Alliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era

Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, Charles L. Barry
Lead Authors

The Washington NATO Project

Center for Transatlantic Relations
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

in collaboration with the

Atlantic Council
Center for a New American Security
Center for Strategic and International Studies
German Marshall Fund of the United States

April 2016
# Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments............................................................................................iii

*Headline Summary*.............................................................................................................iv

*Executive Summary*...........................................................................................................v

**Alliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era**.................................................................1

**I. Ends: Strategies for the East, North and South**......................................................3

**II. Ways: A Top Ten for NATO**....................................................................................9

1. Build “Full Spectrum” Deterrence and Defense
2. Enhance Defense and Deterrence in NATO’s East
3. Be Prepared for Immediate Deployments *in extremis*
4. Meet Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges
5. Refocus NATO’s Maritime Capabilities
6. Maintain Nuclear Deterrence
7. Enhance NATO’S Core Task of Crisis Management
8. Maximize Resilience
9. Bolster NATO’s Cyber Defenses
10. Create Continuous Strategic Awareness

**III. Means: Four Paths to Deliver Capabilities**............................................................28

1. Match Means to Missions
2. Develop Stronger Framework Nation Concepts
3. Facilitate Innovation
4. Strengthen Partnerships

*About the Authors*..........................................................................................................38

*Photo Credits*................................................................................................................40

*Endnotes*..........................................................................................................................40
Preface and Acknowledgements

In fall 2015 and winter 2016 five U.S. think tanks, under the leadership of the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), engaged in a process to generate new ideas and thinking about the transatlantic community's role in a changing global security environment and to spark debate before and after NATO's Warsaw summit in July 2016. In collaboration with the Atlantic Council, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), this initiative became known as the Washington NATO Project.

Over the past nine months the five think tanks have solicited views on NATO’s future from scores of current and former government officials and military leaders, legislators, think tank colleagues, scholars and other experts from both sides of the Atlantic. Four major conferences examined specific issues. The first conference, co-hosted by CSIS and the Atlantic Council of the United States, focused on threats and challenges to NATO's north and east, and on collective defense. The second conference, hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Center for a New American Security, together with the Embassy of Italy, focused on threats and challenges to NATO's south and southeast, and on crisis management. The third conference, hosted by the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), together with the Royal Netherlands Embassy, focused on defense capabilities, cooperative security, and NATO transformation. A final conference series in the United States and Europe featured our conclusions and recommendations, in partnership with the Polish NATO Summit team.

We wish to thank those mentioned above for helping to sponsor our deliberations, and the many Europeans and Americans who engaged in the discussions. We are grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and the Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies under the auspices of the Security and Defense in Northern Europe Project as well as the Embassy of Denmark for its generous intellectual and financial support for the first conference, the Embassy of Italy for its support to the second conference, the Royal Netherlands Embassy for its support to the third conference, and the Embassy of Poland and the Polish government for their support to the final conference series. We are grateful to Derek Chollet, Heather Conley, Mariette Hägglund, Robert Hunter, Steven Keil, Frank Kramer, Magnus Nordenman, Heidi Obermeyer, Rachel Rizzo, András Simonyi, Julianne Smith, Kurt Volker and others who remain anonymous for helpful insights.

The views we express are our own, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of our institutions, our sponsors, officials of any government, or anyone participating in our discussions. Not all members of The Washington NATO project would adhere to every formulation or argument. We do not claim to have found all the right answers. But we hope we have raised some of the right questions.
Headline Summary

The NATO Alliance faces simultaneous dangers to its east, to its south, and from a series of security challenges unbounded by geography, at a time when disparate allied responses to a host of challenges are tearing the seams of European unity and American political figures have even questioned the need for NATO. Europe risks turning from an exporter of stability to an importer of instability. The vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace is challenged by a Europe fractured and anxious.

The Alliance must be revitalized for the new world rising before us. An overarching Alliance strategy must rely on NATO's ability to provide a full spectrum of deterrent and defense tools to provide collective defense for all of its members, together with an ability to project stability and resilience beyond its borders using an array of tools for crisis management. Looking to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond, we offer the following recommendations.

Ends: Strategies for the East, North and the South
- **Advance a Three-Track Russia Policy:** Western nations should act to deter Russia where necessary; maintain continuous communication and interact selectively with the regime where useful; and engage actively with the broadest range of Russian societal actors as possible.
- **Conduct a High-Level Arctic Review** to address security challenges in the region.
- **Initiate a Southern Strategy of “Comprehensive Support”** that should include NATO support for lead nation and coalition operations; collective defense incorporating missile and air defenses and new maritime approaches; continued investment in NATO's Readiness Action Plan; crisis management capabilities; closer NATO-EU ties; strengthened regional partners; and focus on deterrence and defense measures, particularly along the Turkish-Syrian border.

Ways: A Top Ten for NATO

*For the past 20 years NATO's mantra has been "out of area or out of business." Today's mantra must be "in area or in trouble."* NATO must:
1. Build “full spectrum” deterrence and defense as the keystone of the Warsaw Summit.
2. Move beyond the Readiness Action Plan to enhance defense and deterrence in NATO’s east.
3. Be prepared for immediate deployments *in extremis.*
4. Meet anti-access area denial (A2/AD) challenges.
5. Refocus NATO’s maritime capabilities on collective defense and flexible deployments.
6. Maintain nuclear deterrence and continue apace with missile defenses.
7. Enhance NATO'S core task of crisis management.
8. Maximize resilience.
10. Create continuous strategic awareness and procedures for rapid decision-making.

Means: Four Paths to Deliver Capabilities

If NATO is to reform along the lines we propose, it must:
1. Match means to missions.
2. Develop stronger Framework Nation concepts to drive smart defense and encourage role specialization by design.
3. Facilitate innovation.
4. Strengthen partnerships.
Executive Summary

The NATO Alliance faces simultaneous dangers to its east, to its south, and from a series of security challenges unbounded by geography. Allies have taken important steps, including at the 2014 Wales Summit, to adapt NATO to deal with these multiple challenges. Additional initiatives are being planned for the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Yet incremental improvements cannot mask growing fissures within the Alliance, particularly between those focused on dangers from the east and those focused on dangers from the south. This divergence in priorities needs to be overcome rapidly, because the east vs. south dichotomy is a false one. The unfortunate reality is that borders and principles are being tested both to Europe's east and to its south, and the dangers of each region have great potential to come together in ways that can directly threaten Europeans, Americans and many others around the globe.

Moreover, these external dangers may prove to be less consequential than mounting internal dangers to Alliance cohesion. Disparate responses to a host of simultaneous challenges are tearing the seams of European unity. Mutual doubts gnaw at allied commitments to collective defense and mutual security. Questions about the future of the Alliance have been voiced during the American presidential campaign.

These forces risk turning Europe from an exporter of stability to an importer of instability. The vision of a Europe whole and free is being tested by a Europe fractured and anxious.

Europe’s internal challenges have now become a critical strategic problem for the United States and the West as a whole. The transatlantic partnership and the NATO Alliance remain indispensable if Western countries are to tackle effectively the challenges they face. A weaker transatlantic bond would render Americans and Europeans less safe, less prosperous, and less able to advance either their ideals or their interests in the wider world. A weakened or destroyed Alliance would hand victory to Russia and to Daesh -- the Arabic acronym for the so-called Islamic State. The Warsaw Summit will need to address this issue and state in the clearest terms the continued importance of the Alliance to all transatlantic partners.

NATO is the preeminent institutional expression of the transatlantic bond. It must be retooled for the new world rising before us. Once a newly elected U.S. administration is in place, NATO allies should tune their Strategic Concept to new times. Looking to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond, we offer the following recommendations, some of which are under debate, yet not necessarily resolved, within the Alliance. We believe that greater public understanding of these initiatives can generate support for a revitalized Alliance.

Ends: Strategies for the East, North and the South

Advance a Three-Track Russia Policy.
• Russia policy begins at home. Putin's challenge is as much about the West as it is about Russia. If we stand up for our values and give fresh life to our mutual commitments, including mutual defense and deterrence through NATO, we are likely to be more successful in our approach to Russia. Some argue that such demonstrations of strength would be provocative. We believe Western weakness would be more provocative. At the same time, maintaining a close dialogue with Russia remains critical as both sides upgrade their defenses. Conflict due to accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation remains a real possibility; constant dialogue will be needed to prevent it.
• Grounded in the policies we recommend in this report, we believe that Western policy toward Russia must be proceed along three parallel and mutually reinforcing tracks:
  • Deterring Russia where necessary;
  • Continuous communication and selective engagement with the regime where useful;
  • Proactive Western engagement with the broadest range of Russian societal actors as possible.
• Conduct a High-Level Arctic Review to consider how to strengthen maritime capabilities in the Arctic; update NATO contingency plans for its northern flank; incorporate a heightened focus on information sharing and surveillance; engage capable and committed partners like Sweden and Finland to address deficiencies in sea, air, and land assets; address the potential consequences of increased militarization in the Arctic through training and exercises, and enhance EU-NATO cooperation in the region.

Initiate a Southern Strategy of "Comprehensive Support" that recognizes the limits of NATO’s ability to affect outcomes and very real resource constraints. The Alliance must rethink its partnerships and look beyond security tools to a more comprehensive and flexible strategy that should include:
• NATO support for lead nation and coalition operations undertaken by NATO members in this unstable region;
• Collective defense incorporating missile and air defenses and new maritime approaches;
• Continued investment in NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, especially the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and exercising its use for southern contingencies;
• Crisis management capabilities such as Special Operations Forces, counter insurgency and aircraft designed for no-fly zones, all as part of NATO's comprehensive approach;
• Closer NATO-EU ties to address the confluence of terrorism, migrant flows, state collapse and general instability from the south and, should such cooperation prove infeasible, NATO efforts to complement the work of coalitions involving NATO and non-NATO countries;
• Strengthening regional partners such as Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, and partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union;
• Reinforcing Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO's political elements, including serving as a platform of dialogue among like-minded countries;
• Focusing on deterrence and defense measures, particularly along the Turkish-Syrian border.

NATO’s strategies towards the east, north and south can be consolidated into an overarching strategy that covers all three areas. This might be accomplished in at least two ways:
• First, in all three cases, NATO’s purpose must be to provide a full spectrum of deterrent and defense tools to provide collective defense for all of its members.
• Second, NATO seeks to project stability and resilience beyond its borders using an array of tools for crisis management.

Taken together, Full Spectrum Defense and Projecting Stability provide a solid core for all NATO’s operations.

Ways: A Top Ten for NATO

   • For the past 20 years NATO's mantra has been "out of area or out of business." Today's mantra must be "in area or in trouble."
     • NATO must be able to dissuade and deter threats to its members, from whatever source and across all domains, while being prepared to defend all parts of NATO
territory and to protect the critical functions of allied societies. It must be designed to
deal with the full panoply of provocations, from low-level hybrid tactics through
nuclear blackmail.

• This requires a mix of new and old deterrent and defense instruments that can be
applied 360 degrees around NATO’s borders and in all NATO countries. NATO will
require the Alliance to better relate deterrence and defense to resilience, to work more
effectively with other partners, and to become more agile, flexible, mobile, and
creative.

• The remaining nine initiatives are designed to provide capabilities for a full spectrum
for defense and deterrence. Building these capabilities will take time but plans to do
so can build assurance and enhance unity in the Alliance now.

2. Move beyond the Readiness Action Plan to Enhance Defense and Deterrence in NATO's
East.

• Deterrence by denial is impractical and deterrence by mobilization of high readiness forces
alone is inadequate. NATO will need to develop a modest but adequate forward deployed
force to create a credible signal of resolve that the Alliance will defend all Alliance territory
and will fight to retake any NATO territory lost.

• Assure that the high readiness forces agreed at the Wales Summit are fully deployable on
very short notice.

• Forward deploy multinational NATO forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis, starting
with a Multinational Battalion in each of the Baltic states and in Poland.

• Preposition adequate equipment and war fighting stocks for the VJTF and for European and
American follow on forces needed to defeat a Russian attack and restore lost NATO territory.

• Encourage the move towards the deployment of four U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in Europe
(two permanently deployed, a third on a heel-to-toe rotational basis in the east, and a fourth
based initially in the U.S. with prepositioned stocks plus rigorous exercising in Europe), and
deployment of 1-2 U.S. Attack Helicopter battalions in Europe.

• Develop current air policing into a NATO rotational air component composed of air fighter
and combat helicopter wings. Additional NATO capabilities, such as a Joint Force Air
Component, should be considered for Poland.

• Make frontline states indigestible, so that they do not become indefensible, via expanded
capacities to conduct irregular defense.


• Set specific targets for the readiness of NATO national forces similar to the targets set for
deployability and sustainability.

• Develop a U.S. follow on capability to deploy an additional reinforced division in ten days.

• Draft a U.S. mobilization plan to reinforce Europe in the event of general war.

• Assure that European forces can contribute significantly to a reinforcement effort.

• Individual NATO Allies may want and be able to deploy high-readiness forces to vulnerable
Allied countries when needed, even before the North Atlantic Council has had the
opportunity to reach consensus to respond in an urgent situation. Such plans should be
consistent with those of NATO and SACEUR.

• Strengthen NATO’s ability to deploy, sustain and provide logistics and host nation support
for follow on forces.

• Authorize SACEUR to conduct extensive scenario planning that can drive
NATO/nations’ military efforts, and unclassified modeling to inform NATO publics.
• Consider further delegation of authority to the Secretary General and SACEUR to make decisions on alerting, exercising and pre-deployment actions, in response to Russian military threats.
• East European Allies need to offer the necessary host-nation support and provide the legal and institutional framework for such rapid stop-gap reinforcement.
• Efforts to remove legal and other barriers to mobilization across national boundaries need to be accelerated; a “military Schengen zone” is needed that can be activated at times of exercise or emergency.

• A higher degree of European allied cooperation and participation will be needed to meet this challenge; the United States cannot conduct these operations by itself.
• Efforts to apply extra resources to meet the Priority Shortfall Areas agreed within the Alliance should help with this initiative.
• Allies should not view these challenges through a narrow military lens alone. They need to be able to calibrate responses and manage escalation as part of a more strategic and sophisticated approach that should involve a wider spectrum of options, ranging from defensive maritime blockades and cyber activities to political and offensive actions.
• This does not mean ignoring military options. Pay greater attention to integrated air and missile defenses, long-range artillery, stealthy air-to-air and air-to-ground systems, submarines and anti-submarine warfare, offensive cyber-weapons and short-range missiles, directed-energy and electromagnetic rail guns, counter-space and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Experimental concepts and technologies in the context of the United States' so-called "Third Offset Strategies" are relevant.

