargement, which they presented to the interagency group in October 1994, and which served as an initial framing document for NATO’s own 1995 enlargement study.

Meanwhile, as Alexander Vershbow recounts in his chapter, the NSC staff had prepared a strategy paper for NATO enlargement in which a timeline would be announced during Clinton’s first term and enlargement accomplished early in the second term. The paper listed five objectives for the end of the year: launching a formal Alliance review on a framework for expansion; an initial sketch of benchmarks for potential new members; an expanded PfP program for future members and non-members alike; an expanded NATO-Russia relationship; and a strengthened OSCE to underscore Western interest to include Russia in a new European security architecture.
The next step was to build what Holbrooke called the “two-year plan” for the remainder of Clinton’s first term to upgrade and recast Euro-Atlantic architecture. The effort would be built on multiple pillars: a new NATO, a revamped U.S.-EU relationship, and transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE. Russia policy and European policy needed to move along parallel tracks, with the realization that in the end they were also intertwined. And Bosnia, if untamed, would cause all of it to crumble. The core rationale for an integrated approach would turn on Central and Eastern Europe.

In November Holbrooke asked me to work with Bureau colleagues to articulate the Administration’s comprehensive approach to a transformed Euro-Atlantic architecture for a speech Secretary Christopher was slated to give on November 28.\(^60\) The timing was important. Russia was teed up to join the Partnership for Peace at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on December 1, and on December 5 Boris Yeltsin would join President Clinton and the leaders of the CSCE states to herald its transformation into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—another pillar in the updated concept. It was important to signal to the Russians—as well as to Allies and other European countries—how the Administration was approaching the various pieces of the puzzle.

Things did not go as planned. In the end, Christopher did not give his speech due to other conflicts. The Russians had learned of the interagency group’s work and the Pentagon’s study on what it would take to actually enlarge the Alliance. On November 29 Yeltsin complained in a letter to Clinton about what he called U.S. efforts intent on “speeding up the broadening of NATO.”\(^61\) Three days later Foreign Minister Kozyrev unexpectedly refused to sign up for the Partnership of Peace, as he recounts in his own personal recollection in this volume. On December 5 in Budapest, Yeltsin lashed out publicly at a surprised and none-to-happy Clinton, accusing him of “sowing the seeds of mistrust” and plunging Europe into a “cold peace.”\(^62\)

Vice President Al Gore tried to patch things up with Yeltsin and other Russian leaders on a visit to Moscow December 16, underscoring that Washington was not subordinating relations with Russia to NATO expansion. Gore stressed that the two processes would move forward in tandem, with no surprises, and that no new countries would enter
NATO in 1995. Talbott and Christopher followed with their own conversations with Russian interlocuters in January 1995, but with little progress. The only bright spot had been the December 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation, containing security assurances for Ukraine in return for renouncing its status as a nuclear weapons state.

The situation was not good. NATO Allies wondered what was happening, Central Europeans were worried about abandonment, and Russian suspicions were high. The Republicans had taken control of Congress in the November 1994 elections, in part on the basis of their “Contract with America,” which included robust support for NATO enlargement. Pundits were also starting to shape the public debate. Former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski commented in *Foreign Affairs* on the need to eliminate “any potentially disruptive geopolitical vacuum between Europe and the new Russia.

In Europe, Kohl confidante Michael Mertes joined with French commentator Dominique Moïsi to urge Western governments to focus on “the security vacuum” between Germany and Russia, the area where European wars have historically started, a region described by Henry Kissinger as a strategic “no-man’s land between the German and Russian peoples.

These dynamics rendered more urgent the effort to articulate and operationalize President Clinton’s “predisposition” to enlargement and square it with his commitment to support Russian reforms within a recast architecture for U.S. engagement in, and with, Europe. The draft speech now needed to be recast into an article, which was finished in January and published in the next issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It became the road map for U.S. European policy. Subsequent statements by the President and senior officials throughout the remaining six years of the Clinton Administration hewed closely to and expanded upon the rationale set forth in the article.

The emerging architecture was based on six cornerstones.

**America, a European Power**

The core premise of the article, as reflected in the title, was that America was a European power. “Should we add a question mark?”
Holbrooke asked me. The answer was a resolute no. The question mark had been the problem.

For decades the United States had been a European power. By that we meant it had been integral to the continental balances, coalitions and institutions that maintained stability, protected democracy, and expanded prosperity for half the continent. Now, with Cold War divides disappearing, Europeans across the continent were asking themselves whether the United States would remain as deeply committed and involved in Europe’s security as it had been in the past. It was also not immediately obvious to Americans that the United States should be so engaged. With the Cold War over, it was tempting to say that it was time for the Europeans to work this out themselves, while Americans focused on problems at home.

The Administration itself had not decided whether Europe was a priority. The United States was in danger of drifting from being a European power to a power in Europe—selectively engaged, distracted by other challenges, and less intuitively convinced of the link between European order and global order.

It was time to erase the question mark with a strong justification of American engagement in the post-Cold War era. After two world wars and a forty-year Cold War there was an enormous historic opportunity to build down Europe’s divisions. But dangers abounded. Europe was not yet there. It remained turbulent and unfinished. Without America’s active and comprehensive engagement, the continent was in danger of succumbing to new instabilities: “In the 21st century, Europe will still need the active American involvement that has been a necessary component of the continental balance for half a century. Conversely, an unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the United States.”

The assertion that the United States remained a European power became a standard refrain of the President and other senior officials throughout the remainder of the Clinton Presidency.
Shaping a New Architecture

Second, understanding its role as a European power meant that the United States had to affirm its role as stakeholder and shaper of the post-Cold War architecture. “As far back as we can remember, questions of war and peace in Europe—with their vast effect on the rest of the world—have been decided by architecture—the architecture of security.” Holbrooke cited Jean Monnet, the great architect of European unity, who had said that “nothing is possible without men, but nothing is lasting without institutions.” The efforts of Monnet, Marshall, and others, Holbrooke wrote, “produced unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a century—but only for half a continent.” Now it was time for the United States to reach beyond old divides and to lead in the creation of a security architecture “that includes and thereby stabilizes all of Europe—the West, the former Soviet satellites of central Europe, and, most critically, Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union.”