5. Refocus NATO’s Maritime Capabilities on Collective Defense and Flexible Deployments.
• Revise the Alliance Maritime strategy to better focus Alliance efforts on collective defense and deterrence in the maritime domain.
• Strengthen the existing Standing NATO Maritime Groups and generate adequate forces for them to deliver on that strategy.
• Generate a robust, well-resourced maritime component for the VJTF.
• Focus on high-end maritime capabilities including anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, strike from the sea, amphibious operations, and integrated theater missile defense.
• Consider how maritime forces can become more survivable and contribute to breaking A2/AD capabilities.
• Create a NATO Black Sea fleet composed primarily of regional allies and perhaps an American contribution.
• Create a NATO consortium to enhance maritime domain awareness that would draw together and pool national assets ranging from maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, aerostats and underwater sensor chains and radars.
• Map Alliance and member state dependencies on undersea pipelines, electrical cables and communications infrastructure, from landing points to deep seabed routes. Design plans to monitor and defend, and to operate in degraded environments.
• Organize frontline maritime powers to provide a “first response” capability in crisis or war.
• Serve as an advocate for good order at sea.
6. Maintain Nuclear Deterrence and Continue Apace with Missile Defenses.

• NATO should not try to mirror Russia’s increasingly irresponsible nuclear behavior. Instead, it should develop a clearer nuclear declaratory policy to complement the steps underway to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces.

• NATO should be forthright to publics about why nuclear deterrence remains critical to the security of NATO and our societies. It should acknowledge that the world without nuclear weapons that NATO seeks is not today’s world, and highlight the risks and dangers of Russia’s nuclear saber rattling.

• NATO should continue to reiterate its interest in reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, but be equally clear that a reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons being used depends on a willing partner, which Russia does not appear presently to be.

• In addition, NATO should make five modest adjustments to its nuclear posture:
  • Maintain and as needed modernize the existing modest NATO non-strategic nuclear deterrent deployed in Europe.
  • Work with affected Allies to replace outmoded dual capable aircraft.
  • Exercise potential responses to Russian nuclear threats.
  • Better integrate NATO’s conventional and nuclear doctrine.
  • Seek ways to integrate France more directly into NATO nuclear planning efforts, including through the Nuclear Planning Group and joint policy planning discussions.

• The Alliance is developing an anti-ballistic missile system to protect Allies from growing missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Attainment of Phase II of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach (including interceptor deployments in Romania) and the completion of the BMD initial operational capability should be declared at the Warsaw Summit. Some have argued that the nuclear deal with Iran removes the threat that the Phased Adaptive Approach was designed to defeat. But Iran’s recent missile tests reinforce the continued need to keep those plans on track.

7. Enhance NATO’s Core Task of Crisis Management.

• The North Atlantic Council has waned as a political forum to discuss strategic issues. The focus on collective defense should not come at the expense of crisis management and the Alliance’s responsibilities to reduce threats, and to prevent and respond to conflicts in and beyond its immediate neighborhoods.

• At a skills level
  • NATO must retain the capability to conduct scalable counter insurgency, stabilization operations, and the building of partner capacity.
  • Nations should prioritize SOF capability investment even with tight budgets, and include the funding of participation in NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral SOF exercises.
  • NATO should continue to facilitate multinational SOF development through training, education, exercises and networking, and if called upon deploy operational command and control of SOF from NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters.
  • NATO should actively seek to maximize the civilian-military integration capabilities of the new Comprehensive Crisis Operations and Management Center (CCOMC) at SHAPE.

• At an operational level
  • the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan should be sustained, with maximum European support, to give Afghanistan every possible chance to succeed in its fight against the Taliban;
  • NATO should take the lead role in training Iraqi and other forces for the fight against Daesh;
• NATO should also take on a major security sector and capacity building mission in Libya.
• At a political level
  • NATO should reinvest in meaningful strategic consultations on a wide range of global security challenges – whether or not there is the prospect of NATO taking on an operational role.
  • The North Atlantic Council should play a vital role in sharing information, analysis, and policy perspectives among Allies on an ongoing basis, on a wide range of issues.
  • Closer consultations between NATO and the U.S. led anti-Daesh coalition should be a key element in restoring NATO’s role as a political forum for crisis management issues.
  • NATO’s ministerial meetings should be revamped to ensure that they can take strategic decisions.
  • When NATO does elect to take action, it should identify a time when the operation will be reviewed and require new authorization by the North Atlantic Council, to ensure engagements continue to enjoy Allied support, without becoming long-term, open-ended missions.

• Traditional efforts at deterrence and defense must incorporate modern approaches to resilience -- building the capacity of societies to anticipate, preempt and resolve disruptive challenges to their critical functions, the networks that sustain them, and the connections those networks bring with other societies.
• Resilience is foremost a task for national governments. Yet in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats and disruptive hybrid attacks, no nation is home alone. Emerging challenges require greater shared resilience. National resilience and collective defense must be mutually reinforcing elements of the same overall effort to enhance deterrence.
• Resilience requires a broad approach with significant civilian political and economic aspects. But it also has major military components. National forces should be primary, but upon request NATO allies can assist, for example, with protection of key societal nodes, counter insurgency operations and paramilitary police functions, responses to civil emergencies, covert operations and crisis response management.
• NATO should set resilience standards and individual allies should each make a Pledge on National Resilience to meet those standards at the Warsaw Summit pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, whereby allies commit to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."
• Reinforce NATO's pledge with a U.S.-EU Solidarity Pledge that each partner shall act in a spirit of solidarity — refusing to remain passive — if either is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.
• Make resilience an integral element of NATO's core tasks, or consider making resilience a fourth core task. Initial activities could include:
  • Developing NATO civil-military Resilience Support Teams to support national authorities in emergency preparedness, intelligence sharing, border control assistance to police and military in incident management, protection for key critical infrastructures and support to NATO’s Cyber Response Team.
  • Creating “National Resilience Working Groups” to coordinate defense activities with overlapping civil authority and private sector infrastructure functions and to provide a key point of contact for outside assistance, including Resilience Support Teams.
• Bolster coordination with the private sector, which owns most infrastructures critical to essential societal functions.
• Enhance counterterrorism cooperation to support the protection of critical infrastructure.
• Develop a more robust strategic communications strategy to address Russia’s information operations.
• Project resilience forward by identifying—very publicly—our resiliency with that of others beyond the EU and NATO, and share societal resilience approaches and operational procedures with partners to improve societal resilience to corruption, psychological and information warfare, and disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other critical infrastructures, with a strong focus on prevention but also response.

• Recognize cyber as an operational domain and launch a voluntary NATO Cyber Operations Coordination Center (NCOCC). If successful, the NCOCC should transition into a permanent NATO Cyber Operations Headquarters similar to the NATO SOF HQ.
  • Provide a capability for Allied Command Operations to plan, coordinate, and de-conflict the actions (defensive, offensive and exploitation) of Allies’ cyber forces committed to NATO operations.
  • Establish mechanisms that allow SACEUR to call upon capable cyber Allies to contribute cyber offensive effects when needed.
  • Consider Mutual Cyber Standards Pledges, in which an individual Ally pledges to meet agreed cyber defense standards and NATO pledges assistance.
  • Enhance NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) by rationalizing and normalizing common funding, strengthening its Rapid Response Teams, and generating greater protection and resilience planning for critical mobile networks.
  • Task ACT to develop a Cyber Operations Transformation Initiative to explore opportunities for multinational training, networking, information sharing and interoperability.
  • Increase support to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia.

NATO must address the issue of building comprehensive and integrated strategic awareness through continuous and comprehensive information collection, fusion and sharing. If NATO is to acquire the ability to conduct such analysis, it must build flexible security networks with allies and partners, as well as other organizations, particularly the EU, as well as a wide range of actors from the private sector, NGOs, think tank and analytic communities. Such networked-based approaches will require a new mindset based on creative and critical thinking that must be fostered in education and training. NATO needs to build a new architecture to deliver NATO’s military strategic effect and to analyze and connect a huge amount of data to manage military action effectively. With regard to rapid decision making, NATO’s political leadership should be encouraged to continue to discuss various contingencies using scenario-based discussions and to exercise NATO decision-making procedures with the aim of streamlining those procedures.
• Create a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Assessment [ASG (I)] to drive the NATO bureaucracy and political process to make more rapid decisions based on the best multi-source intelligence available.
• Create an Intelligence Committee under the NAC, chaired by the ASG (I) and composed of permanent representatives of national intelligence directors (e.g., the U.S. Director of National Intelligence). These representatives should be added to each Alliance member’s
national delegation at HQ NATO. The NATO IC should meet at least twice annually at the level of National Directors, similar to the Military Committee.

- **Build up a dedicated open source information gathering and sharing line of effort** within the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center.

**Means: Four Paths to Deliver Capabilities**

1. **Match Means to Missions.**
   - Implement the Wales Summit defense spending pledge.
   - Strengthen reporting requirements.
   - Consider a Defense Planning Pledge to address shortfalls in high-end capabilities that affect the credibility of collective defense, and to spend all increases on commonly agreed NATO critical shortfall items.
   - Devise an annual “stair step” plan to demonstrate how nations plan to achieve their pledge.
   - Encourage frontline nations to adopt more ambitious spending goals consistent with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.
   - Reinforce the current goal of having no single NATO nation provide more than 50% of the capabilities needed for any one mission.

2. **Develop Stronger Framework Nation Concepts to Drive Smart Defense and Encourage Role Specialization by Design.**
   - Encourage additional Framework Nation groupings for the Warsaw Summit. Each grouping should move in the direction of conducting operations and not just acquisition.
   - Each Framework Nation group might take on certain geographic or functional responsibilities and encourage greater role specialization among its members.

3. **Facilitate Innovation.**
   - NATO Allies must look ahead to ways to leverage innovation to retain technological advantages and hence fulfill their commitment to each other's security.
   - Allied Command Transformation (ACT) should continue its work in six main areas -- command and control, management, logistics, partnerships, human capital, and capabilities -- and find new ways to implement new architectures of command and control, with a view to engaging as well with U.S. "Third Offset" strategies.

4. **Strengthen Partnerships.**
   - **Create a True NATO-EU Strategic Partnership.**
     - Given the broader nature of the security challenges we face, and that military means alone will often be insufficient or irrelevant to address them, there is a compelling need for improved cooperation between NATO and the EU.
     - Little progress is likely, unless greater efforts are made to resolve the Cyprus dispute.
     - As such efforts proceed, the resilience challenge may offer a way to forge more effective NATO-EU cooperation within current political constraints.
   - **Keep the Door Open to a Europe Whole, Free and at Peace.**
     - Unfortunately, the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace has become more slogan than project. Yet NATO's Open Door remains as valid and relevant today as it was in the past. The West must be clear that the door to the European and Euro-Atlantic space where democracy and market economies prevail, and where war does not happen, stands open to those prepared to create the conditions by which they, too, could walk through that door.
• Allies should be careful not to close their door to the people of wider Europe, while at the same time working to deepen practical security cooperation and create conditions under which the question of integration, while controversial and difficult today, can be posed more positively in the future.
• NATO’s 2015 invitation to Montenegro to join the Alliance is an important affirmation that NATO’s door remains open.
• There is unfinished business in the Balkans. Efforts should be made to address the domestic and foreign political conflicts that keep Macedonia from joining the Alliance.
• Designate Sweden and Finland as Premier Interoperable Partners (PIP) to bring each into the Readiness Action Plan, include them in the VJTF, and provide for structures and regular consultations at the political military and intelligence levels with the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the International Staff and the International Military Staff.
  • Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) should continue to invest in and deepen Nordic Baltic defense cooperation, including the development of a Nordic-Baltic military force that should include land, maritime, air, SOF and cyber domain forces.
• Organize the Alliance to better build the defense capabilities of key Partners.
  • Create lead nations to take primary responsibility for strengthening the defense sectors of key partners in both the east and south.
  • Enhance NATO’s capability to work with key southern partners, especially Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the Gulf states, both through bilateral arrangements coordinated through NATO and through a strengthened Med Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
• Strengthen Other Regional and Global Partnerships.
  • Seek more meaningful ties with other regional institutions like the African Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, OSCE and UN.
  • Explore the potential value in discussions with the Organization for Islamic Cooperation.
  • Strengthen cooperation with the U.S.-led anti-Daesh coalition and with Iraq in particular.
  • Japan and the Republic of Korea should be invited to become NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners based on their strong commitments to the Alliance. They would join others, including Australia, thus tying America’s three most important Asian allies closer to the Alliance and to each other.
Alliance Revitalized:
NATO for a New Era

NATO remains America’s indispensable alliance. It is the largest and most successful alliance in history. Time and again it has shown its ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to provide security for its members. It retains by far the largest military capability on earth. European Allies alone spend over $300 billion annually on defense, more than China and Russia combined. European forces are well trained, battle tested and interoperable with U.S. forces. Even non-NATO coalition operations rely fundamentally on the interoperability and habits of cooperation inherent in the Alliance. These attributes are more important today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. It is therefore particularly troubling that this indispensable alliance is at risk due to divisions in Europe and a renewed burden sharing debate in the United States.

Sixty-seven years after its founding, NATO’s three-fold purpose remains: to provide for the collective defense of its members; to institutionalize the transatlantic link and maintain a preeminent forum for allied deliberations on security and strategy; and to offer an umbrella of reassurance under which European nations can focus their security concerns on common challenges. Yet each of these elements is being questioned today.

The Alliance faces simultaneous dangers to NATO's east and to its south, as well as a series of security challenges unbounded by geography. Efforts to adapt NATO to deal with these multiple challenges are already underway, with notable steps taken at the 2014 Wales Summit. Yet incremental improvements cannot mask growing fissures within the Alliance, particularly between those focused on external dangers from the east and those focused on external dangers from the south. This divergence in priorities needs to be overcome rapidly -- not only because a geographical division of labor would threaten NATO unity, but also because the east vs. south dichotomy is a false one. The unfortunate reality is that borders and principles are being tested both to Europe's east and to its south, and the dangers of each region have great potential to come together in ways that can directly threaten Europeans, Americans and many others around the globe.

Moreover, these external dangers may prove to be less consequential than mounting internal dangers to Alliance cohesion. Disparate European responses to a host of challenges, ranging from massive migrant flows, continued debt crises and uneven growth to the rise of illiberal, populist and nationalist political movements and threats of Brexit and Grexit, are tearing at the seams of European unity. Mutual doubts gnaw at allied commitments to common defense and security. Questions about the future of the Alliance have been voiced during the American presidential campaign.

These crises risk turning Europe from an exporter of stability into an importer of instability. The vision of a Europe whole and free is being tested by a Europe fractured and anxious.

Europe’s internal challenges have now become a critical strategic problem for the United States and the West as a whole. Transatlantic partnership remains indispensable if Western countries are to tackle effectively the challenges they face. A weaker transatlantic bond
would render Americans and Europeans less safe, less prosperous, and less able to advance either their ideals or their interests in the wider world.

NATO is the preeminent institutional expression of the transatlantic bond. It must be retooled for the new world rising before us. NATO’s current Strategic Concept, its sixth over the past sixty years, was adopted in 2010 – before Ukraine’s Maidan “Revolution of Dignity,” before Russian military intervention in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Crimea and the Donbas, before Moscow’s characterization of NATO as a “threat” to Russia, before terrorist attacks in a number of Western cities, before the rise of Daesh or the so-called Islamic State, before the Syrian civil war and the migration crisis, before the systematic use of hybrid operations and unconventional warfare in both Europe’s east and south, and many other global trends.

While some elements of the 2010 Concept hold up fairly well, various assertions and assumptions warrant reconsideration given the dramatic changes of the past half-decade. For instance, the Concept declares that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.” It says little about unconventional warfare tactics, makes only modest mention of the importance of societal and institutional resilience, is silent with regard to growing anti-access/area denial dangers, and devotes little attention to the need to generate a southern strategy. It mentions the need to use resources efficiently and to sustain necessary levels of defense spending, but it does not adequately describe the extent of Europe’s defense spending deficit and the need to correct it quickly. It is silent on the risk of having no plans or models for returning to full mobilization if necessary in an Article 5 contingency. It says little about the need for NATO to build the defense and security capabilities of vulnerable but critically important non-NATO members. It places inadequate stress on the need for better shared intelligence, accurate situational awareness, and rapid decision-making.

Moreover, NATO is now operating in more integrated ways that blur the Strategic Concept’s neat conceptual distinctions among the Alliance’s three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Crisis management in the south, for instance, involves a big component of collective defense and reassurance for an Ally such as Turkey, whereas collective defense in the east requires more effective integration of partners such as Finland and Sweden as well as the agility of crisis management to defeat hybrid warfare. In short, the boundaries of each core task have been redrawn to a point where the delineation has lost most of its relevance. Moreover, the growing need for resilience is related to all three of the current core tasks, yet has not been adequately integrated into allied planning or operational activities. Once again, it is time for Allies to explore how to define and best perform the Alliance’s core tasks in this new security era.

With these considerations in mind, NATO Allies should review the Strategic Concept once a newly elected U.S. administration is in place. As NATO Allies look to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond, we offer the following recommendations.
I. Ends: Strategies for the East, North and the South

Challenges to the East and North

Security in Europe is under growing threat from a resurgent Russia that has repudiated the post-war order, most blatantly with its 2014 annexation of the eastern Ukrainian region of Crimea and ongoing military intervention in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, following on Moscow’s 2008 military intervention in Georgia. Russia under Vladimir Putin has become a revisionist power seeking to undo the post-Cold War settlement, control its neighborhood, and disrupt Western influence wherever possible.

Russia is conducting what its military strategists call "new generation warfare" by employing a growing range of increasingly effective coercive and subversive political, economic and military tools -- from informational and psychological manipulation, cyber warfare and energy blackmail to the use of proxies and special forces, rapid mobilization, direct military intervention and the threat of nuclear use. Moscow's efforts were initially labeled by some in the West as "hybrid warfare" and treated as a new phenomenon. But this term only captures part of Russia's approach, which leverages non-military means and the threat of force with a new emphasis on surprise, deception, disruption and ambiguity in intent and attribution. The Russian approach is designed to achieve strategic aims without war by staying below NATO's threshold for reaction, dividing Europeans from each other as well as from their North American allies, and slowing, if not outright blocking, NATO decision-making and unity of purpose.

Europe's eastern lands beyond the EU and NATO are less secure and less at peace than they were a decade ago. Moscow has taken advantage of post-Soviet turmoil when and where it can, and seeks to treat the region as a sphere of "privileged interest." Five of the EU's six Eastern Partnership countries now have a separatist conflict on their territory where Russia either directly occupies territories or supports one of the conflict parties. Moscow’s opportunities are enhanced by these countries' own endemic corruption and dysfunctional governments, which remain an equally important threat to the integrity of these countries.

Ukraine is now the crucible of change. It stands at a critical crossroads between a more open society integrated increasingly into the European mainstream and serving as an alternative model to that of Putin for the post-Soviet space; or a failed, fractured land of grey mired in the stagnation and turbulence historically characteristic of Europe's borderlands.

Putin's aggression is more than an attack on Ukraine; it is an assault on basic principles and structures underpinning the security of all countries – the inviolability of their frontiers and the right to choose their allegiances. These universally recognized principles are at the heart of the transatlantic community. They are also what that community advocates for all countries. Putin's aggression is a test of the international community's willingness to uphold these principles and refute contrary rules, such as Putin’s claim that Russia has an inherent right to defend the interests of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers anywhere, regardless
of territorial boundaries. Such a generalized right would wreak havoc in a world where most states are multiethnic.6

The greatest gap between Russian and Western thinking is not over Syria, Iran, or other world regions. It is over Europe. The United States and its European allies and partners must forge consensus on how to deal with a resurgent, belligerent Russia and with Europe's grey zones before things get worse.

Unfortunately, the chances of that are high. Moscow's aggression extends beyond Europe's east to both the northern and southern expanses of the continent. Its military escalation into Syria has inflamed Middle Eastern turmoil. Dangers in each region are blending in ways that threaten Europeans, Americans and many others around the globe.

A Three-Track Russia Policy

Russia policy begins at home. Putin's challenge is as much about the West as it is about Russia. If we stand up for our values and give fresh life to our enduring commitments, including mutual defense and deterrence through NATO, the more successful we are likely to be in our approach to Russia. The best way the United States and its European partners can act together vis-a-vis Europe's east is by getting their respective acts together in the West. This report focuses primarily on this imperative.

Grounded in the policies we recommend in this report, we believe that Western policy must proceed along three mutually reinforcing tracks: deterring Russia where necessary; continuous communication and selective engagement with the regime where useful; and proactive engagement with the broadest range of Russian societal actors as possible.

• **Track One**: North America and Europe should make clear that relations with Russia must be based on respect for international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki principles, including respect for the sovereignty and independence of Russia’s neighbors. Track One should encompass both clear signals to Moscow and independent measures that can reassure allies and partners concerned about Russian pressure. It should also deter Russia from further intimidation. Western states must:
  • Deploy multinational battalions forward to make clear their willingness to defend all of NATO’s territory.
  • Reject any effort to negotiate the future of eastern Europe over the heads of those societies.
  • Strengthen Western non-recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of the Ukrainian area of Crimea.
  • Maintain Russian sanctions until full military and political implementation of the Minsk agreements has been secured. Six-month reviews of sanctions, which generate recurrent strains on Western unity, should be replaced by open-ended sanctions until conditions warrant change or additional review.
  • Press Moscow to give international organizations access to monitor the situation on the ground.7
• Prosecute Russian corruption where possible, cast a public spotlight on networks of influence, and target key figures of the Russian ruling elite if they participate in criminal business. Western countries should also take action against Western institutions and countries that enable those activities through legal loopholes, tax havens, shell companies and lax law enforcement of anti-corruption laws at home, or through their own activities in eastern countries.  

• **Track Two:** As NATO enhances deterrence in the East, continuous communication with Russia will be needed to minimize misunderstandings. North America and Europe should be clear that they stand ready as willing equitable partners with a Russia that decides to build better relations with its neighbors and act as a responsible international stakeholder. They should set forth in concrete terms the potential political, economic and security benefits of more productive relations.
  • Engage selectively on issues such as terrorism, Daesh, Syria, North Korea, Iran, and climate change.
  • Follow up on the April 20 NATO-Russia Council meeting, using this forum to reduce the risks of military incidents and subsequent escalation. We endorse the proposal made by a high level Russian-Western task force, sponsored by the European Leadership Network, to use the NATO-Russia Council urgently to discuss a possible Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and its partners and the Russian Federation on Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters between the two sides. Sweden and Finland, both of which are exposed to the dangers connected with increased military activities in the Baltic Sea region, should be included in the discussions. The agreement could be open to other members of the Partnership for Peace and OSCE.
  • Revitalize Europe's historic and vital conventional arms control framework via fresh confidence-building measures in the Vienna Document, a renewed and unbiased CFE treaty, and modernized Open Skies regime.
  • Reinforce the architecture of nuclear security through continued START Treaty implementation, examining challenges to the INF Treaty system; open or reopen discussions over issues related to missile defense, dual-use delivery systems and tactical nuclear weapons.

• **Track Three:** Western nations and non-governmental institutions should engage as robustly as possible with the whole of Russia – its people, commercial enterprises, information channels, and governments. In particular, Western groups need to maintain a dialogue with those in civil society and opposition political figures. The West should develop opportunities for student and professional exchanges and visa-free travel. Track Three initiatives must be sensitive to Russian suspicions of subversion by Western organizations. Track Three is the critical track to an eventual return of Russia and the West to common purpose and reduced tension. Russia is not the semi-autarkic Soviet Union. It is integrated in many ways in the global economy, and the digital age offers many opportunities to exchange information and shed light on each other’s societies.
Efforts along all three tracks should be advanced via close transatlantic consultation, and be united by a vision of Russia as part of a new Europe. Such a Russia will have embarked on a course of internal economic and political reform and modernization; it will be a Russia that refrains from the use of force, a Russia that does not seek a sphere of influence but develops integration through cooperation with neighbors and by increasing its own attractiveness. Today's Russia is not that Russia. Yet it is important that Western interlocutors not engage in the zero-sum thinking that characterizes Kremlin policy.

**A High-Level Arctic Review**

Even as Western nations engage with Russia through the Arctic Council and other mechanisms, NATO allies should undertake a High Level Arctic Review to consider:
- How to strengthen maritime capabilities in the Arctic and include the Arctic within a new maritime strategy.
- How to update NATO contingency plans for its northern flank to reflect changes in Russia’s Arctic force posture as well as the Arctic’s advancing commercial importance to NATO members and the world.
- How to incorporate a heightened focus on information sharing and surveillance (all NATO countries in the region are now planning to invest more in these capabilities).
- Greater engagement with Sweden and Finland, NATO’s two Nordic "Enhanced Opportunities Partners, to address deficiencies in sea, air, and land assets in the area.
- The potential consequences of increased militarization in the Arctic through training and exercises.
- Possibilities for EU-NATO cooperation in the region.

**Challenges to the South and Southeast**

NATO’s southern security challenges are extraordinarily complex in both form and force. At the epicenter of these challenges lies the Syrian conflict, which continues to generate waves of instability that spill across the Levant and the Mediterranean and into Europe. These waves of instability have a million human faces, as refugees fleeing the conflict surge into Turkey and seek to reach Europe's shores. The migration crisis has overburdened NATO allies as well as key NATO partners in the region. It has also created fissures across Europe as countries struggle to cope with the crisis.

Syria, of course, is not the only crisis stemming from NATO’s south. Libya remains unstable and now serves as a safe haven for terrorist groups like the so-called Islamic State. Foreign fighters returning to Europe and European-based extremists constitute a dire intelligence and security challenge for both Europe and the United States. Horrific terrorist attacks, most recently in Istanbul, Ankara, Suruç, Paris, Brussels and San Bernardino, are tragic evidence of clear and direct threats to the Euro-Atlantic community.
A Southern Strategy: Comprehensive Support

For NATO today, setting forth a new strategy for the south requires a deliberately defined approach that recognizes the limits of NATO’s ability to affect outcomes and the very real resource constraints facing all members. The impact of the region’s turmoil on Euro-Atlantic partners suggests that NATO’s current strategy is lacking. While NATO may be unsure of how to address these instabilities, there is an imperative to act.

The Alliance must rethink its partnerships, use its political capacities more holistically, and look beyond security tools to institution building. We suggest a broad and flexible southern strategy of “comprehensive support” that could include the following elements:

1. Collective defense is the first and primary core task of the Alliance. It must apply as much to the south as to the east. Missile and air defenses against states like Iran should be an integral part of the southern strategy. A new maritime approach is needed to make European navies more operational and accessible for the common defense. Operation Active Endeavour should be transformed into an active mission and standing maritime forces must be boosted. These assets have been under-supported for too long by Alliance governments.

2. The Alliance must continue to invest in and advance its Readiness Action Plan, especially the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a multinational land brigade of around 5,000 troops with air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) units available. Some elements of this spearhead force can be ready to move within two to three days in the face of an immediate threat.12

3. Crisis management is the core task most often associated with operations to NATO’s south. Two prime examples are the missions in Afghanistan and in Libya. Both were out of the treaty area, and both were challenging. NATO’s southern strategy should stress capabilities for these kinds of operations, such as Special Operations Forces, counter insurgency, the comprehensive approach, which merges civilian and military skills, and aircraft designed for no-fly zones.

4. Cooperative security is increasingly relevant to a holistic southern strategy. This includes closer and more formal NATO-EU ties to address the confluence of terrorism, migrant flows, state collapse and general instability from the south. The artificial barriers that have impeded full NATO-EU institutional cooperation must finally be overcome for a southern strategy to work. NATO must find a way to complement EU efforts particularly with regard to crises that require the full spectrum of policy tools. A mechanism called Berlin-Plus exists to lend part of NATO’s integrated command structure to the EU.

Unfortunately, Berlin-Plus and other NATO-EU arrangements are in a deep freeze because of disputes among NATO and EU member states over the Cyprus issue. Given this situation, NATO should be prepared to consider alternatives, for instance by complementing the efforts of coalitions involving NATO and non-NATO countries. To
take an example, an Italian-led stabilization and reconstruction coalition that might engage in Libya should be able to call on NATO support to complement its operations.