Cold War architecture was static; it reflected the nature of the East-West stalemate. The new architecture, in contrast, had to be dynamic; it needed to address the open nature of the new Europe. While NATO was the “central security pillar of the new architecture,” others were also essential, including the EU and the OSCE. Each, however, would need to transform internally and be open externally.

John Kornblum elaborated on the architectural metaphor:

The history of Europe, the relationships among the countries of Europe, and in fact the relationships between the United States and Europe—at least in this century—have tended to be organized around structures of one sort or another...By architecture we mean relationships among peoples, among countries, among organizations which give both the sense and the substance of cooperation, or maintenance of stability, or maintenance of predictability...Since 1991, '92, with the end of the communist regimes in Central Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has been without a clearly defined security architecture. It has been in a period of considerable transition and this has led both to conflicts—many of which were papered over under the old security architecture—and to a good deal of uncertainty among peoples, both East and West, as to what, in fact the future security rela-
tionships in Europe are to be.....building a security architecture in Europe really is the essential question of building democracy, building stable societies, and ultimately building a stable and just peace across the continent....

I want to stress that the approach of the United States is not to define NATO as the only aspect of the security architecture. It's an important one, a very important one, but it's not the only one. And we would never argue that you can have any kind of stable peace in Europe if you just base it on NATO.77

Strobe Talbott often used the architectural metaphor. “The goal,” he said, was to “help build a Europe that is whole and free and at peace for the first time in its history”:

The means, as we see it, are largely institutional—or, as is often said, architectural. We are building a structure in which we and our children and our grandchildren will make our homes. The foundation of that structure is a shared commitment to democratic governance, to civil society, to sustainable development through the dynamism of the free market, to the rule of law and human rights, to the principles of mutual respect, and to the peaceful settlement of disputes...The task of constructing a new Europe requires us to adapt existing structures where possible and build new ones where necessary...The size, the scope, the job descriptions, and the membership lists of these institutions are different, but their missions and their compositions are often overlapping. In some key respects, they are mutually reinforcing. Together, they make up the superstructure of the new Europe.78

In 1991 James Baker had already set forth a U.S. vision for future European security structures based on an interlocking series of institutions based on NATO, the European Community and the CSCE grounded in common values of democracy and human rights. The Clinton Administration, however, had to put in place the operational strategy to realize that vision.79 As then-U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter later recalled, “one reason that NATO took three and a half years from the moment of deciding to enlarge to the naming of the first invitees: it was essential to build a broad, encompassing architecture that could include all countries engaged in European security.”80
The Challenge of Central Europe

Third, to be effective, the new architecture needed to address what Holbrooke called Europe’s “greatest threat,” which was no longer Soviet expansionism but “local conflicts, internal political and economic instability and the return of historical grievances...Any blueprint for the new security architecture of Europe must focus first on central Europe, the seedbed of more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any other area on the continent.” 81 Failed efforts of the past, from Versailles and Trianon to Yalta and Potsdam, and the collapse of the Soviet empire had “left throughout central Europe a legacy of unresolved and often conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and, most dangerous, territorial and ethnic disputes. Without democracy, stability, and free-market economics, these lands remain vulnerable to the same problems, often exacerbated by an obsession with righting historical wrongs, real or mythical. If any of these malignancies spread—as they have already in parts of the Balkans and Transcaucasia—general European stability is again at risk.” 82

The dangers were apparent. “East-Central Europe is littered with potential mini-Weimar republics,” RAND analysts Ronald D. Asmus, Steven Larrabee and Richard Kugler had written some months earlier, “each capable of inflicting immense violence on the others.” 83

The opportunity, however, was historic. The wild mélange of posters and placards borne by the many thousands of people who in the late 1980s and early 1990s had jumped into their Trabants, Skodas and Ladas and taken to the streets of Budapest, Gdansk, Prague, Leipzig, Bucharest and other central and eastern European cities essentially carried one message: “We want to return to Europe”—to be part of a Europe to which they had always belonged, and yet had been prevented from joining because of where the Red Army stopped in the summer of 1945. Their message had unleashed an earthquake that was shaking the continent and its institutions. Their message was both opportunity and obligation: the opportunity to build a continent that was truly whole, free, and at peace with itself, and the obligation to see it through. “For the first time in history” the nations of central Europe have the chance simultaneously “to enjoy stability, freedom and independence based on another first: the adoption of Western democratic ideals as a foundation for all of Europe.” 84 It was imperative that Western Europe and
the United States “jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved.”

Holbrooke underscored the urgency of action. “It would be a tragedy if, through delay or indecision, the West helped create conditions that brought about the very problems it fears the most. The West must expand to central Europe as fast as possible in fact as well as in spirit… Stability in central Europe is essential to general European security, and it is still far from assured.”

The Administration had come to understand both opportunity and obligation. It realized it would need to balance its message that the doors to the West stood open with a “tough love” message that only those countries who could consolidate democracy, build market economies, control their militaries, and reconcile with their neighbors had any chance of walking through those doors.

The opportunity to develop the Central Europe theme came when Karsten Voigt, President of the North Atlantic Assembly, asked Holbrooke to join German Defense Minister Volker Rühe at the Assembly’s spring meeting in Budapest on May 29. Holbrooke asked me to prepare his speech with a strong emphasis on the significance of Central Europe, but with a strong “tough love” message. We went through successive drafts; he was very focused on the importance of this talk. In many ways this speech was a bookend to the Foreign Affairs article.

The United States, Holbrooke declared, would “support the entry of the nations of Central Europe into the institutions of Europe—the European Union, NATO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe.” Then came the tough love message. “The people of Central and Eastern Europe now have a real opportunity to create a lasting peace,” he said. “But to do so, they must be prepared for one final act of liberation—this time from the unresolved legacies of their own tragic, violent, and angry past.”

For the peoples of this region, the words Versailles, Trianon, Munich, Yalta, or Potsdam are not just names on the map; they are living legacies of conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and, most dangerous, unresolved territorial or tribal quarrels—quarrels that allowed the false ideologies of fascism and communism to
prosper, and that now threaten progress toward integrating Central Europe into an undivided Europe.