Additionally, strengthening regional partners will be critical. Jordan has been a key source of stability in a sea of tumult. Yet it is poised precariously on the front lines of conflict. This had led to severe security concerns for Jordan’s government and has made Jordan a key host for refugees. Prioritizing mechanisms for assisting Jordan should be at the center of NATO’s southern strategy efforts.

More generally, NATO should focus less on broader fora and more on injecting life into bilateral partnerships, for instance with Israel, Morocco and Tunisia. This should include reinvigorated intelligence-sharing and capacity-building efforts.

5. Enhancing surveillance efforts, doubling down on border security, refining the role of airpower in low-intensity conflict, and reigniting intelligence sharing among allies will be critical if Allies are to navigate challenges posed by the region.

6. For the specific challenges of Syria and Libya, NATO must be prepared to play a constructive role where possible. NATO could serve as a platform of dialogue, allowing like-minded countries to share insights and ideas on existing and potential conflicts. This could be critical to move the discussion forward, particularly in relation to Turkey.

7. As the UN-brokered agreement in Libya seeks to create stability, NATO should support international efforts, and if that diplomatic effort succeeds, NATO should stand ready to help build Libya’s indigenous security capacity. But the Alliance must also be mindful and realize that it may have no direct role to play, and that direct NATO involvement in Libya could further exacerbate tensions rather than add to stabilization efforts.

8. Finally, Russia’s increased presence in the region has elevated the intensity of the challenges facing NATO in the east and south. In this regard, NATO must focus on deterrence measures, particularly along the Turkish-Syrian border. Article 4 consultations will remain an important part of the strategy. While Russia is integrally involved in the diplomatic search for a Syrian settlement, its interpretation of the settlement directly contradicts the causes of Sunni-Shia tensions in the region – the foundation for the underlying instability.

While NATO must do its part in encouraging security in the south, Allies must also recognize that many of the current challenges will continue for some time. The central problem is moving the political process forward. Knowing this, NATO should formulate effective policies that comprise enhanced deterrence, in which dialogue and cooperation with interested partners, including regional actors, play a major role. In this regard, NATO ministers agreed in February 2016 to assurance measures for Turkey – with Patriot batteries, AWACS surveillance planes, and an enhanced maritime presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. NATO must recognize, however, that the region’s challenges are such that it may be unable to directly solve them and may be hard-pressed
to shield Allies from their consequences. Revitalizing the Alliance’s resiliency through the measures suggested above, and others recommended below, would be important steps.

Consolidating these strategies

NATO strategies towards the east, north and south can be consolidated into an overarching strategy that covers all three areas. This might be accomplished in at least two ways. First, in all three cases, NATO’s purpose must be to provide a full spectrum of deterrent and defense tools to provide collective defense for all of its members. Second, NATO must project stability and resilience beyond its borders using an array of tools for crisis management. Taken together, Full Spectrum Defense and Projecting Stability provide a solid core for all NATO’s operations.

II. Ways: A Top Ten for NATO

NATO must address the dangers it faces by ensuring stability in the NATO region and reducing the threat of significant conflicts in and around NATO’s adjacent areas in the east and south. NATO must enhance capabilities in the east against conventional and hybrid conflicts, in the south against instability arising from conflicts and extremism in neighboring countries, and across the Alliance to decrease vulnerabilities and maximize resilience.

NATO’s efforts will be most effective when nested within a larger Western strategy that also includes the EU and the broader transatlantic community. The nations of the Alliance face a wide range of security challenges that call for capabilities beyond those of NATO alone. Security today means more than just the military defense of territory and sovereignty. We are called increasingly to plan, support, and execute a broad range of new and non-traditional roles, missions and functions – not all of which are well suited to traditional military forces.

An effective strategy will recognize that NATO need not always take the lead. Depending on the contingency at hand, NATO may be called to take the lead, be a supporting actor, or simply join a broader ensemble. For defense and deterrence, NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic institution. In all other areas, however, it is likely to play a supporting role or work within a larger network of institutions. Knowing where and when NATO can add value is critical to prioritization of effort and allocation of limited resources.

If NATO is to continue to be an effective instrument of broader Western strategy, we must transform its scope and strategic rationale in ways that are understood and sustained by parliamentary and public opinion. We must continue to adjust the nature of its capabilities, the way it generates and deploys its forces, the way it makes decisions, the way it spends money, and the way it works with others.

The Alliance has made respectable strides to address new security challenges. Nonetheless, NATO can do better. Several of the initiatives discussed below are under debate, yet not necessarily resolved, within the Alliance. We believe that greater public understanding of
these initiatives together can generate support for a revitalized Alliance, and enable NATO nations to implement the strategies discussed above.

**Initiative One**

**Build “Full Spectrum” Deterrence and Defense as the Keystone of the Warsaw Summit**

For the past 20 years NATO’s mantra has been “out of area or out of business.” Today’s mantra must be "in area or in trouble."

NATO nations must be able to back up their political commitment to defend one another with capability and will if they are to deter those who would intimidate or attack any member. Yet deterrence and defense have become more complicated and their scope much broader than during the Cold War.

As Russia has challenged the West, it has used an impressive array of tools to invade neighboring countries, annex their territory, intimidate them via energy cutoffs and nuclear saber-rattling, generate insurgencies abroad via irregular forces, initiate surprise conventional force exercises, menace air and maritime traffic; and exploit societal differences and generate political and economic instability within Allied and partner states. Russia's actions have exposed gaps in NATO deterrence and highlighted potential new gaps to come. Crimea-style tactics, which are localized, low-intensity and quick, are designed to be just below the threshold of triggering Allies' commitment to mutual defense in response to armed attack. NATO is neither structured militarily nor disposed politically to handle such challenges. Moreover, new doctrinal and technological challenges could further impair NATO's physical ability to defend allies under attack.¹⁴

Deterrence south of NATO is in many ways even more complicated when it comes to threats posed by Iranian missiles, terrorist attacks, assaults on Turkey, barbaric practices of Daesh, mass migration, and the instability that flows from sectarian violence and failing states. Many of these challenges are not NATO's alone, but they are NATO's as well. Understanding how and what to deter to NATO’s south and southeast is more difficult and amorphous than in the east. The tools of deterrence – knowing what deters which threats – are less clear. NATO is more likely to be one of many actors rather than the dominant one; and the forces required must be more agile, adaptable and synchronized with non-military instruments of power.

NATO allies must reemphasize the importance of deterrence and defense while expanding our understanding of their requirements. In order to deter, for instance, NATO members must show credibly they are prepared to respond not only strategically, but in tactical or operational ways as well. Strategic deterrence was set aside with the post-Cold war presumption that large conventional wars of self-defense no longer concerned NATO members. As a result, basic plans to achieve full national mobilization no longer exist for most countries. Put simply, NATO has plans to deploy the 40,000 strong VJTF and NATO Response Force in time of crisis, yet there are few if any verified plans to get the rest of NATO’s approximately 2 million military and its essential civilian and industrial resources
ready to defend nations. NATO should call for and review national mobilization planning as part of the NATO Defense Planning Process. Such plans should periodically be exercised, mainly by simulation, so that NATO knows the response timelines its planners and decision makers must consider.

What NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has referred to as “full spectrum deterrence” means the Alliance must be able to dissuade and deter threats to its members, from whatever source and across all domains, while being prepared to defend all parts of NATO territory and to protect the critical functions of Allied societies. It must be designed to deal with the full panoply of provocations, from low-level hybrid tactics through nuclear blackmail. This requires a mix of new and old deterrent and defense instruments that can be applied 360 degrees around NATO’s borders. It will require the Alliance to better relate deterrence and defense to resilience, to work more effectively with other partners, and to become more agile, flexible, mobile, and creative. This will require cultural change.15

Initiative Two
Move beyond the Readiness Action Plan to Enhance Defense and Deterrence in NATO's East

Numerous steps have been taken since Russia’s annexation of Crimea to reinforce NATO’s will to implement its Article 5 collective defense clause, reassure eastern Allies, and deter Russia from taking aggressive steps on NATO territory. In addition to NATO’s actions, the Obama administration’s intention to quadruple its funding for Washington's European Reassurance Initiative16 represents a significant upgrade of U.S. engagement in European security. It will expand persistent rotational presence of U.S. air, land and sea forces in central and eastern Europe, enable more extensive U.S. participation in exercises and training, enhance prepositioned equipment stocks to reduce force deployment times and facilitate rapid response to potential contingencies, improve infrastructure, and further build the capacity of allies and partners to defend themselves and join with U.S. forces in responding to crises in the region.

These steps have been important. Building the Alliance’s capacity for rapid reinforcement is essential. But maintaining a constant, significant, capable, and multinational forward presence in vulnerable regions is equally essential. Further measures beyond NATO's Readiness Action Plan can be implemented that would further enhance deterrence yet neither violate the letter of the Founding Act nor give Russia any pretext for taking further counteractions. Stronger measures must be adopted, including at NATO's Warsaw Summit in July 2016.

Forward deploy NATO multinational forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis, starting with a multinational battalion in each of the Baltic states and in Poland. Those multinational battalions might be designed in several ways. One approach would be to combine one U.S. infantry or armor company already deployed rotationally in each of these nations, a second company from a major European Ally (e.g. UK, Germany, France), and a third company drawn from the host country, combined with a host nation battalion headquarters elements and multinational logistics. Alternatively, these multinational
battalions might be made up primarily of forces from European framework nations such as Britain, Germany, Poland and France, (with the U.S. also serving as a framework nation for one battalion), thus giving the forward deployed U.S. Brigade Combat Team greater flexibility for optimum reinforcing capability. These multinational battalions together with appropriate enabling forces could constitute a multinational brigade. Eventually they could be augmented by other indigenous and European forces. Such a multinational force should have sufficient fighting capabilities to remove any Russian doubt that the full Alliance would respond to any provocation. Rotational forward deploying forces should have the ability, in conjunction with national defense forces, to respond to the full range of contingencies, from a limited incursion to the unlikely event of a robust attack. In the latter case, these forces must be able to delay the opposing forces until Allied reinforcements arrive.17 At the same time, the relatively modest size of these forward deployments and the fact that they would be rotational rather than permanent makes the initiative completely consistent with the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

**Preposition adequate equipment to sustain the defense of the Baltic states.** Estimates vary with regard to the amount and location of equipment that needs to be prepositioned for the defense of the Baltic states. That prepositioning would include equipment for both rapid reaction forces and for some follow on forces. Prepositioning too close to potential front lines risks compromising the sites, while prepositioning too far to the rear risks long delays in mobilization. Perhaps a dozen or more NATO brigades plus related maritime, air, and supporting forces might be needed for the initial defense the Baltic states against a concerted attack. Current preposition planning tends to focus on rapid reaction forces. More planning is needed for follow on forces and their equipment.

**The United States is moving towards the deployment of four Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe, and these efforts should be encouraged.** Four U.S. brigades in Europe was the deployment profile a decade ago. The United States is already moving back in this direction. Two BCTs are stationed permanently in Europe today, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 2nd Calvary Regiment in Germany. A third BCT will now be deployed from the United States to NATO states in eastern Europe on a continuing ‘heel-to-toe’ rotational basis for the foreseeable future. A fourth U.S. Army heavy BCT equipment set is slated to be prepositioned in Europe within the next few years. The equipment will be in operational-ready storage for short notice contingencies. This fourth brigade should also be considered for permanent deployment in Europe. These four U.S. brigades might be employed independently or in any combination, but they must regularly exercise with the joint forces of frontline NATO states.

**Attack Helicopters** should be reviewed as a special capability with the goal of maintaining at least one U.S. AH-64 battalion permanently in Europe (with another being deployed at select exercise times). This is the current U.S. Army posture (one stationed and one rotating battalion) and it should be sustained as the minimum requirement. These assets are one of the most potent forces for both deterrence and defense yet they are costly and slow to deploy from the United States, and their equipment cannot practically be prepositioned in ready storage. Given the cost, alternatives should be studied by NATO, including other NATO AH-64-equipped Allies as well as European attack helicopters.
**Enhanced air policing** is an important element of enhanced deterrence and defense in NATO's east. It could be further developed into a NATO rotational air component composed of air fighter and combat helicopter wings. In addition, NATO should be ready to transition swiftly from air policing to air defense. Additional NATO capabilities, such as a Joint Force Air Component, should be considered for Poland.

**Make frontline states ‘indigestible’ so that they do not become indefensible.** Frontline states should be encouraged to strengthen their defenses under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. The Baltic states in particular should expand their capacities to conduct irregular defense, including through an array of stay-behind resistance forces, prepositioned caches of equipment and supplies, comprehensive barrier planning, and clandestine support networks to link resistance cells to conventional forces for support, intelligence and operational coordination. Such preparations should become routine parts of national defense plans, and periodically exercised. The knowledge of such preparedness increases deterrence by further raising the costs of potential aggression, denying quick wins that could confront the Alliance with any *fait-accompli* on the ground in advance of full Alliance response. This concept is consistent with the new emphasis on Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, which stresses the obligation of each Ally to strengthen its own defenses.

**Initiative Three**

**Be Prepared for Immediate Deployments in extremis**

At Warsaw, the Alliance should take steps to enhance the deployability, sustainability and readiness of European conventional forces, which have been badly depleted by budget cuts and stability/counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. This is needed to assure that NATO has adequate long-term rotational as well as follow-on forces available should a major conflict erupt in Europe. The strength of active European ground forces has dropped by 60% since the Cold War, while maritime forces have dropped by over 40% and air forces by over 50%. Europe would be hard pressed to quickly deploy and sustain an adequate joint combat force to meet a major threat. European forces lack the efficiency of being in one army; they are in 25 separate militaries, each with its own administrative, training and support requirements that require personnel. Now there is a greater demand for higher intensity capabilities. Each Ally should look to increase investment in a reasonable contingent of highly ready conventional land, maritime, and air forces that are appropriately modern, trained, ready, deployable, sustainable and networked.

**Set specific targets for the readiness of NATO’s forces.** NATO must assure that European forces can contribute significantly to a reinforcement effort. NATO has over the years set specific targets for the deployability and sustainability of its forces. The targets differ among land, air and sea assets. Land forces of the NATO nations should be 50% deployable and 10% sustainable; air forces 40% deployable and 8% sustainable; and maritime forces 80% deployable and 27% sustainable. These goals have proven useful tools for NATO planners. Given the potential need for rapid response of forces beyond the NRF, and the requirement for eventual mobilization of large forces, NATO should also set...
graduated readiness goals for all national forces committed to NATO Force Structure requirements.