Even as democracy and free markets sweep the continent, armed conflict and political instability are more pervasive and severe than at any time during the past half century. They are concentrated in Southeastern Europe, extending to the region beyond our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. I submit to you that this vast region—including its neighbors in the Transcaucasus, and Syria, Iraq, and Iran—has become the most explosive region on earth. Ottomans and Habsburgs, czars and commissars have left behind them unresolved legacies that continue to roil the entire area. Some, such as Bosnia, Croatia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya, have already exploded. Others continue to fester, such as tensions over Cyprus or those between Athens and Tirana, Athens and Skopje, Bratislava and Budapest, Budapest and Bucharest, Bucharest and Kiev, Kiev and Moscow, even Rome and Ljubljana.

These forces, if not contained, risk holding the new Europe hostage to its own history.

Every country in this region, no matter what the current state of its economy, can aspire to join in time this rich tapestry of nations. But joining the core institutions of the West is not the same as joining a country club. Countries aspiring to enjoy the benefits of membership also have the responsibility to meet its obligations.

Holbrooke laid out the terms. Stability did not come solely from external guarantees; it must be built from within. Democratic structures were important. So was a vibrant civil society, independent institutions, a free press, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the free expression of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities in an area in which peoples and borders do not match. No one country should seek to join the European mainstream by leaving its neighbors behind. Democratic pluralism demands regional cooperation. Borders must not be changed by force. Holbrooke cited a host of examples where Central European countries were engaged in reconciliation and cooperation; he also admonished his Hungarian hosts and others for areas where such reconciliation had yet to take place. The message: The United States would stand with those ready to make the changes needed to truly “return to Europe”—but they would have to lead the way.
Secretary of Defense William Perry echoed these sentiments in a February 5 speech to the Wehrkunde Munich Security Conference. Perry set forth what became known as the “Perry Principles,” the criteria by which NATO would judge the new members eligible: they had to make commitments to democracy and markets, to the sovereignty of others, to NATO’s consensus decision-making, to developing interoperability in doctrine and equipment, and to the defense of the other allies. 89

Holbrooke’s “tough love” message, together with the “Perry principles,” gave the Administration leverage and helped it to define a timetable for deeper integration that would enable it to build support within the Alliance and align the Central European track with its efforts with Russia. It became a became a standard refrain for Administration officials. Kornblum brought home the point: “The most important security architecture is to be found inside countries. It is democratic development, democratic systems, free market economies.” 90

A Place for Russia?

The next piece of the architectural puzzle was Russia. Holbrooke, Talbott and other senior officials were consistently clear that the dynamic of integration was not directed at Russia, in fact it could help define the role of Russia which, in Holbrooke’s terms, “has been outside the European security structure since 1917.” In Budapest he argued that this dynamism presented “the opportunity—indeed, the necessity—to extend this Europe of the institutions to the Europe of the map.” 91 As Talbott later commented, “Over the long term, pan-European integration depended both on the Central Europeans joining the major structures of the West, including NATO, and on Russia’s remaining on a reformist track internally and a cooperative track in its foreign and defense policies. These goals were in tension but not necessarily irreconcilable.” 92

The Administration and its partners would need to move along parallel tracks. Moving too fast along the central European track could upset delicate developments in Russia. Moving too slow could mean losing the momentum for reform and opening oneself to the charge of sacrificing central European security in the face of Russian pressure.
Sandy Berger said the Administration had to navigate between “Scylla and Charybdis;” Talbott called it a Sisyphean task.

Political concerns over the U.S. budget deficit and Cold War legacies had left Clinton unwilling or unable to explicitly propose a Marshall Plan for Russia. However, his administration came up with $4.5 billion in bilateral assistance to Yeltsin’s government from 1993 to 1996. This aid helped facilitate economic reform in Russia by curbing inflation and stabilizing the ruble. As a result, by 1996 more than 60 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product was generated by its private sector. In fact, the Clinton Administration’s assistance helped Russia privatize more property in less time than any other foreign development venture in history. By September 1996 more than 120,000 Russian enterprises had been transferred to private hands, with foreign trade up 65 percent since 1993. Meanwhile, the United States became Russia’s largest foreign investor, with the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency supporting commercial transactions with Moscow valued at more than $4 billion.

The President was also keen to help Russia become part of the institutional architecture, not only the G-8 but the WTO, the Paris Club and the OECD. He favored a cooperative relationship with NATO, and never deviated from his view that should the day ever come, NATO’s door also had to be open to Russia. As Talbott has noted, “Clinton’s concept of NATO enlargement always included—for reasons that were strategic, not cosmetic or palliative—the idea of Russia’s eventual eligibility and indeed its entry.” Talbott adds: “He knew that the idea was, as he sometimes said, “blue-sky stuff.” If the day ever came when Russia entered NATO, it would obviously be a different Russia, a different NATO, and a different Europe. But, anticipating—and, better yet, inducing—transformation was what strategic policymaking was supposed to be all about.”

In a letter to Congressman Benjamin Gilman on May 9, 1996, President Clinton reiterated the premise that it was essential “to place NATO enlargement in the context of a broad, balanced and integrated approach to increasing stability and security throughout the transatlantic area by building a cooperative security structure in Europe. This includes a revitalized NATO, support for enlargement of the European
Union, strengthening the OSCE and enhanced cooperation with other states not immediately aspiring to NATO membership of who may not be in the initial group of states invited to begin accession talks with the Alliance. It also includes a strong and productive relationship between the Alliance and Russia, given the key role Russia can play in shaping a stable and secure Europe.”

“The problem,” Talbott noted at the time, “is that, historically, Russia has tended to define security in zero-sum terms—win/lose, or, as Lenin famously put it: kto/kogo. The Soviet Union seemed unable to feel totally secure unless everyone else felt totally insecure. Its pursuit of bezopasnost’, or absence of danger, posed a clear and present danger to others, especially small countries on its periphery. The issue on all our minds is whether post-Soviet Russia, as it goes about redefining its political system through elections, will redefine its concept of state security as well.”

Commenting on a report that Boris Yeltsin told Helmut Kohl that Europeans surely realized that “the security of all European countries depends on Russia feeling secure,” Talbott wrote that in “that one statement, Yeltsin had captured the nub not just of the immediate problem but of much trouble in the century coming to an end: Russia had habitually defined its own security at the expense of others’; many Russians seemed incapable of feeling secure unless others felt insecure.”

**Upgrading U.S.–EU Relations**

A fifth puzzle piece in the emerging architecture, one often overlooked in many debates about NATO enlargement, was the need to make the transatlantic partnership more effective in addressing global challenges. A more secure, prosperous and confident Europe was potentially our primary partner when it came to a range of issues that even a superpower could not address effectively alone. An unstable Europe, in contrast, would look inward and be less of the partner that the United States needed. This reinforced the U.S. stake in extending the space of democratic stability in Europe where age-old conflicts had healed and war simply did not happen. Moreover, those European areas that were not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream were themselves becoming focal points for many of the transnational
issues we needed to address—organized crime, human trafficking, critical energy flows, environmental degradation, terrorism and nuclear smuggling. And because this new partnership would be tied to clear transatlantic interests around the world, it would give the U.S. role in Europe new meaning and staying power. In that sense, the issue of new members in Europe and new missions beyond it were linked.”

The emerging architecture needed to give us the means to address those challenges more effectively together. For decades, NATO had been the institutional expression of the transatlantic link. There was no equivalent U.S. link, however, with the European Union (EU), even though the EU was the most important organization in the world to which the U.S. did not belong. The EU was increasingly the institution that European governments used to coordinate their policies and actions. It would be America’s essential partner in many strategic areas that were beyond NATO’s purview and capacities. If we were to advance a more effective transatlantic partnership, including a reformed NATO, we realized we had to build a stronger, more strategic U.S.-EU relationship.

“The Problem from Hell”

Finally, it was clear that this grand architectural effort would fail if we were unable to contain the fire spreading from Europe’s southeastern corner. Secretary Christopher called the Bosnian conflict “the problem from hell.” Christopher recalls, “As long as Bosnia was unresolved,” he recalled, “it was a cloud that hung over our heads…if NATO could not find a solution for Bosnia, then why think about enlarging it? Did NATO have a mission worth enlarging for if it could not solve Bosnia?”

In his article, Holbrooke made the challenge clear. “Bosnia is a brutal reminder of the power of ethnic and nationalist hatreds, how dangerous this power is to the peace not just of a particular part of Europe, but to Europe as a whole, and how important it is to defuse ethnic grievances before they explode…The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the responsibility to build a new comprehensive structure of relationships to form a new security architecture. On the contrary, Bosnia, the greatest
collective security failure of the West since the 1930s, only underscores the urgency of the task.”

Bosnia would be the litmus test of Holbrooke’s assertion that the United States would continue as a European power, and would occupy most of his energies throughout 1995.

Meanwhile, other pieces of architecture needed to fit into place.

A New Transatlantic Agenda

Having set forth the interlocking elements of its European policy, during 1995 the Clinton Administration sought to advance each track in mutually reinforcing ways. Progress on NATO enlargement had been set for the year by the December 1994 NATO foreign ministers’ decision to use 1995 to address the “why” and “how” of enlargement; NATO’s study on the matter was completed in September. It reflected in large part the Perry Principles. Its conclusions were communicated to PfP members through the fall. Significant U.S. diplomatic effort was expended on engaging directly with central European countries with regard to political, economic and military reform and reconciliation with neighbors. Russia overcame its earlier hesitations and joined the Partnership for Peace in May. The OSCE was fully engaged in its transformation into a full-fledged organization following the December 1994 Budapest Summit. Holbrooke began his intense focus on Bosnia that was to lead to the Dayton Peace Accords that fall.

The missing piece of the architecture was an upgraded U.S.-EU relationship. Just as Russia policy had threatened to get ahead of European policy during the first two years of the Administration, NATO and OSCE policy now threatened to get ahead of an updated U.S. approach to its relations with the European Union.

With Holbrooke fully immersed in Bosnia and the other architectural pieces on track, I turned attention to this theme, together with European Bureau colleagues, Ambassador to the EU Stuart Eizenstat and his key deputies E. Anthony “Tony” Wayne and Charles Ries, and Secretary Christopher’s Policy Planning Staff.

We quickly agreed that it was increasingly urgent to upgrade the U.S.-EU relationship for a combination of positive and negative rea-
sons. Trends in Europe were clearly unnerving political leaderships. The lagging pace of progress within the EU and a growing sense of insecurity in Europe as a whole were raising doubts about the prospects for further integration and uncertainty how the task of EU construction fit within the broader context of European and transatlantic change. The results of the November midterm elections in the United States reinforced European doubts about the steadfastness and durability of the Atlantic partnership. Western European doubts and Russian grumpiness, in turn, were raising anxieties among East Central Europeans who were almost desperate to establish a tight bond to the United States. We were concerned that the positive proposals being set forth by the United States could shift to a defensive debate over how to stave off the erosion of the transatlantic partnership.

The best way to counter such fears, we believed, was to give further evidence of dynamism and cooperation. We also understood that the EU was embarking on a series of decisions—regarding its own future enlargement, a nascent economic and monetary union, defense and other issues—in which the United States had a stake but not a seat at the table. We were concerned that the multiple challenges of deeper and wider EU integration could turn many of our key Allies inward at a time when the United States increasingly needed an outward-looking partner who could deliver on a broad range of subjects of common concern. Finally, through an enhanced U.S.-EU economic and political partnership we could equip ourselves with a wider range of tools to address the varied sources of instability now afflicting the continent. We needed a mechanism to engage the EU in ways that went beyond the 1990 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration.