- These goals have proven useful tools for NATO planners. But NATO does not have similar standards for the readiness of national forces. Given the potential need for rapid mobilization, NATO should set similar standards for the readiness of national forces.

Consider further delegation of authority to the Secretary General and SACEUR to make decisions on alerting, exercising and pre-deployment actions, in response to Russian military threats. To deter Russia’s growing conventional capabilities, NATO has focused on its ability to deploy rapid-response forces, which includes doubling the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and creating a brigade-sized “spearhead” force (VJTF). These initiatives underscore that NATO’s approach remains principally focused on reinforcement of Allies in a crisis, which in turn depends upon adequate indications and warning of a threat (so that decision-makers have sufficient time to make educated decisions) and access to all Allied territory (so that reinforcements can arrive and be integrated in time to play their military role). Both of those factors are in doubt, however. NATO countries have not possessed sufficient warning of Russia’s troop movements in its large-scale “snap” exercises, which in a crisis would place pressure on the Alliance’s indications-and-warning capacity and on its decision-making, which occurs at the political level rather than the senior military level. Russia’s reliance on strategic surprise and hybrid warfare poses acute risks for NATO Allies. They fear a Russian snap exercise that could potentially result in encroachment on their territorial sovereignty. SACEUR has been granted some new limited authorities to counter this threat. Allies should ask for concrete recommendations from the NATO Military Authorities regarding further delegation of alerting, exercising, and pre-deployment actions authority to the Secretary General and SACEUR, especially regarding deployment of rapid-response forces within Alliance territory in extreme circumstances.19

Allies should also authorize SACEUR to conduct extensive scenario planning that can drive NATO/nations’ military mobilization efforts, and unclassified modeling to inform NATO publics. NATO has already taken some welcome steps, and should be encouraged to do more. In 2015 NATO’s Political Guidance included threat-based defense planning for the first time in many years. Exercises are taking place at all levels on a more regular basis. ‘Scenario-based discussions’ at ministerial level should be encouraged to train the decision-making muscle of the Alliance. Planning by SACEUR can illuminate the requirements for potential contingencies and drive NATO military requirements, thereby enhancing deterrence and defense. Unclassified modeling would provide a basis to assure NATO populations while also identifying deficiencies and the need to remedy them. Classified modeling and planning would provide the military steps necessary to ensure that NATO allies can in fact provide collective defense.

Individual NATO allies may want and be able to deploy high-readiness forces to vulnerable allied countries when needed, even before the North Atlantic Council has had the opportunity to reach consensus to respond in an urgent situation. Allies taking bilateral measures with a vulnerable state should ensure their plans are consistent with those of NATO and SACEUR, otherwise such activities risk undermining Alliance solidarity and
the value of a cohesive political decision. Contingency plans should anticipate ultimate NATO engagement and a need for unity of effort.

**Strengthen NATO’s ability to deploy, sustain and provide logistics and host nation support for follow on forces.**

- *East European Allies need to offer the necessary host-nation support* and provide the legal and institutional framework for such rapid stop-gap reinforcement.

- *Efforts to reduce legal and other barriers to mobilization across national boundaries need to be accelerated.* A “military Schengen zone” is needed that can be activated on short notice for exercises and emergencies. This should include modalities for national land, maritime and air spaces and modes of transportation.

**Initiative Four**

**Meet Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges**

The Alliance must anticipate and address novel obstacles to allies' freedom of action on NATO's own territory, to their ability to operate outside the NATO area, and to their access to space, cyberspace or other elements of the global commons.

The proliferation of sophisticated military capabilities and lowered barriers to competition in space and cyberspace are likely to lead to proliferating access-based threats over the next decade. “Anti-access” (A2) capabilities include modern surveillance and strike assets like satellites and cruise/ballistic missiles; cyber, space, and counter-space systems; and proxies like terrorists and foreign paramilitaries. Adversaries can combine these capabilities to limit allied use of the global commons, raise barriers to effective U.S. and allied power projection, and impose high costs on intervening allied forces at substantially greater distances than previously imagined, including U.S. reinforcements to European allies in need.

“Area denial” (AD) capabilities, including air defenses, precision guided missiles, rockets, and artillery, mines, weapons of mass destruction, and innovative irregular warfighting capabilities like paramilitaries and special forces could thwart allied efforts to operate to project stability or manage crises outside of NATO territory.

While much of the A2/AD debate within Alliance circles has focused on Russia, whose activity in Kaliningrad, the Crimea, and along its Arctic coast enhance its ability to create what have been called A2/AD bubbles near these locations. But the A2/AD challenge extends beyond Russia. NATO is likely to face what one might call "ordered" A2/AD challenges, primarily from state actors, as well as "disordered" A2/AD challenges, stemming from non-state actors in chaotic, fluid environments. The former seem more relevant to NATO's east and north, the latter seem more relevant to the Alliance's south and southeast. Yet the intrusion of Russia power into the Broader Middle East and Iran’s warnings that it could close the Strait of Hormuz suggest that state-based A2/AD threats could also arise to NATO's south and southeast. Across the arc of crisis the Alliance must consider how it can address "ordered" and "disordered" A2/AD threats, breach sophisticated and unsophisticated A2/AD barriers maintain freedom of action in and
around contested land, sea, air, cyber and outer space, and conduct military operations, if necessary, in the face of continued AD-focused opposition.

Allies should not view these challenges through a narrow military lens alone, since kinetic responses such as suppression of enemy air defenses could mean war in the heart of Europe, something governments will only contemplate in very extreme cases. They need to be able to calibrate responses and manage escalation as part of a more strategic and sophisticated approach that should involve a wider spectrum of options, ranging from defensive maritime blockades and preemptive cyber activities to political and offensive actions.

At the same time, this does not mean ignoring military options. Allies need to pay greater attention to integrated air and missile defenses, long-range artillery, stealthy air-to-air and air-to-ground systems, submarines and anti-submarine warfare, offensive cyber-weapons and short-range missiles, directed-energy and electromagnetic rail guns, as well as counter-space capabilities. The Alliance will also require Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that are ‘A2/AD proof’ and thus less dependent on space-based assets. Consideration should be given to alternative ISR systems for precision navigation and timing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and ‘aerial layer’ options for communications. Experimental concepts and technologies in the context of the United States so-called "Third Offset Strategies" are most relevant.²⁰

A higher degree of European allied cooperation and participation will be needed to meet this challenge. The United States cannot conduct these operations by itself. Efforts to apply extra resources to address the Priority Shortfall Areas identified within the Alliance should help with this initiative.

**Initiative Five**

**Refocus NATO’s Maritime Capabilities on Collective Defense and Flexible Deployments**

NATO’s maritime flanks, stretching from the Atlantic and High North through the Baltic Sea and down to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, have become direct friction zones with an assertive Russia that has chosen to engage in close and dangerous encounters, shows of force, harassment of civilian ships, enhanced A2/AD capabilities, and probable submarine incursions deep into the territorial waters of NATO allies and partners. Moscow recently released an updated maritime strategy charting a further build up in the Arctic, as well as access to the Atlantic Ocean. It has conducted joint naval maneuvers with China in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2015 Russia also demonstrated its growing maritime power by firing cruise missiles from surface warships in the Caspian Sea against targets in Iraq and launching missiles from a submarine in the Mediterranean against targets in Syria. While conducted in the context of Russia’s intervention in the Middle East, the potential of these capabilities should not be lost on NATO members.

Security challenges emanating from the volatile Middle East also contain important maritime aspects. The Mediterranean has now become the main conduit for refugees seeking to enter Europe, and the same space could serve as an avenue of approach for other
non-state actors. NATO's newest operation, launched in February 2016 to address the ongoing refugee crisis, is perhaps an indication of future tasks to come. Any future interventions into the regions south and east of the Mediterranean are likely to depend on the maritime domain for support, sustainment, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, just as Operation Unified Protector did in 2011. NATO's two long-running and ongoing maritime operations, Ocean Shield and Active Endeavor, have dealt with counter-piracy and counter-terrorism threats emanating from the south.

In short, maritime challenges have taken on new urgency in terms of readiness and intensified operations. NATO's 2011 Allied Maritime Strategy places a strong emphasis on crisis management and countering non-state challenges that threaten commercial and other flows across the global maritime domain. However it must elaborate maritime forces’ contribution to collective defense and deterrence, and what the alliance needs to do to safeguard its interest in a maritime domain made more competitive and contested by regional and global powers.

Some positive steps were taken at the 2014 Wales Summit. NATO agreed to intensify and expand implementation of its Maritime Strategy and to reinvigorate its Standing Maritime Forces by focusing less on protracted operations (such as Active Endeavor, which is changing its mission, and Ocean Shield, which will be terminated) and making national naval contributions more flexible. Yet more needs to be done. NATO’s problem is less the number of members’ surface combatants than it is the willingness of nations to invest in the readiness, sustainment and provisioning of their ships to NATO for exercises and operations. For example, today only one of the two major NATO Standing Maritime Groups (the Aegean operation) has ships assigned to it.

NATO and its leaders should consider the following:

- Revise the Alliance Maritime strategy to better focus alliance efforts on collective defense and deterrence in the maritime domain.
- Take additional measures to strengthen the two existing NATO Standing Maritime Groups and its two Counter-mining Groups. In particular, efforts to generate adequate forces for all four Groups and to scale up these Groups in time of crisis (from the normal level of 4-8 combatants for the two major groups) need to be exercised frequently.
- Generate a robust, well-resources maritime component for the Very High Readiness Task Force.
- Focus more on high-end maritime capabilities including anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, strike from the sea, amphibious operations, and theater missile defense.
- Consider how maritime forces can become more survivable and contribute to breaking A2/AD capabilities.
- Create a NATO Black Sea fleet, composed primarily of regional allies and perhaps an American contribution.
- Create a NATO consortium to enhance maritime domain awareness that would draw together and pool national assets ranging from maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned systems, aerostats and underwater sensor chains and radars.
• Map Alliance and member state dependencies on undersea pipelines, electrical cables and communications infrastructure, from landing points to deep seabed routes. Design plans to monitor and defend these, to circumvent losses and to operate in degraded environments.
• Organize frontline maritime powers to provide a “first response” capability in crisis or war.
• Serve as an advocate for good order at sea.

Initiative Six
Maintain Nuclear Deterrence and Continue Apace with Missile Defenses

NATO’s strategy for transatlantic security, throughout the Cold War and to the present day, has been based on deterrence of potential adversaries through a mixture of both conventional and nuclear forces. More recently, Alliance leaders have added missile defense to the list. A coherent and effective deterrence and defense policy depends on all these assets, especially at a time when Russia’s nuclear behavior is presenting significant challenges for NATO.

The Alliance’s formula for nuclear weapons was originally outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept and reinforced in the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. The Review concluded that:
• Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense;
• The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be used are extremely remote;
• As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance;
• The supreme guarantee of Allies’ security is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance;
• Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrence remain safe, secure, and effective;
• NATO will develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangement.

During the past few years, however, Russia has developed new nuclear building programs and exercises which, together with thinking published in Russian defense circles, have raised significant concerns within the Alliance about Russia’s willingness to lower the nuclear threshold.

Russia sees its nuclear forces as a tool in pursuing its political objectives, which it uses in statements to intimidate neighbors and NATO members about Russia’s nuclear assets, by mobilizing or threatening to mobilize dual-capable delivery platforms, by trying to delegitimize NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, or through direct or implied nuclear threats against specific countries.21
Moscow exercises its nuclear forces regularly, including the transition from a conventional to a nuclear contingency during annual wargames. NATO also conducts nuclear exercises, but those are not linked to NATO’s conventional exercises and do not practice the transition from conventional to nuclear conflict. Moscow’s evolving nuclear doctrine now calls for a possible “de-escalation” first strike to halt conventional operations by NATO. Combined with increasingly intimidating rhetoric this creates concerns that Russia might lower its threshold for using nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the 2014 Russian Military Doctrine’s position that nuclear weapons would only be used in response to a nuclear attack on Russia or a conventional attack that threatened Russia’s very existence as a state.22

Moscow’s likely violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty puts in jeopardy the stabilizing factor of U.S.-Russian arms control efforts. All these issues raise serious questions and require renewed attention to the nuclear component of NATO’s deterrent.

The overriding political objective for NATO is to convince Russia (or any conceivable future nuclear adversary) of the Alliance’s determination to respond to any contingency, including a nuclear one, in a united fashion. NATO should not try to mirror Russia’s increasingly irresponsible nuclear behavior. Instead, it is time for NATO to develop a clearer nuclear declaratory policy to complement the steps underway to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces. NATO should be forthright to publics why nuclear deterrence remains critical to the security of NATO and our societies.

A Warsaw Summit statement would begin by reiterating why nuclear weapons remain necessary for NATO. The idea is not new and was articulated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, “the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence.” The purpose of NATO Allies’ nuclear forces can be more clearly stated, as reflected in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts: “the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war.” While the precise role that nuclear weapons might play is not detailed (and should not be), its value is in raising the risks to an aggressor: “[Nuclear weapons] will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option.” A declaratory policy at Warsaw should make clear to Russia that any use of nuclear weapons would fundamentally change the nature of any conflict.

We support the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. A clear declaratory statement adapting previous NATO language to today’s circumstances would not repudiate initiatives such as Global Zero. It would not entail new systems or reverse the steps made bilaterally by the United States and Russia through the New START Treaty or other initiatives to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons. It would acknowledge that the world without nuclear weapons that NATO seeks is not the world that exists today, highlighting instead the risks and dangers of Russia’s nuclear saber rattling. NATO should continue to reiterate its interest in reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, but be equally clear that a reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons being used depends on a willing partner, which Russia does not appear presently to be.
In addition to a Summit statement, NATO should make five modest adjustments to its nuclear posture to compensate for recent Russian behavior, lest Moscow draw the conclusion that NATO’s commitment to the full spectrum of deterrence is weakening.

- Maintain and as needed modernize the existing modest NATO non-strategic nuclear deterrent deployed in Europe.
- Work with affected Allies to replace outmoded dual capable aircraft.
- Exercise potential responses to Russian nuclear threats.
- Better integrate NATO’s conventional and nuclear doctrine.
- Seek ways to integrate France more directly into NATO nuclear planning efforts, including through the Nuclear Planning Group and joint policy planning discussions.