As we intensified our work, the public spark for an upgraded U.S.-EU partnership came initially from Europe. In April in Chicago, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel called for a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement, or TAFTA, as a logical follow-on from the recently concluded NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, and as a new binding glue between Europe and North America. Kinkel embraced President Clinton’s theme of integration as a binding force, and took it one step further. TAFTA, Kinkel said, should be part of “a trans-Atlantic zone of close political, economic and military cooperation (that) is the logic of our common history.”
The idea gained force. That same month, British Prime Minister John Major pitched the idea to President Clinton. Spanish, Swedish, Italian and other European leaders signed on, as did business leaders and Lane Kirkland, the long-time head of the AFL-CIO labor union. In its May 27th issue, *The Economist* endorsed the idea, noting that “economics and security go hand in hand” and calling it potentially a first step toward a “shared foreign and security policy…a new NATO of tomorrow.” French politicians were notably silent.

The idea had supporters within the Clinton Administration. A TAFTA could complement NATO as a second anchor to the transatlantic partnership. There were also skeptics. Some argued that since the United States and the EU accounted for such a large part of the global economy, a transatlantic deal would be “too big,” meaning it could subvert multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. Others argued it would be “too small,” meaning that the EU and the United States enjoyed such low tariffs that they were essentially already engaged in free trade, so that the benefits of a deal would be marginal, and that precious time and energy would be better spent tackling high trade barriers imposed by others.

Holbrooke asked me to bring together experts for one of his “Saturday seminars.” But distracted by Bosnia and ambivalent in his own mind, Holbrooke concluded that TAFTA was “an idea whose time has not yet come.”

Nonetheless, the idea of reinvigorated transatlantic economic leadership struck a chord with an administration committed to raising the profile of economic issues in U.S. diplomacy. It also resonated with those of us who were arguing that the U.S.-EU piece of the “architecture” could complement and reinforce the other tracks of our policy and equip our partnership with more than military means to address “out of area” issues. We could build on the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration to offer a comprehensive partnership that included but went beyond economic issues.

This approach resonated with Secretary Christopher, who asked our team to be ambitious in our new vision for the U.S.-EU relationship. He unveiled the approach in Madrid on June 2, 1995. In his speech Christopher explained U.S. goals for a comprehensive partnership with the EU within the context of the emerging European architecture that Holbrooke had articulated in his *Foreign Affairs* article. He declared...
U.S. support for EU and NATO enlargement, citing President Truman’s Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, who in 1948 said that the objective “should continue to be the progressively closer integration, both economic and political, of presently free Europe, and eventually of as much of Europe as becomes free.”

Christopher also framed the need for closer U.S.-EU cooperation within the context of the global economic architecture design the Clinton Administration had been advancing. The United States was implementing NAFTA, working to complete negotiations on a free trade area in the Americas by the year 2005; and advancing APEC’s decision to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. “Our vision for the economic relationship between Europe and the United States must be no less ambitious...Our long-term objective,” he said, “is the integration of the economies of North America and Europe,” consistent with the principles of the WTO.

He proposed a comprehensive investment regime, innovation cooperation, aligning standards, opening skies, liberalizing financial services and telecommunications. He went further to call for greater cooperation politically to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking, to coordinate humanitarian and development assistance, to promote human rights, and to address regional challenges, particularly in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

EU leaders responded enthusiastically. Intense negotiations began immediately. They led to the formation of the New Transatlantic Agenda, signed by President Clinton and EU leaders in December 1995.

The 1990 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration had primarily sought to ensure that the transatlantic relationship kept pace with accelerating European integration and the dramatic political changes unfolding in central and eastern Europe as the Cold War ended. It stressed the desirability of close consultation, but focused more on identifying the beliefs and values that united the United States and Europe than on actual policy cooperation.

The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) moved U.S.-EU relations from consultation to cooperation in four broad areas: promoting peace and stability, democracy and development; responding to glob-
al challenges; expanding world trade and promoting closer economic relations; and building people-to-people bridges across the Atlantic. A Joint Action Plan identified some 150 measures to be advanced. Together, these agreements amounted to a framework for dialogue consisting of bilateral summits (initially twice per year) biannual dialogue at the level of EU Foreign Ministers/U.S. Secretary of State; a Senior Level Group at the level of U.S. Undersecretary of State and EU Commission Director General to oversee implementation of the NTA; and an NTA Task Force at Director level to facilitate exchange at the operational level. The NTA also gave rise to a variety of other dialogue structures, most notably varying economic innovations in the guise of the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the current Transatlantic Economic Council; a series of stakeholder dialogues, the most durable of which proved to be the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) and Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD); and a Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD), which built on existing regular exchanges between the European Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives.

At the time, the NTA framework went considerably beyond other frameworks for bilateral cooperation—in terms of ambition, formalitiy, and institutional procedures—than either partner had with other parties. Nonetheless, Christopher’s ambitious goal for the integration of the European and North American economies encountered considerable headwinds on each side of the Atlantic. Even though the economic pillar of the agenda was to be a Transatlantic Marketplace, to be achieved by “progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services, and capital,” there were few specifics, no commitment to comprehensive coverage, and no deadlines for achievement of such a goal. The U.S. Trade Representative’s office and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade agreed simply to conduct a “joint study” of trade liberalization possibilities, and the TAFTA boomlet subsided.

**Tragedy and Triumph in Bosnia**

Meanwhile, after further tragedies, the intensive efforts of Holbrooke and his team to find a solution to the war in Bosnia bore fruit. The U.S. success in concluding the peace accords signed in Dayton,
Ohio, in fall 1995 gave U.S. and NATO officials more confidence to speak about how the emerging architecture, including NATO enlargement, could prevent future conflicts.\textsuperscript{110} NATO had gone out of area to end the Bosnian war. France had drawn closer to the Alliance and Germany was taking part in Allied military operations out of area. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) validated both the CJTFs and the PfP, which now provided an ideal framework to bring together allies and non-allies into an Implementation Force (IFOR). Of the initial 60,000 IFOR troops deployed in early 1996, one in six were from non-NATO countries. Aspirant countries took to heart NATO’s message that closer integration into Western structures was also likely to be accelerated to the extent a country “acts like a member” even before it becomes a member. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and other aspirants joined the peace implementation process.

IFOR also demonstrated that NATO and Russia could work together. NATO ground troops were deploying—for the first time in Alliance history—with Russian soldiers at their side as partners, not enemies.\textsuperscript{111} NATO, the EU, and the OSCE were working in mutually reinforcing ways to implement the peace.