In addition, the Alliance should seek high level discussions with Russia to clarify the nuclear doctrine of both sides.

**Develop Missile Defenses.** The Alliance has sought to develop an anti-ballistic missile system designed not to deal with any threats from Russia, but to protect Allies from growing missile threats from the Middle East. NATO has sought to cooperate with Russia in developing that anti-ballistic missile system, but those efforts thus far have failed. Implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach designed by the Obama Administration is on track. The Phase 1 forward deployment of four Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) capable surface ships to Rota, Spain were enhanced by the Phase II December 2015 completion of an Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) site at Deveselu, Romania and the scheduled 2018 completion of a second AAMDS at Redzikowo, Poland (Phase III).

Some have argued that the nuclear deal with Iran removes the threat that the Phased Adaptive Approach was designed to defeat. But Iran’s recent missile tests reinforce the continued need to keep those plans on track. The Alliance should continue to demonstrate that these deployments will not affect Russia’s nuclear deterrent and efforts to seek Russian cooperation in this effort should continue.

**Initiative Seven**

**Enhance NATO'S Core Task of Crisis Management**

While the Warsaw Summit will focus on collective defense, this should not come at the expense of crisis management and the Alliance's responsibilities to reduce threats, and to prevent and respond to conflicts in and beyond its immediate neighborhoods. Syria, Northern Africa and the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia and Kosovo are all active crises of varying intensity with significant implications for Alliance members. In some cases, NATO Partners are involved in hot wars, the outcome of which will have a significant impact on NATO and Partner security, yet NATO as an Alliance is not engaged. Even leaving a NATO operational role aside, the North Atlantic Council has waned as a political forum to discuss strategic issues.

As NATO’s focus shifts to collective defense, a tendency to downgrade crisis management as a core function of the Alliance will likely increase. Indeed, the danger may arise that a
bright line will be drawn between NATO’s willingness to defend Allies, and its unwillingness to engage in promoting security outside of Alliance territory.

At a skills level, NATO must retain the capability to conduct scalable counter insurgency, stabilization operations, and the building of partner capacity by taking on a major mission through training of defense and police forces, and security sector assistance and reform.

NATO's Special Operations Forces capabilities are particularly important to the crisis management mission in the south as well as to managing hybrid threats from Russia in the east. Nations should be encouraged to sustain their investment in SOF capabilities as a priority even with tight budgets. This has to include the funding of participation in NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral SOF exercises. NATO should continue to facilitate multinational SOF development through training, education, exercises and networking, including if called upon, to deploy operational command and control of SOF from NATO's Special Operations Headquarters. It also means sustaining SOF national training bases. Equipment investment decisions should weigh heavily the degree of enhanced interoperability provided as well as state of the art capabilities. Allied joint SOF has to be integrated into the plans and exercises of conventional force employment. National SOF participation offers one level of cooperation, but higher skill levels are required to employ Allied joint SOF as part of any larger NATO mission. Some have suggested that NATO’s SOF forces need to be more fully integrated into NATO’s command structure, a concept which needs to be studied. The evolution of hybrid warfare and disruptive challenges also means SOF must develop and maintain additional capacity to work with civilian authorities, including law enforcement and other security agencies.

As European armies turn to higher end warfighting and refine their SOF techniques, it is important that the NATO comprehensive approach not be forgotten. Designed to deal with stability and reconstruction operations primarily in ISAF, the comprehensive approach is likely to be relevant for future operations. Lessons encountered must be collected, taught and learned by future leaders, and a scalable capability needs to be retained within the Alliance. When these primarily ground force missions present themselves, the skills thus preserved will be welcomed and available.

At an operational level, NATO should take the lead role in training Iraqi and other forces for the fight against Daesh. Lessons learned in Afghanistan need to be further assessed and made digestible for those who might need to conduct those operations in the future. This effort should be conducted by NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence in The Hague together with NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Lisbon.

NATO should also take on a major security sector and capacity building mission in Libya. The political, economic, and security situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly since NATO’s mission in Libya in 2011. While a political process has been established aimed at bringing disparate claimants to national leadership together, one of the principle obstacles remains the role of militias acting independent of any national authority. NATO should partner with the political process to begin to build a capable, integrated national defense and police capability in Libya. To integrate the civilian and military aspects of a
Libya response or any other crisis management missions, NATO should seek maximum benefit from its investment in the Comprehensive Crisis Operations and Management Center (CCOMC), now fully operational at SHAPE. The CCOMC includes ready spaces for representatives of non-NATO organizations cooperating with the Alliance on crisis management.

At a political level, NATO should reinvest in meaningful strategic consultations on a wide range of global security challenges – whether or not there is the prospect of NATO taking on an operational role. Instances have increased where NATO has called for meetings in the context of Article 4, whereby Allies can "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This is a positive development. But the use of NATO as an essential forum for consultations should extend beyond Article 4 and Article 5 obligations. The North Atlantic Council should play a vital role in sharing information, analysis, and policy perspectives among Allies on an ongoing basis, on a wide range of issues.

In addition, NATO's ministerial meetings should be revamped to ensure that they can take strategic decisions. Too much time is spent on unstructured “tour de table” conversation, and too little examining concrete decision proposals. For example, prior to Ministerial meetings, in such cases the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level could call for civil and military planning options from the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff. This could then set up a discussion among Ministers with a view to authorizing one or more recommendations, deciding to return to the issue again at a later time, or rejecting a recommendation. When NATO does elect to take action, it should identify a time when the operation will be reviewed and require new authorization by the North Atlantic Council, to ensure engagements continue to enjoy Allied support, without becoming long-term, open-ended missions.

Initiative Eight
Maximize Resilience

Transboundary arteries crisscrossing countries to connect people, data, ideas, money, food, energy, goods and services are essential sinews of open societies, daily communications, and the global economy. Yet they are also vulnerable to intentional or accidental disruption. Terrorists, energy cartels, illicit traffickers, cyber-hackers, internet trolls and so-called "little green men" each seek, in their own way, to use the arteries and instruments of free societies to attack or disrupt those societies.

Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must now also focus on protecting their connectedness. New approaches are needed that blend traditional efforts at deterrence and defense with modern approaches to resilience -- building the capacity of societies to anticipate, preempt and resolve disruptive challenges to their critical functions, the networks that sustain them, and the connections those networks bring with other societies. Creating a higher degree of resilience in vulnerable societies makes it more difficult for adversaries to disrupt and create the instability they need for their success.
Ensuring the resilience of one's society is foremost a task for national governments. Resilience begins at home. Yet in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats and disruptive hybrid attacks, no nation is home alone. Emerging challenges will require even greater shared resilience. Moreover, national resilience and collective defense must be understood as mutually reinforcing elements of the same overall effort to enhance deterrence.

While resilience requires a broad approach with significant civilian political and economic aspects, it also has major military components. NATO military forces, even in small number, can be effective to back up local border forces or SOF to detect and neutralize foreign insurgents. National forces should be primary, in keeping with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. But NATO allies can assist where requested, for example, for protection of key industrial, commercial and transportation nodes (especially those intended for use in reception of reinforcements), counter insurgency operations and para-military police functions, responses to civil emergencies and covert operations, and crisis response management.

NATO and its members already possess noteworthy capabilities in these areas, but their ability to act as a fully organized, capable alliance is not well developed. NATO will need improved physical assets, strengthened strategic planning and operating capacities. It will need to coordinate closely with national governments, many of which view control of societal security resources as vital manifestations of their sovereignty, and have diverse constitutional approaches to domestic uses of their military and to civil-military cooperation in crisis situations.

Moreover, NATO engagement in this area will require a fundamentally different relationship with the EU, which has undertaken a range of activities and initiatives aimed at improving its military and civilian capabilities and structures to respond to crises spanning both societal defense and societal security, including cross-border cooperation on consequence management after natural and manmade disasters.

In short, resilience is a job for NATO, but it is not a job for NATO alone. In many instances it may require national or EU authorities to play a lead role. The issue for NATO is not just what it should do, but how it fits within an array of necessary Western efforts to bolster transatlantic resilience. In such instances, NATO may play a support role. Hybrid challenges, for instance, may include but are not limited to military elements and must be addressed in more comprehensive ways.

NATO should set resilience standards and individual allies should each make a Pledge on National Resilience to meet those standards at the Warsaw Summit pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, whereby allies commit to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." This pledge would encompass protection of civilians and infrastructure; maintaining essential government functions and values; protecting and defending cyberspace; modernizing resilience capacities; and promoting transatlantic resilience across the Alliance.
Reinforce NATO's pledge with a U.S.-EU Solidarity Pledge, a joint political declaration that each partner shall act in a spirit of solidarity — refusing to remain passive — if either is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, and shall work to prevent terrorist threats to either partner; protect democratic institutions and civilian populations from terrorist attack; and assist the other, in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster.26

Make resilience an integral element of NATO's core tasks, or consider making resilience a fourth core task. A key element of Russia’s strategy is the use of strategic surprise and hybrid threats to take advantage of weak states. Extremist threats from the south also challenge the fabric of Western societies. Greater societal and defense resilience can be an important component of an effective response. Creating a higher degree of resilience in vulnerable societies makes it more difficult for state or non-state actors alike to disrupt and create the instability they need for their success. Societies deemed indefensible in traditional defense terms can be rendered indigestible through resilience. Resilience has become integral to each of NATO’s current core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. Initial activities could include the following:

- **Develop civil-military Resilience Support Teams**, small operational units that could offer support to NATO member national authorities in such areas of emergency preparedness including assessments; intelligence sharing, support and analysis; border control; assistance to police and military in incident management including containing riots and other domestic disturbances; helping effectuate cross-border arrangements with other NATO members; providing protection for key critical infrastructures including energy; and, in the cyber arena, support to and enhancement of NATO’s Cyber Response Team. These NATO teams could work in parallel with similar EU groups using the same playbook. In certain countries, Resilience Support Teams could be collocated with NATO Force Integration Units, and help national responses with NATO military activities including especially special operations activities.27

- **Create “National Resilience Working Groups.”** Encourage relevant nations to establish working group-type secretariats to coordinate defense activities with overlapping civil authority and private sector key critical infrastructure functions to enhance national capacity to anticipate, prevent, respond and recover from disruptive scenarios and to provide a key point of contact for outside assistance, including NATO Resilience Support Teams in the east, focused on the development of resilience and response to hybrid threats; in the south, focused on resilience and humanitarian requirements; and throughout the Alliance, focused on cyber and particularly its support to the electric grid and finance. Such a group should also have continuous situational awareness of a state’s hybrid risk assessment. Coordination, integration, and exercises at the national level will make outside support from NATO and other organizations most useful.

- **Encourage the establishment of regional working groups.** In addition to national working groups, concerned nations could establish working groups with overlapping issues—one approach would be to look to the nations in the framework arrangements for the east and for the south—with invitations later for others to join as they deem desirable. This would be somewhat similar to such regional mechanisms as Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) or the Southeast European Defense Ministerial.
• **Include resilience events in NATO exercises, training, education and operational planning.** Resilience events should be included especially in NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) and cyber exercises such as the annual cyber coalition exercises.

**Bolster coordination with the private sector.** Effective resilience requires engagement by the private sector, which owns most infrastructures critical to essential societal functions. A good first step would be to develop mechanisms to coordinate with private institutions and entities on key security issues focused on the development of resilience, with cyber as the initial arena.

**Enhance counterterrorism cooperation.** Counterterrorism within the NATO region remains primarily the responsibility of national intelligence, interior and police authorities. NATO’s counterterrorism activities since 2001 have consisted primarily of safeguarding allied airspace and maritime approaches and intelligence sharing, i.e. guarding the approaches to NATO territory. NATO should consider options for expanding intelligence sharing and its capabilities to support the protection of critical infrastructure, especially infrastructure essential to the performance of NATO core tasks. This should include the development of procedures and plans to ensure the prompt deployment of special operations forces—useful in disrupting some kinds of terrorist attacks—if national authorities ask NATO for this type of assistance. NATO should apply its plans for securing pipelines, offshore platforms and ports to assure energy supplies in wartime to the challenge of anti-terrorist protection of such critical infrastructure.

**Develop a more robust strategic communications strategy** to address Russia's information operations, particularly where Moscow seeks to exploit social and political differences in allied states, including those with sizable ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking populations.

**Project resilience forward.** NATO members share a keen interest in the societal resilience of other countries beyond the EU and NATO, particularly in wider Europe, since strong efforts in one country may mean little if neighboring countries, with which they share considerable interdependencies, are weak. Russia's hybrid efforts to subvert Ukrainian authority are but the latest examples of this growing security challenge. Allies should be proactive about sharing societal resilience strategies, not only with allies but with selected partners.

Through a strategy of *forward resilience,* the United States and its partners would identify—very publicly—their resiliency with that of others beyond the EU and NATO, and share societal resilience approaches and operational procedures with partners to improve societal resilience to corruption, psychological and information warfare, and intentional or natural disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other critical infrastructures, with a strong focus on prevention but also response. Forward resilience would also enhance joint capacity to defend against threats to interconnected domestic economies and societies and resist Russian efforts to exploit weaknesses of these societies to disrupt and keep them under its influence.
Initiative Nine
Bolster NATO’s Cyber Defenses

The responsibility to deter, detect, defend against and defeat a cyber attack rests primarily with nations and their private sectors. But the severe impact a cyber attack can have on a nation’s information structure, and its use in recent military operations and intimidation campaigns, has implications for Alliance security.

NATO and the defense establishments of its members are under constant attack from cyber hackers seeking to penetrate their information systems, extract data and plant viruses that could be eventually be used against allies. NATO officials have deemed these attacks to be a tier 1 threat. Attacks are aimed both against NATO systems used to develop defense policies and plans, but also more dangerously against operational cyber networks needed to execute military missions.

NATO has taken the threat of cyber attacks very seriously. It has created a high level Cyber Defense Committee that reports directly to the NAC, a working level NATO Cyber Defense Management Board, a NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), a Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn, and more recently a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. The Wales Summit endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defense Policy which further strengthened NATO’s efforts in this area. Yet more must be done.

Recognize cyber as an operational domain and launch a voluntary NATO Cyber Operations Coordination Center (NCOCC). The NCOCC would report to Allied Command Operations and would be funded and manned by participating members. Ideally the United States should take the lead. Participating members should be those countries with cyber operations forces. The primary purposes of the NCOCC would be to share information among the cyber operational forces of members, conduct training and education in conjunction with the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCD COE), help Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation plan cyber exercise events, and ensure deployable cyber elements are forces listed with the Enhanced NRF and VJTF.

In due course, if the NCOCC proves a success, it should transition into a permanent NATO Cyber Operations Headquarters similar to the NATO SOF HQ. Such a headquarters should generate the necessary arrangements and readiness to allow nations to plug their capabilities and produce cyber effects should there be a collective decision to do so. It should also act to achieve consensus on issues of cyber deterrence, particularly whether individual Alliance cyber defense capabilities alone are adequate or whether capabilities are needed to effectively deter major strikes against NATO networks, the networks of individual nations, or against the critical infrastructures of Allied nations – especially the infrastructure identified as essential to NATO’s core tasks. While NATO's ability to acquire capabilities to respond to such attacks is not a practical near-term consideration, individual Allies are already taking on this mission and could do the same for the Alliance in certain scenarios.
• **Establish the means to allow SACEUR to plan for, integrate and employ the contributions of members’ cyber forces for defensive, offensive and exploitative cyber operations.** While NATO is unlikely to agree to establishing offensive cyber capabilities for the Alliance itself, individual Allies do possess these capabilities and those capabilities may need to be coordinated in time of crisis or conflict.

• **Consider Mutual Cyber Standards Pledges.** National networks that connect to the NATO network can be weak, creating potential vulnerabilities for the entire system. The Alliance might address this problem via a "mutual cyber pledge," grounded in an Alliance-wide certification system, in which an individual Ally pledges to meet agreed cyber defense standards and NATO itself pledges assistance to those lacking capability to meet those standards, which is then followed with a concrete work plan to achieve certification.

• **Enhance NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)** by rationalizing and normalizing common funding, strengthening its Rapid Response Teams in order to better assist members under attack who ask for help, and generating greater protection and resilience planning for critical mobile networks, including capabilities development of national cyber cells earmarked for NRF and VJTF.

• **Task ACT to develop a Cyber Operations Transformation Initiative** to explore opportunities for multinational training, networking, information sharing and interoperability among the growing number of NATO members fielding operational commands. The model for this initiative should be the successful special operations transformation initiative of the Riga summit.

• **Increase support to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence** in Estonia, which should lead NATO to draft a clear policy on responding to cyber attacks.

### Initiative Ten

**Create Continuous Strategic Awareness and Procedures for Rapid Decision-Making**

The simultaneity, confluence and velocity of current security challenges have generated a new need for the Alliance to review and improve its procedures to assure that it can stay ahead of events rather than be driven by them. Problems with intelligence sharing, pre-authorization to military authorities, and unwillingness to consult formally on politically sensitive issues are well known. Yet playing catch-up can only compound Alliance challenges by hampering strategic communications, slowing decision-making, and impairing military operations.

NATO has recognized the general nature of this problem and has taken some initial steps to deal with it. Greater attention is being paid to emerging threats. Contingency planning is on the rise. Consideration is being given to pre-authorization for selected military operations. SHAPE has established a Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center, but it is overwhelmed. It has created a NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, but that, too, is limited.

There are multiple ways in which the current situation can be improved. NATO must build comprehensive and integrated strategic awareness through continuous and comprehensive
information collection, fusion and sharing. If NATO is to acquire the ability to conduct such analysis, it must build flexible security networks with Allies and partners, as well as other organizations, particularly the EU, as well as a wide range of actors from the private sector, NGOs, think tank and analytic communities. Such networked-based approaches will require a new mindset based on creative and critical thinking that must be fostered in education and training.\textsuperscript{28} NATO needs to build a new architecture to deliver NATO’s military strategic effect and to analyze and connect a huge amount of data to manage military action effectively.

**Create a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Assessment** [ASG (I)] to drive the NATO bureaucracy and political process to make more rapid decisions based on the best multi-source intelligence available.

**Create an Intelligence Committee under the NAC**, chaired by the ASG (I) and composed of permanent representatives of national intelligence directors (e.g., the U.S. Director of National Intelligence). These representatives should be added to each Alliance member’s national delegation at HQ NATO. The NATO IC should meet at least twice annually at the level of National Directors, similar to the Military Committee.

**Build up a dedicated open source information gathering and sharing line of effort within the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center.** This area of competency should be specifically expert at gathering information from social media sources. In addition to sharing information among members’ militaries, consistent with NATO protocols, information should also be shared with members’ civil law enforcement agencies and EUROPOL to aid in stemming the flow of foreign fighters to the Middle East and Africa.

**III. Means: Four Paths to Deliver Capabilities**

If NATO is to reform along the lines we propose, it must generate the appropriate capabilities to meet its missions. Without credible capabilities, strategic concepts, treaty guarantees and summit declarations mean little to Allies or those who would confront them.\textsuperscript{29} NATO credibility rests on a demonstrable capability for timely military response to threats to any member’s territory.

**Path One**

**Match Means to Missions**

Day by day the gap is growing between the missions NATO members agree to take on and the means they provide to perform them. NATO has tried a full array of incentives and mechanisms to encourage its members to maintain sufficient levels of ready forces and defense investment. In each case, the initiative has fallen short.

Defense reductions have created significant capability gaps, including declining readiness, delayed or postponed procurement of major defense items, deactivation of active duty units particularly in ground forces, reduced deployability and sustainment, reduced stockpiles of
munitions, and a general absence of plans to reconstitute forces should the strategic outlook change.

At Wales NATO leaders agreed to reverse the trend. Those few nations who were spending at 2% of GDP agreed to aim to maintain that spending level. Those spending less than 2% agreed to halt any further declines and to reach the 2% guideline within a decade. In addition, nations pledged within a decade to spend at least 20% of their annual defense budgets on major new equipment, including related research and development.

The pledge has thus far had some positive effects. East European NATO members have taken the lead in defense spending increases, and Poland has announced plans to double the size of its army. Other NATO countries are also turning their defense expenditures around. By the Warsaw Summit 21 of NATO’s 28 members will have honored the first element of their pledge, to halt the reduction in their defense spending. Sixteen Allies have increased their defense spending since the Wales Summit. Yet in 2015, only 5 member states met the threshold of spending 2% of their GDP on defense: the United States, Estonia, Greece, Britain, and most recently, Poland. The United States continues to account for the lion's share of NATO's defense expenditures. Increased contributions from member states are essential if NATO is to have the resources to meet its challenges.

Several steps should be considered at Warsaw to enhance the Wales defense spending pledge:

- Reaffirm the Wales pledge and underscore the need for full implementation;
- Strengthen reporting requirements and hold NAC discussions to resolve special cases;
- Consider a Defense Planning Pledge to address shortfalls in high-end capabilities that affect the credibility of collective defense, and to spend all increases on commonly agreed NATO critical shortfall items;
- Devise an annual “stair step” plan could be devised to demonstrate how nations plan to achieve their pledge within the allotted decade;
- Encourage frontline nations to adopt more ambitious spending goals consistent with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, which stresses national self-help and individual capacity;
- Reinforce the current goal of having no single NATO nation provide more than 50% of the capabilities needed for any one mission.

The 20% pledge for major equipment and research will be crucial to keep up with the rapid pace of major technological change. A similar pledge at Warsaw for the cyber domain might be useful.

Nonetheless, the current division of labor, with the United States remaining responsible for the bulk of the military burden and Europe not addressing this concern, is not politically or militarily sustainable. Without proper investments, for instance, the technological gap between the United States and Europe will increase. Continued joint training and live exercises are central to the credibility of NATO's reassurance and deterrence measures.
Most European countries expect Washington to approach the defense spending issue in a more nuanced way by taking into account other key contributions that defense budgets do not reflect, such as national resilience against hybrid warfare, the soft power tools the EU commits to failed-state situations, or the fact that some have spent significant resources deploying their troops in sub-Saharan Africa or as part of the anti-ISIS coalition. Nonetheless, the Wales pledges will remain important issues for Washington. 33

National legislatures should consider that in 2014 the European member states of the EU and NATO spent an average of 1.56% of GDP on defense. This amounts to $370 per citizen – about 1.1 euros per person a day at a current exchange rate. In contrast, in 2014, the United States spent 3.5% of GDP on defense, or $2,051 per capita. That is about $5.60 (about €4.90) per American per day – almost 5 times every European NATO and/or EU citizen. If publics realized this stark contrast they may appreciate not only the embarrassing transatlantic imbalance, but the miniscule contribution being made to national security per citizen across Europe. Europeans need not invest comparably to Americans. However, if Europeans could be convinced to spend an average of just 25 euro cents more per citizen per day, all of Europe would be well over 2% of GDP on average for defense (which would still be less than 25% the U.S. level). This seems like a modest and reasonable proposition. 34

Path Two
Develop Stronger Framework Nation Concepts to Drive Smart Defense and Encourage Role Specialization through Design

The Smart Defense and Connected Forces Initiatives were concepts adopted by NATO at its 2012 Chicago Summit. These concepts intended to drive more efficient spending of limited defense resources. Countries were encouraged to work together to develop, acquire and maintain defense equipment in pooling and sharing arrangements. New efforts were taken to align national capabilities with the needs of the Alliance, using the concepts of prioritization, specialization through design, interoperability, and cooperation. Ongoing programs were accelerated and multiple new initiatives were undertaken, primarily at the project level. Progress has been made and the concepts remain very useful, but they cannot compensate for low European defense spending.

The next step was taken at the 2014 Wales Summit, when Germany proposed and the Alliance accepted the notion of creating Framework Nations to lead broader regional defense efforts. The idea is to have a large European nation take a leadership role in and to cooperate with smaller nations who could fill gaps in the capabilities of the larger nation. By partnering together, the group would begin to develop a full spectrum of capabilities. Three Framework Nation groupings were announced at Wales. Germany and ten other allies formed a group to develop capabilities, particularly in logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection; development of greater firepower; and enhancement of deployable headquarters. The United Kingdom and seven allies formed an operational Joint Expeditionary Force. Italy plus six allies formed a third grouping focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations, the provision of enablers, the usability of land formations, and command & control.
In some cases this concept of integrating forces has been extended bilaterally. For example the Dutch, having given up their tanks, have formed a Mechanized Brigade that will serve as part of the German First Tank Division.

Designed and implemented properly, this Framework Nation Concept can become Smart Defense on steroids. Additional groupings should be encouraged for the Warsaw Summit. Each grouping should move in the direction of operations, such as the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force. And each might take on certain geographic or functional responsibilities for NATO in an effort to reduce redundancy and maximize the total capability of the Alliance.

Path Three
Facilitate Innovation

NATO Allies have over the decades maintained the peace in large measure because they held significant advantages in technological innovation and organizational agility. However, the technological gap between NATO and potential competitors is closing. More ubiquitous information technology allows other militaries to strike with greater precision, responsiveness, and range. When coupled with aggressive intent, such capabilities are cause for concern, and Russia has declared it is organizing to fight across the spectrum of warfare.

Even as the Framework Nation approach advances, the United States and its Allies, working together with transatlantic defense industries, must look ahead for ways to leverage innovation to retain technological advantages and hence fulfill their commitment to each other's security. The United States is developing a new approach along these lines. The Defense Department calls it “Third Offset Strategies.” The first offset earlier in NATO’s history was deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons designed to offset Soviet numerical advantages. The second offset concerned the use of deep conventional precision strike weapons designed to offset Soviet advantages in their second echelon of forces. In each of these cases, new technologies, organizational structures, and operational techniques were used to offset a Soviet advantage.

Third Offset strategies are still in an early experimental stage. One key to the Third Offset is the realization that different potential adversaries will require different offsetting strategies; there is no one-size-fits-all approach. In Europe, for instance, offset strategies are likely to encompass high technology as well as innovative whole-of-government concepts to counter ambiguous threats and dangers, as were seen in Crimea and as we continue to see in Ukraine today. A second key to the Third Offset is human-machine collaboration. Cyber and electronic warfare happen at the speed of machines rather than the speed of humans. The Third Offset is about keeping humans central while tuning decision-making to cyber speed challenges. The analogy of good chess players assisted by computers defeating chess masters is often used to describe the human-machine collaboration concept. A third important difference with previous strategies is that earlier military advances were generated by military labs, whereas new advances are being driven more by the commercial sector. These strategies will require public-private innovation
partnerships, for instance with regard to robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, visualization, biotechnology, miniaturization, advanced computing and big data, and additive manufacturing like 3D printing.

Ideas that are under consideration include:
- Creation of more resilient and agile command and control architectures to ensure continuous strategic awareness and timely decision making;\textsuperscript{35}
- Use of artificial intelligence and learning machines;
- Deep learning systems that can provide situational awareness in ambiguous conflict environments;
- Use of Big Data for trend analysis;
- Creating effective swarming techniques;
- Designing advanced human-machine combat teams;
- Creating new network-enabled and cyber-hardened autonomous weapons, while keeping humans central;
- Creating a ‘born secure’ echelon-networking NATO Mission Cloud that draws on operational data to enable the distribution of operational control to enable leaders to better manage the tempo of military actions.\textsuperscript{36}

These concepts play to Western strengths and highlight potential roles for NATO. For the Second Offset the Alliance created the so-called “European-American Workshop” as a framework in which to discuss how such a strategy could work. We need something similar again today. Allied Command Transformation needs a mandate and mechanism to liaise and team where appropriate directly with the Pentagon on developing concepts to effectively use these emerging technologies in multinational operations. ACT can help identify interested NATO members and partners with expertise in particular areas, and facilitate collective participation under Alliance auspices in addition to bilateral engagement. It should continue its work on the military posture focused on six main focus area: command and control, logistics and sustainability, collective training and exercises, partnerships, human capital, and capabilities (equipment, doctrine) and find ways to implement new architectures of command and control -- with a view to influencing Third Offset strategies as well. ACT can also help identify particular European allies, as well as partners such as Sweden and Finland, who have expertise in particular areas and who can contribute directly to this effort. The Alliance should rely on a whole-of-industry approach to leverage innovation and build future capacities.\textsuperscript{37}

**Path Four**

**Strengthen Partnerships**

NATO has more partners than members. Partners provide significant political support to the Alliance and can also contribute substantial military forces as well. NATO’s partners are a significant asset that can enhance the capabilities of the Alliance at low cost. A series of initiatives over the past several decades have created the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Dialogue, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and the Berlin Partnership Policy. Individual partnership councils and commissions were set up with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. NATO has also set up various degrees of cooperation
with the United Nations, European Union, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. Many partners have fought – and taken casualties – alongside NATO nations, contributing to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and other operations.