Holbrooke recounted that “three main pillars of American foreign policy in Europe—U.S.-Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other. Now they reinforced each other.”\textsuperscript{112} Ian Davidson wrote in the \textit{Financial Times} that Dayton was “having an electric effect on NATO” and ended the debate over whether NATO had a post-Cold War purpose. As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette put it: “America was back.”\textsuperscript{113}

**NATO Enlargement: On Track**

After Dayton Holbrooke signaled that he was leaving the Administration, James Steinberg asked me to succeed Steven Flanagan as Associate Director of Secretary Christopher’s Policy Planning Staff, where we continued work on NATO’s enlargement and adaptation as part of the evolution of the broader security architecture.

On January 26, 1996 the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty. Through the rest of the year we
continued to pursue the timetable that President Clinton had given to Boris Yeltsin. There would be no surprises, no rush, but we also needed to demonstrate our determination to open NATO’s door to the strongest candidates. The decision on “who” was for the second term; for the last year of the first term the key was to weather the Russian elections and to put other building blocks of the emerging architecture into place.

As we did so, it was important to affirm our continued momentum. East Central Europeans were anxious that the process was slowing down; they needed continual reassurance that things truly were on course. The Russians, in turn, were proving difficult; they needed to hear that they could not derail NATO enlargement and that it would proceed following the Russian elections. I worked with Tom Malinowski, James Steinberg and John Kornblum to craft a clear statement for Secretary Christopher to deliver in Prague on March 20. At Prague’s storied Cernin Palace, Christopher again reviewed the different elements of the overall architecture, emphasizing that “NATO enlargement is on track and will happen.” As Christopher later recounted, “The speech marked a turning point in our policy: after it there was no doubt in Central Europe, among our allies, or in Russia that NATO expansion would take place.”

After Yeltsin’s reelection on July 3, 1996, the U.S. Congress signalled its support for enlargement of the Alliance. On July 23 the House passed the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by 353-65, and the Senate followed two days later, 81-16.

The European Pillar

Meanwhile, three more pieces of the puzzle needed to fit. The first was to demonstrate that we were not just enlarging the Cold War Alliance, we were creating a new NATO for a new era. The second was to give the PfP a political dimension. The third was how to address Baltic fears of abandonment.

The redesign of Euro-Atlantic architecture needed to adapt NATO to new challenges. Collective defense remained an essential anchor of the Alliance. But Bosnia underscored that NATO might be called on to perform new missions related to conflict prevention and peacekeep-
ing, most of which were likely to be beyond Alliance territory. NATO would need to streamline its planning and force preparations, simplify and speed up its decision-making, provide for greater European responsibilities and capabilities, and be able to operate with a wide range of partners, including the European Union.

Bolstering the Europeans’ capacity to defend their interests in instances where the United States might not be involved had been a related puzzle piece. France in particular sought to bolster the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the European Union. When it became apparent that there was no consensus within the EU for this approach, and as budget strictures began to weigh on French capabilities, President Chirac became more amenable to reintegrating France into Alliance structures if the Alliance could lift European leadership of key commands and if the Alliance could adapt to new missions outside of Alliance territory.

U.S. officials remained ambivalent about efforts to build a European defense profile. U.S. political leaders routinely expressed rhetorical support for a more cohesive Europe that could act, effectively and confidently, as America’s partner on the European continent and in the wider world. Yet when Europeans actually moved to establish truly “common” foreign security and defense policies, they were often faced with U.S. concerns that such coherence could become inward-looking and exclusive, or based on lowest-common-denominator consensus-building within the EU, and thus weaken the primacy of NATO or impede U.S. leadership and freedom of maneuver. The Clinton Administration’s initial view had been summarized by Holbrooke in the *Foreign Affairs* article: “It would be self-defeating for the WEU to create military structures to duplicate the successful European integration achieved in NATO. But a stronger European pillar of the alliance can be an important contribution to European stability and transatlantic burden-sharing, provided it does not dilute NATO.” He then foreshadowed the growing interest of the second-term Clinton Administration in more effective European capabilities to address out-of-area challenges: “The WEU establishes a new premise of collective defense: the United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside Europe.”116
The effort to balance these differing approaches was reflected at the June 1996 NATO ministerial, when Allies agreed that under certain circumstances, NATO could make available to the ten members of the WEU specific assets that would enable the WEU to be militarily effective. This included the provision of CJTF headquarters for WEU use, the double-hatting of some NATO officers, the identification of specific military assets that could be released to WEU, and the designation of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (filled by a European) as the potential WEU strategic commander. Assets to be released to the WEU, subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council, could even include elements of the U.S. military, such as large transport aircraft, satellite-based communications, and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. NATO support for an effective ESDI would enable the European Allies to take greater responsibility for meeting some security challenges on the continent—if the political will to do so could be created and sustained.

These reforms enabled the full integration of Spain into NATO’s military command. France inched closer, although in the end Chirac was not prepared to agree to full reintegration.117

The Baltic Action Plan

The Baltic states were another piece to the architectural puzzle. As the Bosnian peace began to be implemented and prospects for concrete progress on NATO enlargement loomed, Tony Lake was adamant that the Administration had to move beyond its internal deadlock over the goals of U.S. Baltic policy and align its approach with broader European strategy. The Baltic states were nervous that their security would be undercut if they were not among the first new members of NATO. We needed to devise an approach that would ensure this would not be the case, while working with the Baltic republics to facilitate their integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream, including walking through NATO’s door at some point. NSC Senior Director Dan Fried asked me and Carol van Voorst, the European Bureau’s Director of the Office for Nordic/Baltic Affairs, to move beyond the bureaucratic stalemate. We set to work.
By spring 1996 we had crafted a “Baltic Action Plan” to foster the integration of the Baltic republics into the European and transatlantic mainstream. The plan consisted of three tracks.

The first track sought to strengthen Baltic sovereignty and promote internal reforms by integrating the three republics into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This would include U.S.-Nordic cooperation in support of Baltic efforts to integrate. Denmark, for example, had been instrumental already since 1994 in supporting the formation of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), a peacekeeping battalion and training program of the three Baltic states, and had some of their forces participating with the Nordic Battalion in Bosnia.

The second track promoted the use of bilateral and multilateral efforts to encourage the development of good relations with Russia. This meant, for example, providing additional resources to the Baltic nations to encourage regional cooperation between the Baltic states and Russia in the areas of crime prevention, energy use, commercial cooperation, and education, and encouraging Estonia and Latvia to resolve their border disputes with Russia and to integrate their Russian minorities more fully into their nations’ political and social communities. The goal was to convince Russia to see the Baltic Sea region not as a zone of influence or a buffer against nonexistent enemies, but as a gateway outward to the new Europe, of which Russia could be an active participant.118

The third track expanded U.S. efforts to demonstrate its commitment to the Baltic states by developing a regional economic and commercial strategy to bolster U.S. investment and to highlight the potential role of the three Baltic states as an economic platform from which companies could access markets in the European Union, the Baltic states, and in Northwestern Russia. The Baltic-American Enterprise Fund, for instance, provided an average of $1 million a month in loans and investments throughout the Baltic states.

Our ideas overlapped in some ways with those set forth by Ron Asmus and Robert Nurick in an article in Survival that summer. While Asmus and Nurick used NATO enlargement as the pivot for their article, proposing a U.S.-Nordic alliance to mute negative fallout from an initial round of NATO enlargement that would not include the Baltic republics, the Baltic Action Plan had a positive agenda that was focused
on fostering Baltic integration overall. It included the issue of NATO enlargement but was less defensive and did not make it the centerpiece of the approach. Nonetheless, since our thinking coincided in many ways, Talbott was able to distribute this public document around as something worth reading.

Meanwhile, Baltic leaders were increasingly concerned that they might be excluded from NATO. In late May President Clinton received a letter from the three Baltic Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas, Lennart Meri, and Guntis Ulmanis asking him to publicly affirm U.S. commitment to eventual Baltic membership in NATO. When he met with the three Presidents on June 28, he reassured them that the United States wanted to see the full integration of the Baltic states into the West. NATO’s door would remain open after the first round of enlargement, the President said. “Unfortunately,” he went on, “I cannot say to you today what you want me to say”: that the Baltic states would be in the first wave of new members to NATO. In a separate meeting, Republican Presidential candidate Bob Dole also did not give the Baltic Presidents that reassurance.

The Baltic Action Plan, not yet released, had framed U.S. preparations for the meeting of the President. That meeting helped us put together some finishing touches to the plan. On August 28 Strobe Talbott shared the Baltic Action Plan with the three Baltic ambassadors to the United States. Their reaction was muted. Their single-minded focus on getting into the Alliance in the first wave caused them to assign less importance to this comprehensive approach to their deeper integration into the architecture. Ojars Kalnins, the Latvian Ambassador, described the Baltic Action Plan as the American’s “best shot,” but then described “best shot” as “being one that does not provide security guarantees, no hard promises on NATO but a complex of programs and assistance wherein the hope is that the whole will appear to exceed the sum of the parts and convey the impression of security.”

Secretary of Defense Bill Perry made it clear in October that the Baltic states were “not yet ready to take on the Article V responsibilities of NATO membership,” but that “we should all work to hasten the day that they will be ready for membership.” NATO’s position for countries that would not be accepted in the first wave,” he said, “is not ‘no,’ it is ‘not yet.’"
Despite initial Baltic disgruntlement, we moved ahead with the Baltic Action Plan, which energized U.S. diplomacy in Northern Europe.

An Atlantic Partnership Council

The next piece of the puzzle was to give the Partnership for Peace a political dimension. That opportunity came April 22-23, 1996, when I attended a meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, which brought together policy planners from across the Alliance and now from partner countries as well. Such a grouping could offer a useful testing ground for policy. The Romanians had offered to host the meeting in Sinaia, a former casino resort town favored by Ceausescu. We were treated to freezing bedrooms, army blankets and bedbugs. Nonetheless, the atmosphere was collegial and the discussions substantive and open.

At Sinaia I presented a “non-paper” entitled “Europe’s Security Architecture: The next phase,” in which I “test marketed” a new element in the security architecture. PfP had offered Partners an important military link to the Alliance, I argued, but it did not provide an equivalent political link. NACC was moribund. Its original intent was as a forum for sharing information between now non-existent military blocs, not as a forum for political-military consultations on shared challenges and objectives. In addition, PfP was a hub-and-spokes arrangement; partners were linked to the Alliance but not necessarily to one another. If we were to realize our goal of establishing an architecture that could project stability across the continent, we needed a mechanism that would enable strategic discussions among Allies and partners as well as among partners on their own. If NATO Allies and non-NATO partners were to engage on military-security activities together, they also needed a mechanism that provided for political discussion and decision-making. I suggested retiring NACC and establishing a political counterpart to the PfP that I called an “Atlantic Partnership Council.”

As soon as I had presented the idea, Mariot Leslie, head of the Policy Planning Staff in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (and later UK Ambassador to NATO) asked me, “Are you serious about this? If so, we should act on it right away.” Other colleagues were equally enthused. Momentum quickly built to implement the idea.
The opportunity to propose the Atlantic Partnership Council publicly, as well as to move forward other key elements of the architecture, came in September 1996. Secretary Christopher had been invited by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to speak in Stuttgart to commemorate the 50th anniversary of a landmark speech by former Secretary of State James Byrnes that repudiated U.S. postwar policy toward Germany in favor of a policy of economic revival and democratic renewal, including support for German unity, that set the stage for the Marshall Plan and eventual U.S. support for German integration into Western structures. Christopher, Steinberg and Kornblum wanted the speech to reinforce the architectural design and chart a roadmap for advancing each element for Clinton’s second term. John Kornblum contributed building blocks; Tom Malinowski and I worked through a draft.