NATO’s goal is to derive mutual benefit to the Alliance as well as each partner. The Wales Summit took steps to recognize the most advantageous mutual partnerships, for instance by creating a platform to improve military interoperability that now includes 25 partners, and by designating five countries (Sweden, Finland, Australia, Georgia, and Jordan) as Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Individually Tailored Roadmaps with Finland, Jordan and Georgia promise to bring even more enhanced interoperability between these countries and NATO. Overall, however, the Alliance’s older array of partnership initiatives has languished and needs greater coherence. Broad strategic direction and harmonization is called for in order to revitalize NATO’s crucial partnership portfolio. The multitude of partner groups should be reexamined and resourced. A fresh approach is needed to mutually supporting plans and programs. More than 20 years after partnerships proved their value, the Alliance can and must do better.

**Create a True NATO-EU Strategic Partnership.** The NATO partnership with the greatest institutional potential is with the European Union. Given the broad nature of the security challenges we face, and that military means alone will often be insufficient or irrelevant to address them, there is a compelling need for improved cooperation between NATO and the EU. Synchronizing the EU’s extensive civilian and small-operations military expertise with NATO’s high end military capacity and transatlantic reach would dramatically improve the tools at the disposal of the transatlantic community.

Without parallel changes in course, NATO and the EU will continue to evolve separately, generating considerable waste in scarce resources, political disharmony, growing areas of overlap, and increased potential for confusion and rivalry.

A new transatlantic security architecture is called for that strengthens both institutions, allowing them to be effective partners. Little progress is likely, however, unless nations can resolve the Cyprus dispute. Differences among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus have blocked the strategic common good for too long; it impedes a more viable NATO-EU relationship. Overcoming this roadblock to a truly strategic partnership should be the highest priority.

As such efforts proceed, the resilience challenge may offer a way to forge more effective NATO-EU cooperation within existing political constraints. Various initiatives are worth considering:

- At the June 2016 European Council and the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, EU and NATO leaders should each affirm their commitment to enhance the overall resilience of their members, including through EU-NATO cooperation. The NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission
should issue a joint statement that underscores this joint initiative and sets forth practical means to advance it.

- The EU and its member states, and NATO and its allies, should facilitate joint or complementary efforts to project “forward resilience” to EU Eastern Partnership or NATO Partnership countries in areas such as security sector reform, police and gendarmerie training, public health-biosecurity measures, civilian control of the military, or economic reconstruction.

- The EU and its member states, and NATO and its allies, should consider deploying coordinated Resilience Support Teams, at the invitation of EU Eastern Partnership or NATO Partnership countries, to support building resilient capacity in areas ranging from critical infrastructure protection and strategic communications to disaster prevention, management and relief, and civil-military cooperation.

- The EU and its member states, and NATO and its allies, should develop coordinated strategic communication mechanisms to counter disinformation, expose and condemn hybrid actions.

- The NATO International Staff and the EU External Action Service staff should develop an inter-service mechanism to engage together on a regular basis on exchange of good practice, lessons learned exercises, means to identify and address critical vulnerabilities, situational and threat assessments, and early warning and early action procedures.

- The EU Intelligence Fusion Cell and the NATO Intelligence Center, allies and member states should try to commit to making intelligence releasable to EU and NATO simultaneously wherever possible, and making sure that each is aware information has been shared by marking it appropriately.

- Hold a joint crisis management exercise in 2017. The EU and NATO have been conducting such exercises over the past few years; in 2017 it would be useful to focus on hybrid or disruptive threats.

- The EU should engage with NATO centers of excellence in order to benefit from insights generated in such fields as cyber defense, strategic communications, civil-military cooperation and crisis response in relation to hybrid threats.

**Keep the Door Open to a Europe Whole, Free and at Peace.** Unfortunately, the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace has become more slogan than project. Yet NATO's Open Door remains as valid and relevant today as it was in the past. The West must be clear that the door to the European and Euro-Atlantic space where democracy and market economies prevail, and where war does not happen, stands open to those prepared to create the conditions by which they, too, could walk through that door.

NATO remains the main guarantor of European security, not only for its own members, but with regard to the security of European countries beyond NATO. EU transformation policy can only be successful if it is linked with security guarantees, and only NATO can provide such guarantees. Countries beyond the EU and NATO also derive considerable latent security from a vibrant NATO at the heart of Europe. While the situation today is much different than at the end of the Cold War, or when new members joined NATO in the decades since, Allies should be careful not to close their doors to the people of wider Europe. They should work to deepen security cooperation, and to create conditions under
which the question of integration, while controversial and difficult today, can be posed positively in the future.

There is unfinished business in the Balkans. NATO's 2015 invitation to Montenegro to join the Alliance is an important affirmation that NATO's door remains open. Efforts should be made to address the domestic and foreign political conflicts that keep Macedonia from joining the Alliance.

Looking further east, the situation is more difficult. Russian opposition is stronger, aspirants are weaker, and allies are distracted and divided, in particular over membership prospects for Ukraine and Georgia, even though all NATO allies have affirmed that the two countries will someday become allies. A crucial challenge both countries must surmount is the high levels of corruption that hamstrings them politically and economically.

With Ukraine in the midst of a turbulent transition and under siege, it would be a mistake to force the issue of membership now. More practical steps could be taken to strengthen cooperation under the NATO-Ukraine Commission in areas where there is mutual interest, while encouraging progress toward more genuine democratic institutions. Such activities include engaging on military reform and further developing crisis consultative mechanisms and ties in such areas as civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, transparent military budgeting, armaments cooperation, joint exercises and defense planning. The NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership gives Ukraine a unique status with the Alliance.

NATO should make the Partnership for Peace program as substantive as possible for reforming post-Soviet states. The program should favor mutually designed and mutually beneficial individual partnership plans under a broader connective, yet meaningful and demanding PIP chapeau. NATO’s cooperation with Georgia should be further strengthened through the NATO-Georgia Commission, Georgia's Annual National Program, and its Individually Tailored Roadmap. Georgia is heading in this direction and NATO should ensure the relationship’s roots are enduring.

Create additional special mechanisms for Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Finland are important value-added partners for NATO. New initiatives should further thicken these partnerships to include maximum political consultation at all levels, as well as practical cooperation on security, including on military matters, and where possible, in the defense industrial sector.

• NATO should designate both countries as Premier Interoperable Partners (PIP) to bring each into the Readiness Action Plan, include them in the VJTF, and provide for structures and regular consultations at the political military and intelligence levels with the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the International Staff and the International Military Staff. These would not be plus-one models, but a practical and regular part of doing business at NATO headquarters, SHAPE and ACT. Sweden should develop an Individually Tailored Roadmap, as Finland is now doing.
• Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) should continue to invest in and deepen the Nordic Baltic defense cooperation initiated in 2015, including the development of a Nordic-Baltic military force that should include land, maritime, air, SOF and cyber domain forces. Sweden, Finland and NATO members Norway, Iceland and Denmark should extend all aspects of their defense cooperation, including regional intelligence, logistics, and command to the Baltic states compatible with NATO’s Command Structure. This would cement the prominent role of Sweden and Finland as premier partners of NATO, strengthen the NATO aspect of Nordic-Baltic security, and facilitate security cooperation with the United States. The focus would be on defense planning, professional military education cooperation and training facilities, exercises, and defense capacity building as these competencies relate to strengthening security throughout the Baltic Sea region.

Organize the Alliance to better build the defense capabilities of key and potentially vulnerable Partners. NATO’s current mechanisms to strengthen the defense capacity of key partners in the east and south is fairly ad hoc. NATO might create lead nations to take primary responsibility for strengthening the defense sectors of key partners in both the East and South. Those lead nations could create a consortium of other interested NATO allies to coordinate the flow of support.

• NATO’s should enhance its capability to work with southern partners, especially Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the Gulf states. In the south, regional states are heavily engaged in combating violent activities, and specific NATO nations are likewise engaged. However, NATO as an institution can potentially play critical roles, especially in conjunction with pivotal states, including substantial multi-national counter-terror training, development of doctrine, interoperable capabilities, and significant understanding of the countries of potential deployment. Partners will generally have a significant understanding of their own neighborhood and can thereby be quite useful in developing effective strategies.

This will require NATO to recognize that, for many problems, its most effective efforts will be in support of others or as only one of many providing security. A good example of the “one of many” approach is the counter-piracy effort off the east coast of Africa, where the NATO task force is one of three such forces, in addition to individual country activities. Similarly, while the United States is already very active in the Gulf and the United Kingdom, France, and other NATO member countries are periodically engaged, NATO should consider working with regional partners in the Gulf to provide support to the free flow of commerce and also as a deterrent to Iranian activities.38

Strengthen Other Regional and Global Partnerships. NATO should seek more meaningful ties with other regional institutions like the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as the OSCE and the UN. It should also consider the following initiatives.

• **NATO should explore the potential value in discussions with the Organization for Islamic Cooperation**, which came under a promising new Charter in 2008. NATO members Albania and Turkey are also OIC members. The OIC Permanent Mission to the EU in Brussels opened in June 2013 to promote cooperation on matters of common
interests. These topics include countering terrorism, humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, post conflict recovery and peacekeeping. The OIC is also interested in cross cultural dialogue that may assist NATO missions in Islamic countries.

- **NATO should strengthen its cooperation with the U.S.-led anti-Daesh coalition** and with Iraq in particular. The resources of select member states and those of ACT – including its oversight of relevant Centers of Excellence – should be brought to bear in Iraq’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Program. The Alliance should study how its intelligence assets and maritime operations can best support the anti-ISIS campaign as a means of reducing the terrorism threat to members, especially in Europe.

- **Japan and the Republic of Korea should be invited to become NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners** based on their strong commitments to the Alliance. They would join others, including Australia, thus tying America’s three most important Asian allies closer to the Alliance.
About the Authors

**Dr. Hans Binnendijk** is a Senior Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. Until July 4, 2012, he was the Vice President for Research and Applied Learning at the National Defense University and Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy. He previously served twice on the National Security Council staff. He has also served as Principal Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and as Legislative Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He has received three Distinguished Public Service Awards and a Superior Service Award. In academia, Dr. Binnendijk was Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and Deputy Director and Director of Studies at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is author or co-author of more than 100 articles, editorials and reports. His most recent book is *Friends, Foes, and Future Directions*, published by RAND (2016). Dr. Binnendijk serves as Vice Chairman of the Board of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and was Chairman of the Board of Humanity in Action.

**Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton** is the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Professor and Founding Director of the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. From 2002-2010 he served as the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor at SAIS. From 2001-2015 he also served as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies. He has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for NATO, OSCE and transatlantic security affairs; U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization; Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two U.S. Secretaries of State; and Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs. In 2008 he served as the first Robert Bosch Foundation Senior Diplomatic Fellow in the German Foreign Office. He is a prolific author on international affairs, testifies frequently before the Congress and European parliaments, has been a board member and consultant to various companies, research institutes and foundations, and has taught at the Hertie School of Governance, the University of Innsbruck and the Free University of Berlin. Recent publications include *The Eastern Question: Russia, the West and Europe’s Grey Zone* (2016, with Stefan Meister); *Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers* (2016, edited with Jacques Pelkmans); *Advancing U.S.-Nordic-Baltic Security Cooperation* (2014, edited with Andras Simonyi and Debra L. Cagan). He has been presented with Germany’s Federal Order of Merit (*Bundesverdienstkreuz*); France’s *Palmes Académiques*; Sweden’s Knighthood of the Royal Order of the Polar Star, and holds the State Department’s Superior Honor Award.

**Charles L. (Chuck) Barry** has been a student of NATO for more than 20 years, and presently writes on transatlantic affairs as an independent national security consultant. He is also an Aspen Institute Wye Fellow and Visiting Fellow at the National Defense University. Dr. Barry previously served in the U.S. Army, including combat service in infantry and aviation, a decade as a joint strategic planner in Europe and Washington, and operational deployments in Asia, Europe, Central America, and Africa. He assisted senior U.S. and NATO leaders in drafting the first post-Cold War strategy for USEUCOM as well as NATO’s 1990 Strategic Concept. He is a life member of the Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society in Public Administration, the Association of the United States Army, the Army Aviation Association of America, and the Military Officers Association. He was a Woodrow Wilson Foundation Fellow from 2004 to 2008.
Photo Credits

Cover Photos:

Top Left: Courtesy of the Executive Office of the President of the United States
Top Right: Courtesy of NLD 1 German/Netherlands Corps, by Erik Morren
Bottom Left: Courtesy of Regimental Combat Team 7, 1st Marine Division Public Affairs, by Mark Fayloga
Bottom Right: Courtesy of U.S Navy, by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Jesse L. Gonzales

Endnotes

1 These acts violated assurances given by Russia against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; as well basic commitments to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states made by Russia under the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 2010 Astana Declaration, the 1997 Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 NATO-Russia Rome Declaration.


A combat brigade of 3,000 troops is basically comprised of multiple battalions, three of which are fighting battalions of either infantry or armor. A battalion is comprised of companies, three of which are its fighting infantry or armor companies.

15 Bernstein, op. cit.
17 A combat brigade of 3,000 troops is basically comprised of multiple battalions, three of which are fighting battalions of either infantry or armor. A battalion is comprised of companies, three of which are its fighting infantry or armor companies.
18 http://cimsec.org/protraction-a-21st-century-flavor-of-deterrence/19066
19 James L. Jones, Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, October 8, 2015.
24 Mercier, op. cit.; Kramer, Binnendijk and Hamilton, op. cit.
25 Scheffer, op. cit.
27 Kramer, Binnendijk and Hamilton, op. cit.
28 SACT, op. cit.
31 Mercier, op. cit.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 See 2012 Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Routledge. London. 2013. Chapter 2 (United States) and Chapter 3 (Europe). Comparison between U.S. and European Union member data. Compiled from 2012 data on defense spending and population by country to determine per capita defense spending in USD. EU members aggregate to an average $373/per person per year. U.S. per capita defense spending in 2012 was $2057/person/year, more than 5 times Europe’s average. With an EU 2012 defense spending average of 1.28% resulting from $373/per capita, an increase of only $239/per capita, or $0.65/person/day would boost the EU to an average of 2% GDP in annual defense spending.
35 Mercier, op. cit.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Kramer, Binnendijk and Hamilton, op. cit.