The Stuttgart speech updated and expanded upon the architectural framework first introduced by Richard Holbrooke in his Foreign Affairs article almost two years earlier. “The vision that President Clinton and I have for the United States and Europe in the next century,” Christopher began, “is a vision for a New Atlantic Community. This community will build on the institutions our predecessors created, but it will transcend the artificial boundaries of Cold War Europe. It will give North America a deeper partnership with a broader, more integrated Europe on this continent and around the world.” Christopher affirmed the Administration’s core premise that the United States was a European power and mentioned each pillar of the architectural construct, including strong support for EU enlargement. He then previewed the Clinton Administration’s second term agenda by making six major architectural proposals.

First, he recommended that NATO should hold a summit in early 1997 “to agree on NATO’s internal reforms, launch enlargement negotiations for NATO, and deepen NATO’s partnership with Russia and other European states.” At the summit, Christopher said, “we should invite several partners to begin accession negotiations.” He reiterated that NATO’s door “will stay open for all of those who demonstrated that they are willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of membership.”
Second, he said it was time to “expand the scope of NATO’s Partnership for Peace...beyond its current missions. We should involve our partners in the Partnership for Peace in the planning as well as the execution of NATO’s missions. We should give them a stronger voice by forming an Atlantic Partnership Council.”

Third, Christopher urged leaders at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in December to launch negotiations to adapt the CFE treaty and complete the Forum for Security Cooperation.

Fourth, he proposed developing an enhanced partnership between Ukraine and NATO.

Finally, he proposed “the next logical step” in “Russia’s cooperation with NATO”: “a formal Charter” that “should create standing arrangements for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alliance.”

Finally, he proposed moving “toward a free and open Transatlantic Marketplace,” saying that “We are already at a stage when we can realistically discuss the true integration of the economies of Europe and North America. We should now pursue practical steps” to advance that goal.

Christopher also highlighted a rationale for the new architecture that was to become ever more prominent during President Clinton’s second term, at which Holbrooke in his article had merely hinted. A more stable Europe was not only important to the United States in its own right; a more stable Europe could also become America’s partner to address other global and regional challenges, particularly terrorism and the environment. “Our New Atlantic Community will only be secure if we also work together to meet the threats that transcend our frontiers—threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, crime, drugs, disease and damage to the environment.” The danger posed by these threats, he argued, were as great as any that we had faced during the Cold War.

As American voters went to the polls in November 1996, the Clinton Administration had put together the edifice of a new Euro-Atlantic architecture. Yet much still needed to be done.123
Notes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 92-93.


8. Instead of citing a quote attributed to Lord Ismay, those fond of him may prefer to cite a quote actually sourced to him: “On NATO I am convinced that the present solution is only a partial one, aimed at guarding the heart. It must grow until the whole free world gets under one umbrella.” Robert Smith, *The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952-1957* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 65.


18. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 68.

23. Hill p. 68.


26. The mood at the time was captured in *Changing Our Ways*, a national commission on U.S. foreign policy sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in which Holbrooke and I were involved: “there has been no Victory-over-Communism Day, no confetti, no strangers kissing in the street. Indeed, it has been a long time since America has been so uneasy about itself and so uncertain of where to go next...After decades of global exertion, Americans seem in the mood for retrenchment.”


28. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p. 100.


32. Ibid., p. 87.

33. Clinton used that gesture of including Yeltsin in the G7 political meetings to extract from the Russian President a formal, categorical announcement that Russia was proceeding with the withdrawal of the seven thousand Russian troops still in the Baltic states to meet their August 31 agreed deadline. Ibid., p. 125.


41. Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, op. cit., p. 115


45. Including, for example, Ron Asmus, Fred Bergsten, Jeffrey Garten, Robert M. Kimmitt, Joe Kruzel, Col. Bruce Scott, James Steinberg, and Robert Zoellick.


48. Ibid.

49. Cited in Asmus, op. cit., p. 57.


52. See Alexander Vershbow’s account in this volume. Also Asmus, op. cit., p. 79.

53. “Marooned In the Cold War,” op. cit.

54. Various iterations of the Gore speech are in the author’s files.


70. This became a fundamental starting point for subsequent U.S. policy statements on Europe. See, for instance, President Bill Clinton’s speech in Aachen upon


72. It was a term also used by President George H.W. Bush and senior officials in his administration.


75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.


81. Holbrooke, op. cit.

82. Ibid.

83. Hill, op. cit., p. 111.

84. Holbrooke, op. cit.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

88. Ibid.


92. Talbott, The Russia Hand, op. cit., p. 94.


97. Copy in author’s possession.


101. Ibid.


103. Cited in Goldgeier, op. cit., p. 98.


105. These five principles are based on the NATO Enlargement Study of 1995 and were subsequently laid out by former Secretary of Defense Perry in a speech in Norfolk, Virginia in June 1996. They are: commitment to democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly relations; civilian con-


109. Ibid.

110. Goldgeier, op. cit., p. 96;

111. Asmus, op. cit., p. 125.

112. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1998), p. 359. Goldgeier, op. cit., pp. 96–97. Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, op. cit., p. 38. Even before accession negotiations began, in June 1993, during a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, EU member states officially confirmed that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, currently affiliated with the EC, would join the EU after fulfilling economic and political criteria. On April 8, 1994, the Government of the Republic of Poland made a formal request, in Athens, for membership in the European Union. During the European Council summit held in Essen on December 9–10 1994, EU member states adopted a pre-accession strategy, defining the areas and forms of cooperation recognized by the EU as essential to speed up integration. This process also confirmed that the EU was willing to go through with enlargement to associated countries. Formal confirmation of the strategy as outlined in a White Paper on the alignment of countries with the requirements of the internal free market was adopted at the European Council Summit in Cannes in June 1995.


120. Ibid., p. 163.


123. As other authors recount in this volume, President Clinton then made an important speech on NATO enlargement on October 22, 1996, in Hamtramck, the site of a Bush address on Eastern Europe in 1989, in which he declared “America’s goal” to be to admit the “first group” of aspirants to NATO membership “by 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary.” He went on to urge Russia to reconsider its opposition to NATO expansion on the grounds that it would “advance the security of everyone.” “Remarks by the President to the People of Detroit,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 22, 1996. See also Goldgeier, op. cit. p. 104.